Přehled o publikaci
2018
Assessing Internet-wide Cyber Situational Awareness of Critical Sectors
HUSÁK, Martin; Nataliia NESHENKO; Morteza SAFAEI POUR; Elias BOU-HARB; Pavel ČELEDA et al.Basic information
Original name
Assessing Internet-wide Cyber Situational Awareness of Critical Sectors
Authors
HUSÁK, Martin; Nataliia NESHENKO; Morteza SAFAEI POUR; Elias BOU-HARB and Pavel ČELEDA
Edition
Hamburg, Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, p. "29:1"-"29:6", 6 pp. 2018
Publisher
ACM
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Proceedings paper
Confidentiality degree
is not subject to a state or trade secret
Publication form
electronic version available online
References:
Marked to be transferred to RIV
Yes
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14610/18:00102646
Organization
Ústav výpočetní techniky – Repository – Repository
ISBN
978-1-4503-6448-5
UT WoS
EID Scopus
Keywords in English
network security; network scanning; DDoS; critical infrastructure
Links
EF16_019/0000822, research and development project.
Changed: 5/9/2020 16:09, RNDr. Daniel Jakubík
Abstract
In the original language
In this short paper, we take a first step towards empirically assessing Internet-wide malicious activities generated from and targeted towards Internet-scale business sectors (i.e., financial, health, education, etc.) and critical infrastructure (i.e., utilities, manufacturing, government, etc.). Facilitated by an innovative and a collaborative large-scale effort, we have conducted discussions with numerous Internet entities to obtain rare and private information related to allocated IP blocks pertaining to the aforementioned sectors and critical infrastructure. To this end, we employ such information to attribute Internet-scale maliciousness to such sectors and realms, in an attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of the global cyber situational posture. We draw upon close to 16.8 TB of darknet data to infer probing activities (typically generated by malicious/infected hosts) and DDoS backscatter, from which we distill IP addresses of victims. By executing week-long measurements, we observed an alarming number of more than 11,000 probing machines and 300 DDoS attack victims hosted by critical sectors. We also generate rare insights related to the maliciousness of various business sectors, including financial, which typically do not report their hosted and targeted illicit activities for reputation-preservation purposes. While we treat the obtained results with strict confidence due to obvious sensitivity reasons, we postulate that such generated cyber threat intelligence could be shared with sector/critical infrastructure operators, backbone networks and Internet service providers to contribute to the overall threat remediation objective.