n-hne Journa
Modelling the New Europe
Interdisciplinary studies
Issue No. 43 | December 2023
ISSN 2247-0514
ONLINE JOURNAL MODELLING THE NEW EUROPE
NO. 43/2023
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:
Prof. Nicolae Päun, PhD
EXECUTIVE EDITORS:
Assoc. Prof. Adrian Corpädean, PhD
Prof. Sergiu Miscoiu
Assoc. Prof. Laura Herta, PhD
EDITORIAL TEAM
EDITORS:
Assoc. Prof. Paula Muresan, PhD
Assoc. Prof. Delia Flanja, PhD
Assist. Prof. Elena Rusu, PhD
Teaching Assist. Roxana Nistor, PhD
Teaching Assist. Andreea Stretea, PhD
Researcher Andreea Bianca Urs, PhD
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
Prof. Dr. Gerard Bossuat (European Union Liaison Committee of
Historians / Universitě de Cergy-Pontoise, France)
Prof. Dr.dr.h.c. Wichard Woyke (Westfälische WilhelmsUniversität
Munster, Germany)
Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth (European Union Liaison Committee of
Historians / Duisburg-Essen University, Germany)
Prof. Dr. phil. habil Michael Gehler (Universität Hildesheim,
Germany)
Prof. Dr. Dr.hc. Reinhard Meyers (Westfälische WilhelmsUniversität,
Munster, Germany)
Prof. Dr. Sylvain Schirmann (Director of the Institut ďétudes
Politiques de Strasbourg, France)
Prof. Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki, (University of Warsaw, Poland)
Prof. Dr. Vasile Puscas (Babe§-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca,
Romania)
Prof. Dr. Ovidiu Pecican, (Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca,
Romania)
Prof. Dr. Pery Assis Shikida (Western Parana University, Brazil)
Prof. Dr. Lucir Alves (Western Parana University, Brazil)
Prof. Dr. Sergiu Musteata (Ion Creangä University, Chisinau,
Moldova)
Prof. Dr. Mroslaw Banasik (JanKochanowski University inKielce)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ladislav Mura (University of Economics in
Bratislava, Slovakia)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tomáš Peráček (Comenius University in
Bratislava, Slovakia)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elena Calandri (University of Padua, Italy)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Laszlo Erdey (Debrecen University, Hungary)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pawel Hut (University of Warsaw, Poland)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mircea Maniu (Babes-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nicoleta Racolta-Paina (Babe§-Bolyai University,
Cluj-Napoca, Romania)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Georgiana Ciceo (Babe§-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alina Branda (Babes-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Florin Duma (Babes-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Adrian Basaraba (West University, Timi§oara,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Irina Roibu (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies,
Seoul, South Korea)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Nicolae Toderas (SNSPA, Bucharest, Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Anna Skolimowska (Stefan Wyszyňski University,
Warsaw, Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Bartosz Rydliňski (Stefan Wyszyňski University,
Warsaw, Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Boris Mucha (Slovak Technical University in
Bratislava, Sovakia)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Alice Cunha (Nova University, Lisbon, Portugal)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Kamil Zajaczkowski (University of Warsaw,
Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Dorota Jurkiewicz-Eckert (University of Warsaw,
Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Kamil Lawniczak (University of Warsaw, Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Wojciech Lewandowski (University of Warsaw,
Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Miroslav Fečko (Pavol Jozef Šafárik University
in Košice, Slovakia)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Paula Wiániewska (University of Wroclaw Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ciprian Alupului (Al. I. Cuza University, Iasi,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Mhaela Oprescu (Babe§-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Monica Burca-Voicu (Babe§-Bolyai University,
Cluj-Napoca, Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ovidiu Vaida (Babe§-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Radu Albu (Babe§-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Romana Cramarenco (Babe§-Bolyai University,
Cluj-Napoca, Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Beáta Górka-Winter (University of Warsaw,
Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Lucian Butaru (Babe§-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Gabriel Gherasim (Babe§-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Adrian Ludusan (Babe§-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca,
Romania)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Vadym Zheltovskyy (University of Warsaw,
Poland)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Filip Tereszkiewicz (University of Opole, Poland)
Researcher Dr. Zoltán Grunhut (Centre for Economic and Regional
Studies, Hungary)
Dr. Agnieszka Rogoziňska (Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce,
Poland)
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Table of Contents
Agnieszka ROGOZINSKA
THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE B L A C K SEA REGION CREATED B Y THE RUSSIANUKRAINIAN
WAR (2022) 04
Gianina JOLDESCU-STAN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN CULTURAL HERITAGE
PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 18
Iryna GERLACH, Yurii VLASENKO, Maryna GUDZ, Andrii SOKOLOV, Olena BILENKO
THE E U LABOUR MARKET: TRENDS AND PATTERNS FOR CANDIDATE
COUNTRIES 32
Olha IVASECHKO, Oleh TSEBENKO, Yaryna TURCHYN, Khrystyna IVANYSHYN
EU PROJECTS IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
OF IMPLEMENTATION 67
Václav SMEJKAL
ACCESS TO IN-VEHICLE DATA IN THE MAELSTROM OF PROTECTED RIGHTS AND
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AS A N URGENT CHALLENGE FOR EU L A W 102
Venera LLUNJI, Albert PACARIZI
ANTITHESIS AS POWERFUL LINGUISTIC TOOL OF PERSUASION IN POLITICAL SPEECHES
IN KOSOVO 123
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DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2023.43.01
THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE BLACK SEA REGION
CREATED BY THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (2022)
Agnieszka ROGOZINSKA, PhD
Academy of Piotrkow, Poland
arogozinska@op.pl
Abstract: The Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, has demonstrated
Moscow's approach to the Black Sea region. Contrary to the provisions of the law on the law, the Russian Federation
blocked thefreedom of navigation in the inland Sea ofAzov and the principle of enforcing the right to act harmlessly
in Ukrainian territorial waters off the coast of Crimea. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea
region has become a place of intensive trade and transit and the transfer of energy resourcesfrom the Caspian Sea
area and Central Asia to Europe. The events in Georgia in 2008 and the recent developments in Ukraine show that
the Russian Federation is trying to rebuild its former influence and take control of the region. This article aims to
diagnóze the security of the Black Sea Region in the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war (2022). The article
discusses the historical security context of the Black Sea Region, the main threats to the security of the region in the
context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war (2022) and, forecastsfor theformation of the security of the Black Sea
Region after the end of hostilities. Scientific research conducted that the Battle of the Black Sea may become the cause
of a clash in the Russian-Ukrainian war, which will affect not only Ukrainebut also members of the people around the
world, as well as Russia's blockade of the Black Sea communication routes. The research methods used are literature
analysis and criticism, historical methods, comparison, and generalization. Scientific studies have shown that the
Battle of the Black Sea could become a key clash in the Russo-Ukrainian war that will affect not only Ukraine but
also members of the nation around the world and lead to the Russian blockade of the Black Sea.
Keywords: Black Sea, security, region, threats, Russian-Ukrainian war (2022)
1. Introduction
The Black Sea is the border south-eastern between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia,
and is also the only large sea between the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The Black
Sea is an important region for the projection of military power in the Russian direction, as the
Carpathian Mountains chain in Romania and the Caucasus Mountains limit the conduct of land
operations from the south (Zarychta, 2016, p. 54). The Black Sea represents the only alternative
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route by which the Russian Federation can be threatened from this direction. This region is also
an important transit route for European countries in international trade, as an important
connection for Europe of routes leading from east to west and from south to north (Rogozihska,
2023). According to analysts, control or domination of the Black Sea facilitates the takeover of
the entire European continent, especially the Balkans and Central Europe, but also the eastern
Mediterranean region, the southern Caucasus, and the northern part of the Middle East
(Stepniewski, 2013, p. 166). Over the centuries, the interests of the superpowers have intersected
in the area, the main states interested in dominating the region being Russia and Turkey
(Andrusiewicz, 2004, pp. s. 173-174). Today, the security challenges in the Black Sea region
are interlinked and inextricably interwoven into the wider Euro-Atlantic security context.
Three NATO member states are located in the Black Sea area (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey)
and several NATO partner states, so any manifestation of instability or hostility in the region
directly affects the Alliance.
Today, security threats in the Black Sea region are an accumulation of interconnectedness
and are an elementary part of Euro-Atlantic security. In the Black Sea region lie the member
states, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as well as several NATO partner states, which means
that any threats in the region directly affect the security of the Alliance. In recent years, the
Russian Federation has consistently strengthened its military presence and initiated and
supported disinformation activities. The most serious threats to European security that
undermine the existing international order became apparent in the Black Sea region during the
Russian Federation's conflict with Georgia in 2008 (Kowalczyk, 2017, pp. s. 170-173), the
annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Zaniewicz, 2020), Russian destabilization activities in eastern
Ukraine (Gladii, 2017, p. 64) and the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Bryjka, 2023). In
addition to the use of conventional weapons, the Russian Federation also uses asymmetric means
of conducting operations in the region, materializing in hybrid warfare (Banasik, 2018, p. 94).
The main research problem of the article was formulated in the form of the question:
What threats does the war in Ukraine (2022) create for the security of the Black Sea region and
what are the predictions for the formation of future security in the region?
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The main research problem is divided into the following specific problems: 1. What is the
historical context of the security of the Black Sea region?; 2. In what is the security of the Black
Sea region expressed in the context of the aggression of the war of the Russian Federation
with Ukraine (2022)?,;3. What predictions can be drawn for the security of the Black Sea region?
The article aims to identify and diagnose the threats created by the Russian-Ukrainian
war (2022) to the security of the Black Sea region and forecast future security in the region. The
research area is situated in the discipline of security sciences. The research methods used are
literature analysis and criticism, historical methods, comparison, and generalization.
2. The historical context of security in the Black Sea region
For geographical reasons, the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) was decisive in the Black
Sea region. The Empire controlled two major straits, the Dardanelles, connecting the Aegean
Sea to the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, connecting the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea.
The role of these straits, dubbed the Turkish Straits, is fundamental tothe reason that they
constitute the only entrance to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean. Confirmation of Ottoman
dominance in the Black Sea region came with the conquest of-Crimea in 1475. Foreign ships
were then excluded from sailing the Black Sea, creating Ottoman domination of the area for
three centuries. This domination lasted until 17747 when the Ottomans decided to support Poland
in the war against Russia (Morawski, Szawlowska, 2006, pp. 90-91). Empress Catherine the
Great then placed the Crimea under a Russian protectorate, guaranteeing its merchant shipping
free passage through the straits (Serczyk, 1974, p. 220). Over the following years, the issue of
the Black Sea straits remained the subject of international rivalry. Some agreement was not
reached until 1923 in Lausanne (Batowski, 2001, p. 75). The treaty adopted at that time stipulated
that all ships, even warships, had the right of free passage through the straits but only in
peacetime. The International Straits Commission was to supervise the provisions of the treaty by
overseeing the implementation of the various provisions of the treaty, including their
demilitarisation. Changes in this regard came in the 1930s when Turkey claimed that the
demilitarisation clause of the Lausanne Treaty was contrary to Turkey's right to self-defence.
The change of the previous provisions was forced by developments in international politics: the
remilitarisation of Germany accelerated the erosion of the post-war collective security system
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established by the League of Nations. Turkey therefore returned to the subject of the straits at
another conference, this time in Montreux, Switzerland.
Russia was also a power vitally interested in regulating access to the Black Sea straits.
Its demands included that the Black Sea be closed to all but the littoral states. These conditions
were a consequence of the fact that Ukraine and Georgia were then part of the USSR, while
Romania and Bulgaria were Russian allies. However, Russian ideas for the shaping of order in
the Black Sea region did not meet with the approval of the Western powers. Britain and other
European states took steps to limit the ability of Russian warships to explore the waters of the
Black Sea unfettered in the event of a naval war and to seek refuge there. Western states also
sought to limit Turkey's ability to block the Black Sea straits. Faced with the impossibility of
reaching a compromise, a compromise solution was eventually adopted by the states concerned
with the Black Sea Straits issue. The provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention allowed
Turkey to remilitarise the zone of the straits, granting it some control over them (Batowski, 2001,
p. 276). At the same time, the agreement regulating the passage of ships increased Soviet
influence in the Black Sea.
In the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, the Montreux Convention provides the legal basis
for regulating traffic in the Black Sea. Already at the beginning of hostilities, Ukraine asked
Turkey to close the strait to Russian warships, pointing to Turkey's crucial importance in
maintaining peace in the Black Sea region. The Turkish government agreed to the proposal on
28 February 2022 (Respect, 2022). However, this didn't stop Russia from placing several
warships in the Black Sea waters. In response, Turkey stated that it would not prevent Russian
warships from entering the Black Sea if Russia claimed that they were returning to their home
ports (Respect, 2022).
The key provisions of the Montreux Convention governing the entry of ships into the
Black Sea during wartime read: 1) Turkey may close the strait to warships of belligerent parties
in time of war or when Turkey itself is a party to the war or is threatened with aggression by
another state, 2) Turkey may close the strait to merchant ships belonging to states at war with
Turkey, 3) Any state with a coastline in the Black Sea - Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia or
Ukraine - must give Turkey eight days' notice of its intention to send warships through the strait.
Other countries, those that don't border the Black Sea, must give Turkey 15 days' notice. Only
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Black Sea states may send submarines through the strait, but only after prior notification and
only if the submarines were built or purchased outside the Black Sea, 4. Only nine warships may
pass through the strait at any one time, and there are restrictions on the size of the ships, either
individually or in groups. No group of ships can exceed 15,000 metric tonnes. Modern warships
are heavy, with frigates around 3,000 metric tonnes and destroyers and cruisers around 10,000
metric tonnes. Modern aircraft carriers are too large to pass through, and under Turkish
regulations are not allowed anyway (Tulun, 2020).
Dominion of the Black Sea entails many advantages. Ships of coastal countries sailing
on it have much greater rights than vessels from outside the Black Sea. Ships of coastal countries
sailing there have much more rights than non-Black Sea vessels. Foreign warships, for example,
cannot stay in the basin for more than 21 days, Black Sea navies are exempt from such
restrictions (Lomanowski, 2023). In addition, non-Black Sea navies have a permissible total
tonnage of 45,000 tonnes with no non-Black Sea power having more than two-thirds of this
figure. Ships of countries involved in hostilities are not allowed to enter the Black Sea, making
it impossible, for example, to replace, the sunken cruiser „Moscow". Turkey's situation in the
ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war is difficult. Both sides in the conflict are important partners in
key energy and military trade agreements (Olech, Potera, 2022). Turkey is a member of NATO
and seeks to strengthen its ties with the West, at the same time the Russian Federation is one of
its key partners. Turkish control of key straits may prove decisive for its future relations with
both partners.
3. The security of the Black Sea region in the context of the aggression of Russia's war
against Ukraine (2022)
The Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 had serious
implications for the security of the Black Sea region. Russian actions in the region reduced the
role of the Black Sea to a „Russian lake" (Korbut, 2023). To this end, contrary to the provisions
of international law, Russia blocked the freedom of navigation of ships in the inland Sea of Azov
and the exercise of the right of passage in Ukrainian territorial waters off the coast of Crimea.
Since the beginning of hostilities, the Kremlin has used terrorist acts against the Black Sea fleet,
launching drifting „anchor" mines into the sea lanes, shelling merchant ships, occupying foreign
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territories and, blocking commercial ports (Pedrozo, 2023, pp. 15-58). Examples of this type of
action included the shelling of the Turkish bulk carrier "Yasa Jupiter" near Odessa (Grotnik,
2022), the Panamanian ship "Namura Queen" in Odessa (Payne, 2022), and the Romanian
chemical tanker "Millennial Spirit", the annexation of Crimea, the seizure of Mariupol and Snake
Island (Ukraihska, 2022).
In the case of the latter, the seizure already took place on the first day of the war, 24
February 2022. This rocky islet, which has no strategic importance, has become a symbol of
Ukrainian resistance to the Russians, as exemplified by the sinking of the flagship of the Black
Sea Fleet, the missile cruiser Moskva (Flota, 2022).
The Russian blockade of Black Sea ports is not only exacerbating the collapse of the
Ukrainian economy but also contributing to increased access to food to in the world's most
backward countries. It was via the Black Sea sea routes that Ukraine shipped more than half of
its foreign trade. Ukraine is the world's first exporter of sunflower oil, the world's fourth supplier
of maize, and the fifth exporter of wheat (Matuszak, 2022).
In the first year of the war, more than 24 million tonnes of grain (14 million tonnes of
maize, 7 million tonnes of wheat, and 3 million tonnes of sunflower seeds) were in Ukrainian
warehouses, putting Ukraine at risk of losing around 6 billion dollars in a year, with no storage
space for new crops and wasted old ones (Matuszak, 2022).
The blockade of Black Sea ports was an instrument of non-military influence, by
blackmailing with hunger the Russian Federation was not only seeking financial gain but
additionally wanted to force Western countries to lift some of the economic sanctions imposed
on the Russian Federation. A break of the maritime blockade was successfully negotiated with
the involvement of the United Nations Organization and Turkey on 22 July 2022 (Jest
porozumienie, 2022). The agreement was extended three times (Szymczak, 2023). The grain
agreement has ensured the safe passage of ships carrying grain from Ukrainian ports. To date,
the agreement has allowed almost 33 million tonnes of food to be exported through Ukrainian
ports. The negotiated agreement covered only three Ukrainian ports: Yuzhno, Odessa, and
Chernomorsk, their export capacity is estimated at over 7 million tonnes per month. Goods went
to 43 countries, the support was planned to include mainly nations facing a hunger crisis: Egypt,
Indonesia, and Bangladesh.
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The agreement expired on 17 July 2023, and Russia did not agree to extend it. At the
same time, the Kremlin authorities in public statements, such as that of Dimitry Peskov, suggest
that it is possible to return to talks on the extension of the agreement, the condition being the
fulfillment of the provisions of the agreement obliging the UN to facilitate free access of Russian
fertilizers and other products to world markets (Rudnik, Matuszak, Michalskí, 2023).
For virtually the entire duration of the grain agreement, Russia has complained about obstacles
to fertilizer and grain exports. Although European Union and United States sanctions do not
affect crops or fertilizers, restrictions in the financial, insurance, and ship leasing sectors hit
Russian exports hard. The Kremlin decided to sign the agreement in return for, among other
things, allowing the Kremlin to export ammonia, an important component of nitrogen fertilizers.
The Russian Federation had demanded the resumption of ammonia shipments using a pipeline
running through Ukraine to the port of Odessa (Ukraine 2023). Currently, Russia "no longer
needs Ukrainian ports for ammonia exports" (Koniec, 2023), its export can take place via an
alternative route. To this end, a special terminal is being built in Russia for the transport of
ammonia, which could replace the pipeline running to Odessa. The terminal is being built on the
Taman Peninsula, on the Black Sea (Ukraine, 2023).
Anticipating the possibility of the Kremlin withdrawing from the grain agreement,
Ukraine has secured a special insurance fund of around 547 million dollars for companies whose
ships will come through the Black Sea to Ukraine after Russia withdraws from the agreement
(Rudnik, Matuszak, Michalskí, 2023). In such a situation, the alternatives for Russian food
exports will remain smaller river ports on the Danube or the land route, via European Union
countries, including Poland.
It should be noted that food products are not the only goods exported by Ukraine by sea.
For example, two companies (Inagas and Cryoin) located in the south of Ukraine secure 45-54%
of the world's needs for neon needed for lasers cutting so-called silicon „wafers" for
microprocessors (Ukraine, 2022). Ukraine is also a leading supplier of wire harnesses for the
automotive industry (through the Leoni plant built there by the Germans). Supply restrictions in
this sector have affected companies such as Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes, reducing vehicle
production by up to 700,000 in the first and second quarters of2022 alone (Amann, Carey, 2022).
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Safeguarding the waters of the Black Sea and the Black Sea Fota is the continued rearmament
of Ukraine with long-range anti-ship systems.
The transfer of this type of equipment is already underway, with the U K providing
Ukraine with a batch of Brimstone-type short-range 'ground-to-ground' missiles, which are also
highly suitable against small surface targets (Allison, 2023). Admittedly, beyond the reach of
the Brimstones is the maritime exclusive economic zone, but securing it is possible with external
assistance. An example of this is Denmark, which has offered to give Ukraine coastal mobile
Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers with a field of fire of almost 300 km (Jeong, 2022). In this
way, the Ukrainian armed forces could have at their disposal 24 NSM missiles (12 on launchers
and 12 in reserve), which would be sufficient to stop any Russian, ship-based landing craft
(Dura, 2023). It should be noted that the situation of strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities,
obviously necessary, could lead to a repeat of the „Tanker War" that occurred during the IraqIran
war in the 1980s (Navias, 2023). Then it blocked the flow of oil to Europe, now it could
block the flow of grain to Africa.
Taking a long-term view, it should be taken into account that the blockade of Ukrainian
ports does not necessarily end with the war in Ukraine. The Russian Federation may use the
instrument of hunger blackmail in other parts of the world, aware of the lack of response from
Western countries. After all, similar actions have already taken place, if only about the airspace
over, for example, Syria (Conflict, 2023).
4. Security outlook for the Black Sea region
The battle for the Black Sea may be the most important clash in the Russo-Ukrainian war,
with not only Ukraine's economic future but also the food security of millions of people
worldwide at stake. In this context, it seems reasonable to consider scenarios for the development
of the future situation in the Black Sea region, depending on the hypothetical end of the RussianUkrainian
war.
The first scenario under discussion envisages a split in NATO and European Union
countries, leading to a weakening of sanctions against the Russian Federation and a reduction in
the supply of arms to Ukraine. In this scenario, the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention
remain unchanged and the Black Sea remains a „Russian lake" (Korbut, 2023). However, based
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on an assessment of the recent successes of Ukrainian forces and the symptoms of a possible
collapse of the Russian army, this scenario seems increasingly unlikely.
The second scenario envisages the defeat of the Russian Federation by Ukraine, the
balance of political power, however, does not allow for a change in the provisions of the
Montreux Convention. In the context of developments in Ukraine, this scenario can be
considered likely.
The third scenario envisages Russia losing the war, after the end of hostilities the United
States, European Union, NATO, and the Black Sea states undertake a redrafting of the Montreux
Convention to restore and ensure long-term stability and security in the region. As a result of the
changes, the Montreux Convention is updated, but Turkey's position remains unchanged and it
retains control of the straits unchanged. At the same time, the Turkish straits are no longer treated
as a separate legal regime under the Montreux Convention but are subject to the rules on
international straits set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is the
least likely scenario, primarily due to Turkey's resistance to any infringement of its sovereignty.
To generalize, it must be said that how to secure the sea lanes in the Black Sea to
Ukrainian ports is not just a Ukrainian problem. Of course, in the first instance, it is the
Ukrainians who will lose financially from the blockade of Odessa, but the lack of their exports
will be felt by dozens of other countries, and notjust the poorest ones. Russia's blockade of Black
Sea transport routes, which is illegal under maritime law, cuts off access to Ukrainian foodstuffs
for many countries, causing famine and directly related regional armed conflicts. By
blackmailing hunger, the Kremlin not only wants to benefit financially but also to force Western
countries to lift some of the sanctions already imposed on the Russian Federation. The Russians,
by the way, are not hiding about this at all, as evidenced by a statement made by Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko on 25 May 2022. In an interview with the Interfax agency, he
stated that 'Russia is ready to provide a humanitarian corridor for ships carrying food from
Ukraine in exchange for the lifting of certain sanctions' (Russia ready, 2022). If the Kremlin
succeeds in its ongoing war, Russia will feel so confident and impunity that it is likely to pursue
further annexations: starting with Transnistria - a Russian-backed enclave in Moldova
(Rogozihska, 2023) - and extending its influence across Ukraine, and possibly into Romania, all
the way to the Black Sea (Rogozihska, 2022).
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5. Conclusions
Due to the current unstable situation in the Black Sea region caused by hostilities between
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, transport and trade in this basin have been severely
hampered. For centuries, there has been an unresolved dispute over the dominion of the Black
Sea. It is of particular importance in the case of the war in Ukraine - Russia, in violation of
international law, is illegally deploying its ships and blocking food supplies.
For centuries, the Black Sea region has been the intersection of important communication
routes between Europe and the Middle East, between the Eastern Balkans and the Southern
Caucasus. Ensuring the security of these trade and communication routes is an essential
condition for the development of both the region and the countries using these routes. The right
of access to the sea in the Black Sea straits is governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936,
providing Russia and Turkey with a privileged position in the region. However, the Kremlin is
violating the Convention by illegally deploying its submarines in the Mediterranean and blocking
food and energy supplies. The battle for the Black Sea could be the most important clash in the
Russo-Ukrainian war, which could have dire consequences for hundreds of millions of people
around the world and trigger a wave of migration of people at risk of starvation. It will also
automatically be linked to riots and local armed conflicts, which are most often linked to food
crises. If this is a deliberate action by the Kremlin it means that the Russians are introducing a
new way of waging hybrid warfare that will bring millions of casualties and a global crisis
without the need for military instruments of influence.
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DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2023.43.02
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN
CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
Gianina JOLDESCU-STAN, Associate Teacher Ph.C.
Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University,
gianina. i oldescu@ubbclui.ro
Abstract: The analysis of an economic perspective on cultural heritage was carried out until the 1900s using
theories from cultural economics. However, practice at that time showed the need to create a new branch that
would look specifically at cultural heritage, beyond the cultural theories that existed in cultural economics at the
time. This led to the emergence of a new concept: Economics of Heritage. In this context, there were voices in the
literature (artists, archaeologists, cultural practitioners) who believed that a translation of cultural heritage in
economic terms was in fact an unnatural trivialisation and materialisation of heritage, which would have a
degrading effect on it. These effects would be represented by the commercialisation, devaluation, destruction,
and improper exploitation of cultural heritage to gain economic benefitsfrom it. On the other hand, recent studies
promote the economic utilization of cultural heritage and the utilization of artificial intelligence in virtual and
augmented reality technology, with the purpose of increasing measures of cultural heritage protection. This
article proposes an analysis of both theoretical approaches, while including the role technology plays in the shift
of the economic perspective on culture and cultural heritage and accentuates the role of a new framework for
cultural heritage protection, in line with concepts such as sustainability and sustainable development..
Keywords: cultural heritage, virtual reality, digitalization, economic development, sustainability of cultural
heritage.
1. Introduction
The analysis of an economic perspective on cultural heritage was carried out until the
1900s using theories pertaining to cultural economics. However, practice at that time showed the
need to create a new branch that would look specifically at cultural heritage, beyond the cultural
theories that existed in cultural economics at the time. This led to the emergence of a new
concept: Economics of Heritage. In this context, there were also voices in the literature (artists,
archaeologists, cultural practitioners) who believed that a translation of cultural heritage in
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economic terms was in fact an unnatural trivialisation and materialisation of heritage, which
would have a degrading effect on it. These effects would be represented by the
commercialisation, devaluation, destruction, and improper exploitation of cultural heritage to
gain economic benefits from it. Moreover, the same scholars argued that, while financial benefits
can be gained from cultural heritage, these are only short-lived and the long-term effects of using
cultural heritage for economic purposes are negative. On the other side, studies and statistics
conducted in the last 20 years by experts, scientists, NGOs, countries and reputable international
organizations like the European Commission, show that an economic evaluation and utilizations
of cultural heritage, not only does not negatively impact it, but it provides the proper framework
for cultural heritage protection and conservation in a time of uncertainty and decline. This article
proposes an analysis of both approaches, while including the role technology plays in the shift
of the economic perspective on culture and cultural heritage. The purpose of this paper is to
present the arguments in favour of the economic use of cultural heritage, as well as to present
ways in which this economic utilisation can be done without affecting the preservation of cultural
heritage sites and objects.
In the first part of the article, we analyse the economic value given to cultural heritage
(in ways of direct and indirect use, as well as non-use, and how innovative technologies such as
virtual reality and augmented reality can be used to protect and preserve cultural heritage, while
maintaining its economic use. The second part is dedicated to the concept of „paradox of
authenticity" in relation to the reinterpretation of cultural heritage with technology. Lastly, we
focus our attention on a new concept in the field's literature: the Eco-Sufficiency Perspective.
Methodologically, the paper addresses and analyses the economic perspectives and uses
of virtual reality and augmented reality to promote and protect cultural heritage, using the
classical bibliographical review together with document analysis and data analysis, in a CLR
mix. This mixed method of research allows for a coherent and deeper understanding of the theme,
overlapping multiple conceptual frameworks in a multidisciplinary approach on cultural heritage
studies (Onwuegbuzie and Frels, 2016, 1-28).
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2. The issue with economic evaluation of heritage
Cultural heritage can play a significant role in sustainable development, providing a basis
for social and economic development, creating job opportunities, and promoting cultural
diversity and social cohesion. Cultural tourism, for example, can generate income for local
communities while promoting the preservation of cultural heritage. In addition, traditional
knowledge and practices can be harnessed for sustainable resource management and
conservation. At the same time, sustainable development can contribute to the preservation of
cultural heritage. Development projects that take cultural heritage values into account help to
preserve historic buildings and landscapes, while ensuring a socially and environmentally
responsible development process. This process makes the relationship between cultural heritage
and sustainable development one of interdependence, with the aim of promoting social,
economic, and environmental sustainability.
For many years, experts believed that obtaining financial and economic benefits by using
cultural heritage was a mistake, a trivialisation that would result in the destruction of heritage on
the long run. Moreover, the same scholars argued that while financial benefits can be gained
from cultural heritage, they are only short-lived and the long-term effects of using cultural
heritage for economic purposes are negative. The arguments against the use/commercialisation
of cultural heritage were:
The possibility of degradation of cultural heritage. The more popular a heritage site is,
the more intensively it will be visited and therefore the more "worn out". The problem with the
use of cultural heritage is that it cannot be restored to its original form without losing its cultural
importance once it has been degraded.
Preservation of cultural heritage used for economic purposes is not financially
sustainable. The costs of preserving and protecting cultural heritage are far too high compared
to the benefits of its exploitation. These costs are not financially sustainable and cannot be
covered by the heritage owner without subsidies or external funding.
Artificially increasing demand for cultural heritage. Some heritage objects are popular
and will be exploited economically without understanding their cultural significance. This
artificial increase in demand for a cultural site leads to degradation on an image basis, not on a
cultural basis. This effect, also known as the "Venetian dilemma" (Peacock and Rizzo, 2012),
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causes degradation of cultural heritage without, in return, providing a higher level of
culturalization for visitors.
3. The value of heritage and use of the enhanced reality technologies
In his paper, "Heritage Economics: Coming to Terms with Value and Valuation",
(Throsby, n.d.) Throsby argues that the involvement of economists in the field of cultural heritage
is not intended to degrade culture, but rather to contribute to the overall understanding of the
societal values involved in the management of cultural heritage conservation and to provide new
directions and guidance in this area. This paper highlights three areas of research from an
economic perspective when it comes to cultural heritage: the theory and applications of
economic analysis on heritage issues, valuation methods and their relevance to the estimation of
cultural value and the economic impact of heritage policies. A relevant perspective on the
economic impact of cultural heritage on sustainable development is given for the first time in the
field of scientific research by El Sarafi, in 1999, in "The Environment as Capital", where he
compares the concept of natural capital with that of cultural capital (especially from a
sustainability perspective). Eighteen years later, the idea is taken up by Throsby, who describes
the concept of sustainable cultural development as having similar elements to environmental
sustainability. Cultural management is thus integrated into the overall framework of
sustainability and is used as a factor in the formation of environmental public policies.
From an economic perspective, the value of cultural heritage is determined by the benefits
of its direct use (extractive/consumptive), indirect use (non-extractive) and even non-use. When
we refer to the extractive or direct value of cultural heritage, we mean what we are willing to
physically pay to benefit from a particular space, place, asset, heritage item (whether we are
talking about buying it, renting it, or buying a ticket to visit it). The indirect value of heritage is
the mere existence of the heritage object, which increases the value of its surroundings (aesthetic
value, recreational value). An example of this is the increased value of real estate near a cultural
site, or the higher prices charged by cafes, restaurants, and pubs near heritage sites. The value of
not using cultural heritage is the most difficult to estimate but it cannot be ignored. This refers
to the particular situations where a heritage object is more valuable when it is not exploited and
implies that its very use for some purpose may reduce its value by damaging it. For example,
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for some indigenous peoples, a sacred site is more valuable if it is protected and access to it is
restricted. Its very existence gives it value for that cultural group and using it for tourism
purposes can reduce that value.
The European Commission argues that cultural heritage is of significant economic
importance, particularly for the cultural and creative sectors surrounding it. At the same time,
cultural heritage "is an important resource for economic growth, employment and social
cohesion, with the potential to revitalise urban and rural areas and promote sustainable tourism."
(European Commission, 2022)
But what are the levers we can employ to make the economic use of cultural heritage
more effective, while protecting and preserving it? The answers can be diverse. In this paper we
will focus on innovative AR/VR/MR (augmented reality/virtual reality/mixed reality)
technologies and how they contribute (or have the potential to contribute) to the process of
protecting and preserving cultural heritage in the context of sustainable development. These
types of immersive technologies are those that allow the barrier between the real and virtual
worlds to be reduced, even dissipated, allowing users to perceive an immersion in time and space
that cannot be experienced otherwise. Theorising on the importance of immersive technologies
is still in its infancy and the literature on the subject is limited. However, existing studies show
a high interest in the inclusion of augmented and virtual reality elements in the cultural domain.
(Suh and Prophet, 2018) Virtual heritage, as the merging of culture and technology, represents a
'cross-fertilisation' of the disciplines of virtual reality (VR) and cultural heritage. This new field
encompasses not only culture, but also elements of virtual archaeology, art in virtual space,
anthropology, etc. In "Digital Cultures, Lived Stories and Virtual Reality", Maschio proposes a
new cultural paradigm, according to which digital space is an opportunity to rethink and
reinterpret cultural communities.
The application of virtual and augmented reality in the context of cultural heritage can
serve two purposes: the promotion and sustainable use of heritage and its conservation,
restoration, and protection. Virtual heritage incorporates reality-based interactive technologies
in an intangible space. This creates a visual (sometimes tactile) representation of monuments,
artefacts, buildings, and other heritage objects that can be used as educational material to
improve the process of analysing historical events, or that can be exploited economically. As
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mentioned at the beginning of the article, one of the main concerns when it comes to tangible
cultural heritage is its preservation in the context of sustainable development. However, heritage
is fragile and ancient, and inefficient use or excessive exploitation can have unfortunate effects
on it. Innovative technologies such as Virtual Reality and Augmented Reality have the potential
to provide a unique cultural experience when visiting a place, thus preserving its integrity and
reducing the impact of tourism on it. The arguments in favour of using VR and AR technologies
are manifold and can be divided into three categories: time, space, and sustainability.
When it comes to time, the use of VR and AR technologies allows us to access the cultural
heritage of periods that we would not have physical access to in the real world. For example,
through a virtual exercise we can re-enact a scene from 500 years ago using the physical
resources we have, to which we can add artificial reconstructions of the architecture of the time,
the music of the era, the clothing, the customs, and many other things. Virtual and augmented
reality allow people living in the 21st century not only to read about the reality of a past time,
but also to simulate an experience as close as possible to the reality of that period. Augmented
reality utilizes real space to display additional information or to reproduce, through technology,
certain sequences representative of that space, whereas virtual reality takes place exclusively in
a virtual environment, through tools such as V R glasses and cameras. Also from a temporal
perspective, the use of virtual and augmented reality technologies aims not only to recover
elements of cultural heritage that have been lost in the mists of time, but also to preserve those
that are still present to preserve their cultural heritage for centuries to come. In "The Key Role
of VR in Preserving Cultural Heritage", (Leslie, 2022), the author discusses the key role that
modern technologies play in preserving cultural heritage, especially in situations such as
Ukraine, Syria or Iraq, where it is threatened with destruction due to war, and how, through
modern V R and A R technologies, we have the chance to save, if not the physical cultural
heritage, at least its memory by encapsulating it in other technologies. By capturing cultural
heritage with innovative technologies, there is a chance to preserve it and leave it as a legacy to
future generations, as well as the opportunity to rebuild heritage in times of peace. One such
initiative is the Institute of Digital Archaeology - a project of Harvard and Oxford Universities
in partnership with Dubai's Museum of the Future - which has recreated a Roman triumphal arch
from Palmyra, destroyed in the Syrian war, in 3D based on archaeological evidence and
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photographs taken by tourists. Once replicated in virtual reality, the Institute's robots were able
to create a physical replica based on the digital model. The arch has since been exhibited in
several locations around the world, as a testament to digital art in the contemporary world, but
also as a proof of technology's ability to save cultural heritage and pass it on in diverse and
creative ways.
4. The paradox of authenticity
This cultural approach is not without its critics, who argue that the greatest risk to cultural
heritage in reproducing the past through virtual reality is the loss of authoritative authenticity
(Zhao, 2021). In theory, virtual reality is supposed to fully mimic the target heritage object(s)
using high-fidelity technology to preserve the authenticity of the cultural experience. If this could
be put into practice, it would result in an identical user experience in both contexts (real and
virtual). However, this is not possible. The virtual experience is not limited to simulating the real
user experience. Through the virtual experience, reality is redefined and reinterpreted each time.
The paradox of authenticity in virtual heritage is that there is no consensus on what is
truly authentic. As a result, two different schools of thought emerge when it comes to the
authenticity of virtual heritage. The first promotes the idea that virtual heritage is authentic if it
accurately reproduces the original object down to the smallest detail, without trying to enhance
the user experience (Roussou, 2002). This is the direction most archaeologists, historians and
museographers take, as it has proven to be the most relevant to heritage conservation. The second
direction aims at authenticity from the perspective of creating something new from the existing
cultural heritage, adapting it to the current needs of users and 'revitalising' access to cultural
heritage. Visual experience is more important than historical and archaeological accuracy. This
vision is shared by artists, media technicians and owners of cultural tourist attractions. For them,
the use of cultural heritage for economic purposes seems to be more important than historical
accuracy, and newly created elements are not perceived as lifeless replicas of the old, but as new,
original elements that describe culture in an innovative way.
From a spatial perspective, the use of virtual and augmented reality technologies aims to
bring cultural heritage closer to the viewer. If, in the above context, virtual reality recreates
something that once existed and now only exists in archaeological finds, images or historical
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books, in the current context virtual reality seeks to remove another barrier between the heritage
object and the viewer/user: space. The barriers related to the spatial element can be multiple,
both in terms of the culture consumer (economic, time, mobility, etc.) and in terms of the cultural
element itself (state of degradation, reduced accessibility, access restrictions imposed by
authorities, etc.). Virtual reproductions of heritage elements remove many of these barriers,
providing the ideal context for the beneficiary to access the heritage element(s) and eliminating
the implications of the resulting restrictions, as well as those related to the element itself.
However, the space of virtual reality is far from neutral, especially because of the artistic
vision of the heritage element. Most virtual representations of heritage items follow the model
of three-dimensional reconstruction of that object, based on the specific Cartesian coordinates of
three mutually perpendicular axes. Although the model is inspired by Descartes' philosophy, it
only emphasises one of the two terms representative of this philosophy - res extensa - namely
the material aspects that occupy space in the physical world we know and understand. What is
missing from this approach is what actually defines culture, namely the second fundamental
element of Descartes' philosophy - res cognitans - the intangible, non-material elements of
humanity, such as consciousness and subjective experience of time and space. Apart from the
generally accepted mathematical perspective, the idea of 'space' has different connotations and
interpretations from one culture to another. Indian culture, for example, has more than one
concept that described by the term 'space', unlike Romanian or English. In Sanskrit, the same
word, akasa, is used to define mental space, consciousness, and physical space. This is also the
case in Japanese culture.
In other words, the virtual recreation of heritage elements using AR and VR technologies
has the ability to represent only one of the many facets of the spatial dimension, depending on
the artistic vision of the people behind the technology.
5. Sustainability in heritage and the premise for a new theoretical framework: eco-
sufficiency
The use of digital technologies to recreate and enhance the cultural experience was a
natural response to the need to protect and preserve cultural heritage. The degradation of cultural
tourism objectives, the exposure of heritage paintings and sculptures to inappropriate light and
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temperature, the constant contact of heritage elements with large numbers of people, the
destruction of heritage in conflict areas, the excessive tourism associated with excessive
commercialisation, but also the lack of awareness of the importance of heritage, are some of the
reasons why there is a consensus among heritage professionals about the lack of sustainability
in heritage tourism (Ashworth, 2009). There is an interconnected relationship between cultural
heritage and the environment. The negative impact of cultural heritage on the environment
affects the former to the same extent as the latter. The same applies to the negative impact of the
environment on cultural heritage. A relevant example could be the following: heritage sites are
exposed to natural conditions, such as very high or very low temperatures, humidity, air pressure
or specific soil characteristics, which result in the natural degradation of building materials over
time. Degradation processes cause the chemical, physical and biological compounds from which
buildings are constructed to break down and become embedded in the soil layers, perpetuating
the degradation process (Pedersoli, 2016).
Fortunately, technological advancements are making it possible to digitise heritage
tourism and access to heritage sites. Photogrammetry and imaging technologies, combined with
digital data processing and post-processing, make it possible to exploit heritage features for
economic purposes (tourism) as well as for further scientific research and historic preservation.
The use of immersive technologies allows access to cultural heritage not only for tourists but
also for specialists. Digital heritage (as heritage exploited through virtual and augmented reality
and other similar technologies is called in the literature) can be defined as one of the most
important resources for the field of knowledge, as it contains cultural, scientific, technical,
architectural, and other data created from elements of historical value.
The most representative example of digital heritage is the Google Arts&Culture
collection, which at the time of writing includes over 1,200 museums and art galleries world
(Hajirasouli etal., 2021).
Among the largest movements in the field of sustainable development, environmental
protection and the circular economy, and first among them, is the Club of Rome. It was formed
in 1968 by distinguished personalities, famous in the fields of science, politics, culture and
business, who realised that climate change, the problems facing the environment, resources and
population are the consequences of irresponsible use of resources. It was the creators of the Club
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who came up with the idea of "limits to growth", which they and experts from MIT
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) documented and analysed from economic, biological,
sociological, anthropological and technological perspectives, and put all these ideas into what is
now considered the "Bible" of the sustainable development field, "The Limits to Growth", which
promotes the idea that our resources are finite, so that infinite economic expansion is not realistic
or sustainable. The book outlines the predicament facing humanity in terms of growth based on
depleting resources and excessive consumerism and provides an overview of the drivers of this
unsustainable growth, as well as alternative measures that can be taken to create "a global steady
state".
The term "sustainability" has emerged as a ubiquitous discourse in contemporary
literature. While there are divergent perspectives on the precise origins and initial instances of
its utilization, there is a prevailing consensus that the conceptualization of sustainability does not
predate approximately five decades. Today, the concept of sustainability has permeated every
aspect of life, both in everyday life and in specialised areas. According to the Brundtland
Commission, sustainable development defines the level of development which meets the needs
of the present, while making sure the future needs of the generations to come are still being able
to me met. In the context of cultural heritage, it denotes the responsibility to protect and preserve
cultural heritage, considering all the ethical, social, economic, and environmental aspects
involved in the process.
In response to the ethical dilemma regarding the sustainability of using innovative virtual
and augmented reality technologies to preserve and promote cultural heritage, experts have laid
the theoretical foundations for a new concept: the eco-sufficiency perspective (Paschalidou,
Fafet and Milios, 2022). It is based on the premise that the best way to preserve cultural heritage
is through digitisation. In order to minimise the negative impact of the digitisation process on
the environment, it is necessary to create a new conceptual framework that integrates elements
of sustainability into the sphere of development of innovative virtual heritage technologies. Ecosufficiency
aims to strike a balance between efficiency and sufficiency, balancing the positive
impact of developing a new technology for heritage use and preservation with the negative
impact of the same technology on the environment.
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Although still at an early stage, the new concept has the potential to revolutionise the
relationship between sustainability and cultural heritage by involving policy makers and
international heritage organisations in the development of the measurement tools needed for such
benchmarking.
6. Conclusions
Heritage plays an important role not only in the creation and implementation of socioeconomic
development strategies, but also when it comes to sustainable development. The
environmental issues facing society have been a central focus of all soft-power policies over the
last 30 years, and their integration into all socio-economic aspects is no longer new. The
European Union is increasingly focusing attention on the impact of cultural heritage on
sustainable development, initiating a series of cultural funding projects with a key objective: "the
first climate neutral continent". (The European Commission, 2022). The shift from traditional
economic perspectives (pertaining to cultural economics) to a framework dedicated entirely to
cultural heritage shows a growing recognition for the need a specializes approach in the field.
But it also brings a wave of divergent opinions in the literature, between the voices promoting
the preservation of cultural heritage and criticizing the economic utilization of it, and those
claiming that economic utilization, done properly, is the key to cultural heritage protection and
conservation.
In support of the latter, virtual reality and augmented reality offer the best means to both
explore cultural heritage from an economic perspective, and contribute to the preservation of it,
providing tools for safe and non-damaging utilization of culture and cultural sites. But these
advanced technology tools have their own limitations: big costs, limited attribution, and issues
regarding authenticity. Is a virtual and augmented representation of an antic art piece an ideal
copy of it or a reinterpretation with its own cultural value? This is a question that finds its
answers differently, depending on the conceptual framework we analyse. The paradox lies in the
challenge of defining the concept of authenticity in the virtual world, where the users experience,
differently from the real world, can be constantly and continuously redefined and reinterpreted.
In the pursuit of a new theoretical framework to define and understand the challenges of
promoting and protecting cultural heritage in a world focused on growing and expanding beyond
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its means, the concept of eco-sufficiency proves it is possible to integrate the principles of
environmental sustainability and protection in the process of preservation of cultural heritage.
While still in early stages, the framework provides enough evidence to support a strong potential
collaboration between environmental and cultural heritage management with the purpose of
developing strategies and taking measures to enhance digital endeavours towards sustainable
development and protection.
This paper proves a dynamic interplay between economic perspectives, technology
advancements and sustainability concerns in the realm of cultural heritage protection. The
multidisciplinary nature of this research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex
connections between cultural heritage, economics, technology and sustainability. Future
endeavours in the subject must analyse the evolution of eco-sufficiency and its potential to
sustain a new framework for risk management in cultural heritage protection.
With regards to the limitations of the research, one of the most challenging aspects was
to integrate the economic perspective with other fields pertaining to cultural heritage, such as
sociology, anthropology, and archaeology, while fully accounting for the policy framework in
the cultural domain, at national and international levels.
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DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2023.43.03
THE EU LABOUR MARKET: TRENDS AND PATTERNS FOR
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES
Iryna GERLACH, PhD
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Ukraine
iryna.yeleyko@lnu.edu.ua
Yurii VLASENKO, PhD
National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraine
yuriywinner@ukr.net
Maryna GUDZ, Professor
National University "Zaporizhzhia Polytechnic", Ukraine
gydzmarina@yahoo.com
Andrii SOKOLOV, PhD
National University "Zaporizhzhia Polytechnic", Ukraine
sokolovav3 33(g^gmail. com
Olena BILENKO, PhD
National University "Zaporizhzhia Polytechnic", Ukraine
o.v. bilenko@gmail. com
Abstract: The article examines specific aspects of the European Union (EU) labour market, its dynamics and
structure to assess the potential opportunities for candidate countries. The research aims to identify trends and
patterns of labour market developmentfor candidate countries and potential candidates for membership in the
European Union. The study uses datafrom labour market statisticsfor the EU, candidate countries, andpotential
candidates (enlargement countries). The research is based on comparison, grouping, generalisation, trend
analysis, correlation regression, and cluster analysis. The labour market indicators in most studied countries are
significantly lower compared to the EU, but positive dynamics are observed. The results show that candidate
countries and potential candidates have different indicators that characterise the level of development and
dynamics of the labour market. Most candidate andpotential candidate countries (except the Republic ofTurkey)
have downward trends in unemployment and a close negative correlation between unemployment and Gross
Domestic Product per capita. Labour market analysis can support policymaking for candidate countries and
potential candidates and monitor participation in the EU labour market.
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Keywords: candidate and potential candidate countries, economic activity, employment, EU, labour
market
1. Introduction
Unemployment is one of the most pressing global issues today. In the EU, this
predicament is tackled using intricate methods of regulation, which not only provide financial
support but also establish the necessary conditions for economic growth. However, in countries
undergoing economic transition, specifically those considering E U membership, high
unemployment remains an outstanding challenge that requires resolution. Applying for
membership in the EU, less developed countries expect to receive economic benefits from
interaction with more developed countries, thus solving the issue of poverty and unemployment.
One of the primary objectives of the EU's labour market development by 2030 is to attain
an employment rate of 78% among individuals aged 20 to 64. Simultaneously, it aims to
encourage the education of citizens by ensuring that 60% of the adult population participates in
training programmes. Additionally, the E U aims to reduce the risks of poverty and social
isolation by lifting at least 15 million citizens from the risk of poverty. These ambitious
objectives are outlined in The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (European
Commission, 2021). By 2019, most developed European countries were steadily progressing
towards their labour market targets. Nevertheless, the COVID-19 pandemic changed the
development strategy, resulting in a pause in rapid progression. The employment rate in the
European market dropped to 72.4% during the third quarter of 2019 according to the European
Commission (2021). However, there is some variation among researchers regarding reducing
employment during the crisis. Although at the outset of the COVID-19 outbreak, many experts
and scientists were discussing the pandemic's negative and potentially catastrophic impact on
the labour market, the trends observed in 2021 have validated the hypothesis that nearly all
European developed countries have been obliged to adopt a new, more dynamic approach to
development. This transformation is attributed to innovations and the transition of almost all
sectors to new product launches and sales technologies (De Vet et al, 2021).
The rapid market recovery of high-income countries affects labour markets in lessdeveloped
countries. The impact is felt even within the EU, where the increased demand for
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labour stimulates migration from the less developed regions of Eastern Europe. Once the labour
market becomes accessible for the EU-candidate countries, where wages and living standards
are much lower than in Europe, their labour market will be reformatted entirely (World Bank,
2019).
The research aims to identify trends and patterns of labour market development in
candidate and potential candidate countries for the European Union membership.
To accomplish the aim, the subsequent tasks were completed:
- Comparative analysis of the labour market in the candidate countries and potential
candidates;
- Identification of trends in changes in the employment level of the population in the
countries after joining the EU;
- Determination of the relationship between unemployment and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita in candidate and potential candidate countries;
- Identification of standard and distinctive features of labour market development in the
studied countries.
Research identifying potential opportunities and threats for E U candidate countries is
scarce at the scientific level, so this topic has significant scientific value.
The study's structure comprises an introduction, a literature review outlining crucial
aspects of the E U labour market's evolution, its distinctive traits, and transformations. The
research findings involve an examination of activity level alterations (in E U membership
applicant and possible applicant nations), employment and unemployment indicators (in E U
2004 and 2007 accession states), recognition of the relationship between unemployment and
GDP level in states seeking E U membership and potential candidates, cluster analysis, data
discussion, and conclusive author observations from the analysis.
2. Literature review
In the 1950s, the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and
the European Economic Community (EEC) established the basis for developing a shared
labour market, free labour mobility, and social protection for migrants. Since then, there has
been a pronounced rise in economic cooperation among member states of the EEC, and
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subsequently, the EU. During the period of deepening integration processes, one of the primary
objectives of the E U was to establish a unified market, guaranteeing the free flow of goods,
services, individuals, and capital throughout its boundaries. However, this goal has been
impeded by intangible barriers and difficulties in decision-making, leading to significant
delays in the integration process (Lehtimäki & Sondermann, 2022). The European
Commission's White Paper in 1985 was crucial in restoring integration by outlining
requirements for a single market. The creation of a genuine single market had outlined the
economic needs, channels, and impact. This became the foundation for further adopting the
Single European Act in 1986 and forming a common market. Consequently, it served as an
essential stage in recognising the labour market as part of the common pan-European internal
market. Since 1992, the European Union's single market has expanded by admitting new
member states that have become part of the common market. As a result, the European Union
labour market has developed key features. This includes the freedom of labour movement, a
social security and protection system, a promotion of occupational mobility, and collaboration
in skilled worker training. The E U labour market, established on the principles of a shared
market, has emerged as the pivotal component of Europe's sociopolitical spectrum.
To thoroughly analyse the issue, it is essential to study the complex structure,
organisation, and unique characteristics of the labour market in the EU. The core objectives of
EU general social policy involve ensuring a high level of employment, reduced unemployment,
stable living standards, social protection, and addressing migration issues (Didenko, 2010). The
authors' research outlines the unique characteristics of employment policies and the EU's
strategies for addressing employment-related challenges. The Open Method of Coordination
(OMC) forms part of the EU's employment policy and Luxembourg process and can serve as an
instrument of the Lisbon strategy. This framework allows the Member States to cooperate
towards achieving common objectives by directing their respective national policies. Under this
intergovernmental approach, countries assess each other through peer pressure, while the
Commission's responsibility is limited to monitoring (Eurostat Statistics Explained, 2023a).
Tvrdon (2008) showed the theoretical foundations of labour market formation in the EU,
highlighting the institutional component and its importance in the efficiency of the labour market
and economy. Regarding the structure of the EU labour market, the author's research examines
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the influence of the Visegrad Group nations, encompassing Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary, on the EU labour market. Tvrdon (2008) identified that the labour market
in these countries struggles with less effective regulation compared to developed European
countries. The significance of improving labour market regulation efficiency is supported by
Dayioglu and Aydin's (2020) research. The authors identified economic development,
unemployment stemming from labour market management, inflation, and current account
balance as crucial indicators of a country's economic performance. The interplay between these
variables holds immense significance for economic policies.
A key feature of the contemporary E U labour market is to encourage employment in
specific member countries of the EU and to address workforce deficiencies caused by migration
of workers (Ward-Warmedinger & Macchiarelli, 2013). The authors demonstrate that E U
members establish labour and work conditions that can efficiently tackle unemployment in
various countries and economic sectors within a particular nation. Khaing (2021) analysed the
countries' policies to regulate labour migration, while Arpaia et al. (2016) support the notion that
population mobility can bring balance to labour markets across EU countries. Barrett et al. (2006)
and Ward-Warmedinger and Macchiarelli (2014) demonstrated the particularities of workforce
movement in diverse areas of the of the EU.
Kahanec's (2015) analysis explored the impact of labour migration from the Eastern to
the Western regions of the EU. The study identified the primary threats and opportunities faced
by both sides. Kahanec argues that the receiving country gains a larger benefit than the sending
country in regards to available labour resources. However, the advantages and disadvantages of
labour migration and free mobility within the enlarged E U are influenced by a variety of
individual and industrial factors. Nevertheless, these practices allow for more efficient labour
markets. Global crisis phenomena, including the COVID-19 pandemic, play a pivotal role in the
labour market across various countries. An analysis of the pandemic's effects on the labour
market revealed a significant surge in the E U market during the first quarter of 2020. The
countries with the highest absenteeism rates were Cyprus, the Hellenic Republic, Spain, Italy,
and France, while the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and Hungary had the
lowest rates. According to experts (Chinn et al, 2020), unemployment in Europe could be
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prolonged. Economic recovery was expected to take up to four years in 2020, but in 2021, experts
anticipate a complete recovery from the pandemic by 2022 (De Vet et al., 2021).
The impact of the pandemic on the labour market is not uniformly adverse across all
countries and economic sectors. Certain states will benefit from the labour market crisis. For
instance, Poland, Romania, and Italy will be able to hold onto their highly skilled workforce that
would typically migrate to work in other European countries (Buttler, 2021). Regulating labour
markets within European countries greatly affects the overall effectiveness of employment level
management in the EU. Therefore, the functioning of labour markets at the national level remains
increasingly relevant and is a significant area of scientific research. Tassinari (2022) analyses
labour market regulation in Italy, investigating the various stages of liberalisation and identifying
persistent obstacles that hinder further growth. The research reveals that policies governing the
labour market, particularly with regards to post-pandemic trends, remain restricted in scope,
leading to a lack of substantial change. Italy's National Plan for Recovery and Resilience centres
on measures impacting the supply of the labour market (Tassinari, 2022). Similarly, Walter
(2023) emphasises the particular importance of the German market in the EU labour market
structure. His study analyses the link between the effectiveness of German labour market reform
and employment, looking at the impact of productivity growth in Germany and Eastern Europe
and the relationship between trade intensification and labour productivity.
The labour market conditions in EU candidate countries are less favourable than those in
developed European nations. Blazhevski and Nikolic Blazevska (2023) underline in North
Macedonia the labour shortage as a consequence of migration trends and the decreasing
employment of workers with specific knowledge, abilities and skills. In Montenegro, Golubovic
et al. (2022) examine poverty within the working population and discover that it has reached an
unprecedented level, surpassing all other countries in the former Yugoslavia, demonstrating its
lack of compliance with the EU's poverty guidelines. Factors contributing to the issue of poverty
in Montenegro are the prolonged lack of minimum wage adjustments, inadequate benefits,
limited financial assistance based on income, challenges in obtaining child support from
employment status, and relatively high tax rates on earned income. Albania's labour market is
characterised by developmental variability, particularly with the country's transition to a market
economy. Vulnerability is observed among two categories of the working population: young
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people who are new participants in the labour market and workers of the older generation who
struggle to adapt to changes in the working environment, social services, and public enterprises
(Xhumari, 2023). The authors highlight the significance of customising Albanian work
provisions for these vulnerable workers to meet the standards and principles of European social
policy, as the nation pursues integration with the European Union. Bosnia and Herzegovina also
faces challenges related to population ageing, leading to difficulties in employing older
generations of citizens (Pranjic and Racic, 2020). The trends in population ageing contribute to
a deteriorating employment situation and an increase in unemployment, further widening the gap
between the country's indicators and those of successful, developed EU states. Also, Stojanova
et al. (2019) conducted a study on the elderly population of EU countries, examining the duration
of their working lives and the prevalence of unemployment in a distinct context. The author
determined that the shorter the duration of working life, the less likely the labour force aged 55
to 64 will be unemployed. Older people are expected to retire earlier, reducing unemployment
in the 55-64 age group. As per the author, digitalisation and unemployment are correlated. To
maintain employment levels among older citizens in the "Industry 4.0" era, strategic workforce
planning, role adaptation, personnel selection, and professional training are crucial. These
measures aim to equip the labour force with additional IT skills.
Active discussions are taking place regarding the dependence of labour market
development on various factors. Notably, monetary policy is singled out as one of the main and
significant factors that correlate with labour productivity (Assemien et al., 2019; Gomes et al.,
2023), especially concerning the control of inflation levels (Ari et al, 2023; Bulligan and
Viviano, 2017; Yildirim, 2015;) and the discount rate.
It has been demonstrated that emigration influences employment and unemployment
rates. Specific patterns were identified by Skuflic and Vuckovic (2018), who found that a higher
share of emigrants corresponds to a higher unemployment rate, indicating a positive correlation
between the variables. However, an unambiguous interpretation of this conclusion is not possible
due to the influence of other factors such as differences in skills between emigrants and those
who remain, labour shortages in specific sectors, potential immigration, and wage levels, and the
resulting consequences (Zaiceva, 2014). The emigration prerequisites are also linked - if
emigrants were previously classified as unemployed, the unemployment rate would decrease;
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however, if emigrants were employed before emigration, the impact would be contingent on the
likelihood of filling their vacancy with eligible candidates (Asch, 1994).
Moreover, a noticeable correlation exists between the level of innovation development
in a state, technological progress, and labour productivity. Chinoracky and Corejova, T. (2019)
made a noteworthy contribution and conducted a correlation regression analysis to determine the
relationship between labour market development and digital transformations. Their findings
highlight that the main trends in the correlation between the two are the changes in employment
rules, requirements for competencies, knowledge, skills, and attitudes of employees. The risk of
automation due to global digitisation is inherent in all European nations. However, those in
Eastern and Southern Europe are at a significantly higher risk of job automation. This could
bring about potential transformations in the job market structure and employment indicators.
According to the authors' calculations, countries with low levels of employment face a greater
risk of job automation, while those with higher employment levels are less likely to experience
it.
In the context of enhancing productivity management and mitigating job losses brought
about by digital transformations, emphasis is placed on enhancing digital skills and the
professionalism of human capital (Aly, 2022). Retkoceri and Kurteshi (2018) investigated
Kosovo, Deshati (2015) analysed Albania, and Nikolic et al. (2015) researched Serbia,
pinpointing the primary limitations to innovative progression in particular EU member states and
their influence on the labour market and employment opportunities.
3. Methodology
The study analyses the labour market of various groups of countries based on a sample.
EU member states include Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey, all
candidates for joining the EU. In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are considered
potential candidates. These countries have demonstrated their unequivocal interest in joining the
European Union. Nevertheless, the European Commission is presently examining their status as
members of the European Community (European Commission, n.d.). As labour market statistics
are only available up to and including 2020, it was necessary to consider modifications to the list
of candidates and potential candidates for 2021 and 2022.
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For the study, we have provided an overview of labour force characteristics covering
indicators defined according to the methodology adopted in the E U (Eurostat Statistics
Explained, 2015):
1. Activity rate - the percentage of active persons about the comparable total population.
The economically active population comprises employed and unemployed persons;
2. Employment rate - the percentage of employed persons about the comparable total
population. The comparison is made with the working-age population for the overall
employment rate;
3. Unemployment rate - the number of people unemployed as a percentage of the labour
force.
Eurostat publishes labour market statistics based on the definition of unemployment
provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO). The primary source for European
labour force statistics is the European Union labour force survey (Eurostat Statistics Explained,
2023). The labour force survey is conducted according to the European legislation in all E U
Member States. Likewise, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey, candidate
countries and potential candidates, carry out the survey following the same protocols. Both the
EU and their data are available for free on Eurostat's website (Eurostat Statistics Explained,
2023b). Data for the enlargement countries (candidate nations or potential candidates) is
collected annually for a range of indicators via a questionnaire sent by Eurostat.
Correlation coefficients were calculated from 2010-2020 data to explore the correlation
between unemployment levels and GDP per capita in candidate nations and potential candidates
for EU membership. The regression equation for each country was established:
yt = oi + btxu (1)
where: i - years, y - GDP per capita (current EUR), x - unemployment rate (% of the total labour
force).
The utilization of correlation-regression analysis enables a thorough depiction of the
interdependencies among indicators. Chinoracky and Corejova (2019) previously employed this
methodology to investigate the labour market of the European Union. Their research sought to
establish correlations and evaluate the degree of influence between the labour market progress
of designated EU nations and variables that impact it, for instance, the proliferation of digital
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technologies. The selected methodology enables a clear depiction of interdependencies and
causal relationships. The study examined the correlation between the unemployment rate among
those aged 55-64 and individual explanatory variables utilizing the methodology presented in
Stojanova et al.'s (2019) work. Additionally, the research conducted by Skuflic and Vuckovic
(2018) analysed the influence of migration processes on the level of unemployment.
To obtain a labour market forecast for 2021-2022 in candidate and potential candidate
countries, a trend analysis was conducted based on data for 2010-2020.
The study employed the cluster analysis method to cluster analysed countries according to their
unemployment rate and GDP per capita similarity in 2010 and 2020. An Agglomerative
Hierarchical Clustering (AGNES) was used to create the clusters. The statistical analysis was
conducted using XLSTAT software in Excel.
4. Main features on the labour market within EU and enlargement countries
In the context of the rapidly evolving migration processes and the rise in human capital
mobility, coupled with the exacerbation of crisis phenomena at the national economy level, the
significance of the EU labour market is of paramount importance. The European labour market
provides a relatively stable atmosphere with a dense concentration of skilled, top-notch labour
and enticing job prospects. The crisis between 2010 and 2022 had a significant impact on market
stability, resulting in decreased employment levels and an uptick in the unemployment rate.
However, the clear adherence to defined guidelines, principles of employment management, and
the social sphere, along with member states' compliance with national goals and obligations in
labour market management, helped prevent indicators of activity on the European labour market
from reaching critically low levels.
The co-ordinated employment management policy of the EU creates a highly desirable
European labour market for developing countries. These countries commonly align themselves
with the European integration development trajectory. As a result, the activity rates have
increased in most of the EU's potential candidate countries, including Albania, Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 2010 to 2020 (refer to Figure 1).
Figure 1. Activity rates of persons aged 20-64 years, 2010-2020
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Montenegro North Macedonia Albania
Serbia Turkey Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Republic of Ko sovo E U
Source: Eurostat Statistics Explained (2023b)
Based on Figure 1 data, the average activity level among the population aged 20 to 64
years residing in EU member states stands at 76.1%. During the investigated period, there was
an increase of 3.8% in the indicator. Despite the survey, none of the countries have achieved the
EU activity level. Albania reported the highest activity rates at 75.3%, whereas Kosovo, a
potential candidate for the EU, marked the lowest at 43%. As the activity level quantifies the
proportion of active individuals within the entire population, it is relevant to concentrate on the
count of both employed and unemployed individuals in prospective E U member states and
potential candidates. Figure 2 shows an analysis of the employment structure for 2010 and 2020
by broad economic activities.
Figure 2. Employment of persons aged 15 years or more by economic activity, 2010 and 2020
(% of total employment)
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• Agriculture, forestry and fishing Industry Construction
Source: Eurostat Statistics Explained (2023b), Eurostat (2023a)
Services
In most candidate and potential candidates' countries, services are the most significant
proportion of the workforce and grew during the analysed period. In 2020, services accounted
for more than half of people employed in all studied countries except Albania Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The highest employment share of services was in Montenegro (74.1% in 2020)
and Kosovo (67.9% in 2020). Many of the workforce was employed in agriculture, forestry, and
fishing in most candidate and potential candidates' countries except for Kosovo (4.8%) and
Montenegro (7.5%). The industry's employment share was relatively stable and changed slightly
over the period analysed. The different structure of economic activity was in the EU's workforce.
In 2020, more than 70% of persons were employed in the service; the industry had the second
largest share with more than 18% of total employment, and the claims of employment in
construction, agriculture, forestry, and fishing were much lower (Eurostat Statistics Explained,
2023b).
Generally, the unemployment rate changes sometimes after specific economic or political
influences. When a country's economy begins to respond to definite macroeconomic factors,
employers remain typically cautious about hiring new workers, and there may be a delay before
the unemployment rate begins to fall. A study of various country-specific case studies and trends
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demonstrates that changes in labour market stem from alterations in regulations and regulationsrelated
institutions that govern the labour market (International Labour Organization, 2016).
EU membership has a variety of impacts on the labour market, and accession may lead
to changes in employment rates. Figure 3 (a, b) presents data for the nations that joined the EU
in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
Figure 3. Employment rate, total (% of the total labour force of working age): a - in Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland and EU; b Bulgaria,
Romania and EU
a
o
f
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
cf
V 4-"
4>
• 2002 2004 «2006
a)
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llE U
• 2005 2007 «2009
b)
Sources: Compiled by the authors on the data from Eurostat (2023a)
Employment rates in EU accession countries have varied during the study period and no
specific pattern emerged. Certain countries, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and
Slovakia, experienced an increase in employment rates within two years of accession. However,
others, including Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, witnessed a decline. The
accession countries that joined the E U in 2007 had differing scenarios, with Bulgaria
experiencing a decline in employment and an increase observed in Romania.
Unemployment rate data for candidate and potential candidate countries, as well as for the EU,
is presented in Figure 4 (a, b).
Within the 2010-2020 period, unemployment rates peaked in Kosovo and Albania in
2014, in Montenegro, B osnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia in 2012, in North Macedonia in 2010,
and in Turkey in 2019. The highest unemployment rate for the E U was recorded in 2013.
Unemployment rates in most E U candidate and potential candidate countries hit their lowest
point in 2019, during the period from 2010 to 2020. However, Turkey experienced its minimum
rate in 2012 (refer to Figure 4 (a, b)).
Figure 4. Unemployment rates 2010-2020 (% of the labour force): a - in Montenegro, Turkey,
Serbia, North Macedonia and Albania; b - in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU
45
5
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Montenegro North Macedonia
Turkey Albania
Linear (Montenegro ) Linear (North Macedonia)
Linear (Turkey) Linear (Serbia)
Linear (EU)
a)
5 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Kosovo Bosnia and Herzegovina
EU Linear (Kosovo)
Linear (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Linear (EU)
b)
Sources: Compiled by the authors on the data from Eurostat Statistics Explained (2023b), Eurostat (2023c)
The unemployment rate in the EU was 7.1% in 2020, with an average rate of 9.2% from
2010-2020. Kosovo had the highest unemployment rate in 2020 and the highest average
unemployment rate between 2010 and 2020. The countries with the highest unemployment rates
during this period were Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while
Serbia and Albania had the lowest unemployment rates in 2020 amongst the countries analysed.
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Turkey's unemployment rate in 2020 was 13.2%, surpassing the average rate of 10.6% from 2010
to 2020 and standing out from its candidate and potential candidate counterparts.
5. Results and Discussion
The trend lines for 2021-2022 indicates a general trend towards diminishing
unemployment rates throughout the European Union, including both candidate and potential
candidate countries. Notably, Serbia is predicted to meet the EU's unemployment level by 2022.
However, Turkey is the only country that displays an inclination for escalating its current
unemployment rate over the course of 2021-2022.
The analysis of the relationship between unemployment (UnL) and GDP per capita
(GDPpc) in the candidate countries and potential candidates based on the correlation-regression
analysis of the data for 2010-2020 is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Unemployment rate* and real GDP per capita** in candidate countries and potential
candidates in 2010-2020
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovi
na
Kosovo Serbia
Montenegr
0
Turkey
North
Macedonia
Real
GDP UnL
Real
GDP
Un
T
Real
GDP UnL
Real
GDP UnL
Real
GDP UnL
Real
GDP UnL
Real
GDP UnL
pc pc
1.
pc pc pc pc pc
2010
3
090
14.0
9
3 665
27.3
1
2
271
4
330
19.2
2
5
050
19.6
5
8
000
10.6
6
3
460
32.0
2
2011
3
180
13.4
8
3 792
27.5
8
2
528
4
450
22.9
7
5
200
19.7
6
8
760
8.8
3
530
31.3
8
2012
3
230
13.3
8
3 794
28.0
1
2
655
30.8
8
4
440
24.0
0
5
060
19.8
1
9
070
8.15
3
510
31.0
2
2013
3
260
15.8
7
3 878
27.4
9
2
794
29.7
7
4
590
22.1
5
5
230
19.5
9
9
710
8.73
3
610
29
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2014
3
330
18.0
5
3 967
27.5
2
2
950
35.2
6
4
540
19.2
2
5
320
18.0
5
10
050
9.88
3
740
28.0
3
2015
3
410
17.1
9
4 155
27.6
9
3
202
32.8
4
4
640
17.6
6
5
500
17.5
5
10
520
10.2
4
3
870
26.0
7
2016
3
530
15.4
2
4 355
25.4
1
3
368
27.4
9
4
820
15.2
6
5
660
17.7
3
10
730
10.8
4
3
980
23.7
2
2017
3
670
13.6
2
4 578
20.5
3
3
534
30.3
4
4
950
13.4
8
5
920
16.0
8
11
380
10.8
2
4
020
22.3
8
2018
3
830
12.3 4 891 18.4
3
715
27.7
6
5
200
12.7
3
6
230
15.1
9
11
560
10.8
9
4
130
20.7
4
2019
3
920
11.4
7
5 169
15.6
9
3
959
25.0
7
5
460
10.3
9
6
480
15.1
3
11
490
13.6
7
4
290
17.2
6
2020
3
810
11.8 5 040
15.8
7
3
772
25.4
6
5
440
9.01
5
490
17.8
8
11
600
13.1
1
4
100
16.5
5
Multip
leR
0.5429 0.9614 0.7178 0.9238 0.9651 0.6748 0.9662
R
Square
0.2948 0.9243 0.5152 0.8535 0.9315 0.4554 0.9335
X
Variab
le
-73.2362 -102.9695 -98.2492 -72.9698 -257.8805 493.8183 -49.7067
Sources: Compiled by the authors on the data from Eurostat (2023c), Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2022).
Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2023)
Note: *Unemployment, total (% of the total labour force); **GDP per capita (current EUR).
The correlation coefficients computed in Table 1 confirm a tight correlation between
unemployment and GDP per capita across nearly all considered countries. The calculated
coefficients range from 0.5429 (Albania) to 0.9662 (North Macedonia). An examination of the
results mentioned earlier indicates that unemployment rates have an effect on the GDP level.
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The countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and North
Macedonia share a direct and significant relationship between their indicators. By decreasing
unemployment rates, these nations could improve their GDP, boost production levels, and drive
aggregate demand. As these nations undergo transformation, the persistent effort to maximize
the effective utilization of their human potential should be a critical component of their
development strategy. The implementation of socially-driven initiatives by these nations will aid
in achieving acceptable levels of production while facilitating steady GDP growth. In contrast,
the scenario in Albania and Turkey varies, where the correlation between unemployment and
actual GDP is comparatively weaker. A more complex set of factors influences the creation of
GDP, and unemployment is not the sole determinant of its dynamics. Pricing processes, market
price regulation, economic conditions, and inflation play significant roles. The markets' unique
characteristics, as well as the relatively higher inflation rate in Albania and Turkey compared to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, may explain the
average density of connection between the studied indicators in these countries (Appendix A).
Inflation and unemployment show a dependent relationship, as evidenced by the Phillips curve,
whereby a reduction in unemployment rates leads to a faster increase in inflation-adjusted wages
in the long term.
Although the correlation between these indicators has undergone some changes
following the global financial crisis of 2008 and the 2019 pandemic in Eurozone countries, it
still demonstrates instability over time but remains present. The decrease in unemployment rates
in Albania and Turkey cannot be interpreted solely as a consequence of increased labour
productivity. Therefore, it did not considerably influence the increase in production volumes and
the upward trend in GDP, as indicated by correlation indicators.
The information gathered from Table 1 on unemployment levels and GDP per capita
allowed for the classification of candidate and potential candidate countries into three groups
at the start (2010) and end (2020) of the study period (Table 2).
Table 2. Results of cluster analysis for candidate countries and potential candidates in 2010
and 2020
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Clusters 2010 2020
1 Albania
Albania, Serbia, Montenegro,
North Macedonia
2
Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, Serbia,
Montenegro, North Macedonia
Kosovo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina
3 Turkey Turkey
Source: Compiled by the authors
Cluster analysis results provide evidence of different labour market development patterns
for candidate and potential candidate countries over the period studied. Consequently, Turkey
exhibits distinctive features within its labour market. Between 2010 and 2020, Albania, Serbia,
Montenegro and North Macedonia exhibited similar levels of unemployment and GDP per
capita, comparable to those of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are currently
potential candidates. These countries share common traits with regard to the indicators and their
relationship.
Emigration is a widespread phenomenon in E U candidate countries and potential
candidates. Based on Eurostat website data, the majority of studied countries, excluding Turkey,
exhibit a negative net migration indicator, demonstrating high emigration rates in these states.
Table 3 displays the correlation-regression analysis of data from 2011 to 2020 concerning
the relationship between net migration (MIGRn) and unemployment (UnL) in candidate and
potential candidate countries.
Table 3. Unemployment rate and net migration* in candidate countries and potential candidates
in 2011-2020
The
Republic
of Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovi
na
The
Republic
of Kosovo
The
Republic
of Serbia
Montenegr
0
The
Republic
of Turkey
The
Republic
of North
Macedonia
MIG
Rn
UnL
MIG
Rn
Un
L
MIG
Rn
UnL
MIG
Rn
UnL
MIG
Rn
UnL
MIG
Rn
UnL
MIG
Rn
UnL
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2011
-18
626
13.4
8
-271
27.5
8
-34
674
2
437
22.9
7
-910
19.7
6
1352
36
8.8 -795
31.3
8
2012
-19
841
13.3
8
0
28.0
1
15
159
30.8
8
-1
24.0
0
-952
19.8
1
26
251
8.15 -934
31.0
2
2013
-20
684
15.8
7
244
27.4
9
-17
167
29.7
7
0
22.1
5
-930
19.5
9
1295
12
8.73 -455 29
2014
-21
702
18.0
5
0
27.5
2
-33
982
35.2
6
2
420
19.2
2
-937
18.0
5
80
657
9.88 -475
28.0
3
2015
-20
501
17.1
9
27.6
9
4973
2
32.8
4
0
17.6
6
-938
17.5
5
1245
84
10.2
4
-508
26.0
7
2016
-9
346
15.4
2
0
25.4
1
-2
994
27.4
9
0
15.2
6
-936
17.7
3
1861
82
10.8
4
-161
23.7
2
2017
-14
904
13.6
2
-2
255
20.5
3
294
30.3
4
0
13.4
8
-937
16.0
8
1303
80
10.8
2
163
22.3
8
2018 15 0
27
12.3 0 18.4
-16
603
27.7
6
0
12.7
3
-937
15.1
9
3706
16
10.8
9
225
20.7
4
2019
-23
096
11.4
7
15.6
9
-25
919
25.0
7
0
10.3
9
-937
15.1
3
4034
04
13.6
7
-276
17.2
6
2020
-16
684
11.8
15.8
7
2
821
25.4
6
0 9.01 -938
17.8
8
13.1
1
-755
16.5
5
Multip
leR
0.1402 0.5067 0.3967
0.4355 0.2279 0.8112 0.4611
R
Square
0.0197 0.2567 0.1574
0.1896 0.0520 0.6582 0.2126
Sources: Compiled by the authors on the data from Eurostat (2023d)
Note: *net migration (number).
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The findings of our investigation partly align with those of Skuflic and Vuckovic (2018).
Our analysis has demonstrated a notable association between emigration levels, predominantly
the net migration index, and unemployment rates in the nations under investigation. As per the
evidence, the correlation was moderate (0.5067 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 0.3967 for Kosovo,
0.4355 for Serbia, and 0.4611 for North Macedonia) and strong (0.8112 for Turkey). It has been
observed that the prevalence of emigrants over immigrants leads to a rise in the unemployment
rate, ultimately resulting in a shortage of labour in these countries. Membership in the E U
provides fresh employment prospects for individuals deserving of jobs in the European labour
market. This could potentially reduce the outflow of citizens from the surveyed nations and
contribute favourably to the unemployment rate. Analysis of correlation indicators and research
by Zaiceva (2014) affirms that several other factors considerably affect migration and may arise
as an outcome of emigration. Assuming that emigration is caused by an excess supply of labour
within a specific country, rising emigration rates can reduce current levels of unemployment by
redistributing the labour force. Moreover, this modification may potentially benefit salaries,
notably for employees in regions with labour shortages due to migration. The outcomes of the
research exhibit only limited correspondence with Zaiceva's (2014) findings due to the
interrelationship amidst the factors. Nonetheless, its efficacy is limited in certain countries
(especially Albania and Montenegro), proving that curtailing emigration does not ensure the
attainment of low unemployment rates and has minimal impact on the nation's job market.
Our research affirms the perspective put forth by Pryimachenko, Fregert, and Andersson
(2013) that "unemployment may result in emigration, but such migration can positively impact
and alleviate unemployment," highlighting the interconnectedness of these elements. There are
various limitations to the statistical separation of the effects of emigration and their assessment,
which implies the limitations of our research. The development of the labour market is
influenced by a significant number of factors, and as a result, membership in the EU does not
guarantee stable, high employment levels.
Simultaneously, trend analysis suggests that favourable alterations in the unemployment
rates are observable within the labour markets of EU accession states.
The trend analysis indicates favourable prospects for the labour markets of the countries
under scrutiny. The activity and employment dynamics have been gradually improving,
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especially within the 2010-2020 period, following their acquisition of candidate status or
potential candidate. Despite this, the indicators continue to fall below the EU and member states'
weighted average. Potential candidate countries (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Turkey
have the worst activity rates. The most common type of economic activity among enlarged
countries is services, the share of which increased during the period under study in most countries
and the EU. Also, many workers are employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing,
distinguishing the studied countries from other EU countries.
The study's findings confirm that a nation's entry into the E U substantially affects the
level of joblessness, leading to a decrease. The results of the countries thatjoined the EU in 2004
(namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland) and those that joined in 2007 (such as Bulgaria and Romania) are in line
with the findings of the International Labour Organization's (2016) review, which reveals that
changes in the labour market of individual nations are brought forth by external factors.
However, it is apparent that EU membership cannot universally manage employment growth.
Zaiceva's (2014) research highlights this; when the 2004 and 2007 countries joined the EU, there
was economic growth and an increase in labour demand.
This led to a decrease in unemployment as there was more intense labour movement
between sectors and states, ultimately requiring new personnel. The determination of the
unemployment rate in 2004 and 2007 was predominantly driven by business cycle factors
(Skuflic & Vuckovic, 2018). It would be imprudent to assert that the unemployment rate has
decreased unequivocally. The rise in the employment rate is attributable solely to the country's
membership in the EU. However, the operation of the labour market is influenced by a
combination of economic and political factors, with EU accession being only one of them.
The presence of a close relationship between the level of unemployment and GDP per
capita should be taken into account when developing a national policy for the development of
the labour market in candidate and potential candidate countries since, with an increase in the
level of employment, the indicator that reflects the prosperity of nations will increase. The
findings from this investigation, concerning varying degrees of correlation between GDP per
capita and unemployment levels among candidate countries and potential candidates, align with
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the conclusions drawn by An et al. (2017), demonstrating the applicability of Okun's Law in
advanced economies but its inapplicability in low- and lower-middle-income countries.
The trend analysis for 2021-2022 indicates a decline in unemployment within the EU and
the candidate and potential candidate countries. Serbia is projected to reach the average EU level
of unemployment in 2022, while Turkey is expected to experience a further increase in
unemployment during 2021-2022.
The cluster analysis results confirm the presence of various trends and patterns of labour
market development for the candidate countries and potential candidates during the studied
period. Due to its prominent features, Turkey occupies a separate cluster during the studied
period. Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia achieved common approaches
regarding the unemployment rate and GDP per capita. Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
potential candidates, have similar features regarding the studied indicators and their relationship.
Our analysis of Turkey is consistent with the findings of Dayioglu and Aydin (2020),
who observed an inverse correlation between growth and unemployment in Turkey, particularly
during times of crisis. Additionally, the International Labour Organization (2016) recognises
Turkey as a country with non-standard employment practices.
When considering the development of the labour market in Turkey as a potential E U
member, it is crucial to objectively examine the correlation between inflationary processes and
the market's trends. Despite its rapid industrial growth, Turkey's unrestrained inflationary
processes are impeding its potential for a thriving labour market. We concur with Yildirim's
(2015) research, which illustrates a correlation between labour productivity and inflation. This
correlation is inverse and stronger than the impact of real wages on labour productivity.
Additionally, the causal relationship between wages and productivity indicates a unidirectional
causality that disrupts the constant interdependence of these indicators. Consequently,
harmonising the Turkish labour market following EU standards, particularly when inflation rises,
becomes increasingly challenging.
This study focuses on countries with economies in transition and developing countries,
as these nations have unique labour market developments. Our results confirm significant
features in the labour market of candidate and potential candidate countries, as most are classified
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by the United Nations (2021) as transition economies, including Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.
In developing countries, particularly those seeking EU membership, monetary policy has
a significant impact on the labour market, productivity, activity level and employment (Assemien
et al., 2019; Gomes et al. 2023). Monetary policy instruments play a crucial role in regulating
market processes during macroeconomic instability. Labour productivity is responsive to
fluctuations in both inflation rate and discount rate levels. Research conducted by Yildirim
(2015) suggests that a managed reduction in discount rates has the potential to enhance labour
productivity, particularly in larger business operations.
While monetary policy tools are customary in the regulatory activity of nations and have
a broad influence on the labour market, innovations are a fundamental aspect of contemporary
management practices and have a substantial impact on the development of human capital, the
calibre of human potential and its efficacy at work. The innovative element of the labour market
development strategy is being revised due to the impact of digitisation. Digital transformations
are of great significance in developing nations; however, the pace at which innovations are
adopted within labour markets is not as speedy when compared with that of highly developed
EU member states.
Digitisation has a significant impact on human capital and labour productivity. The
quality of human resources varies among EU member states and candidate states for membership
based on differing levels of digital literacy and skills among citizens.
Considering this, the harmonisation of social policy in employment and human capital
development should include steps towards fostering digital competencies and facilitating general
adaptation to work in the digital space. Simplifying the process of integrating national labour
markets into the European ones is possible by eliminating significant differentiation in the levels
of digital personnel training. Aly (2022) conducted a study demonstrating a closely positive
correlation between the digital transformation index and economic growth, labour efficiency,
and employment in the state. Using innovations, particularly artificial intelligence, in the labour
market brings significant advantages for developing countries. To obtain these benefits, it is
advisable to address specific barriers, including:
- Firstly, adapting employees to work within the digital environment;
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- Secondly, seeking additional financing sources to support technical transformations in
national labour markets (Aly, 2022).
Digital literacy is an essential aspect of education. Moreover, it is agreeable with scholars
that to enhance labour markets, interested authorities must focus on reinforcing the high-skilled
labour market and increasing the education level and entrepreneurial activity (Liotti, 2022;
O'Higgins and Pica, 2020). With adequate education, the workforce possesses the option of either
being employed or self-employed. Ewing and Hendy (2021) focused on the significance of the
level of qualifications and innovative qualities of the workforce while developing the job market
in European nations. Ozgen (2021) examined the influence of diverse directions of regulatory
policy on alterations in the labour market. They substantiated through empirical evidence that
the state establishes the necessities for cultivating the economy and the labour market by
influencing the labour market through innovation. Koster et al. (2011) demonstrated the
repercussions of innovation on the labour market, which instigates growth in the demand for
highly skilled labourers among nations. Thus, the greater the government's investment in cuttingedge
technology and research, the more vibrant and active the job market will become.
The labour market development system may be altered by adopting an unemployment
policy that aims to offer financial compensation and aid while encouraging labour resource
growth and innovative potential among the population, as recommended by the International
Labour Organization (2021).
Unfortunately, the innovative potential of candidate countries is weaker compared to
highly developed EU states, primarily due to a set of barriers, including:
- In Kosovo (Retkoceri and Kurteshi, 2018): government policies and legislation.
- In Albania (Deshati, 2015): high economic costs for innovation, market instability and
crises, poor copyright protection, and ease of copying innovations.
- In Serbia (Nikolic et al., 2015): society's unpreparedness for innovative
transformations, insufficient awareness of the importance of innovation, particularly in
the labour market, irrational state innovation support strategies, market restrictions,
insufficient capital, non-innovative organisational culture, and inadequate stimulation
of innovative activity.
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The OMC is a crucial element among measures to harmonise the functioning of labour
markets and employment policy in the EU. However, its effectiveness must be clarified due to
the mild regulatory influence without European legislative regulations and mandated efforts
(Eurostat Statistics Explained, 2023a). The OMC is effective if the aspirations and goals of the
EU members are united. Therefore, it can only be considered as an additional element supporting
the processes of adapting the labour markets of the new E U members to the already-formed
market environment.
This approach facilitates the dissemination of best practices among Member States and
promotes progress towards the EU's key objectives, such as enlargement policy. As part of the
enlargement objectives, the candidate countries are required to enhance the quantity and quality
of their data submitted to Eurostat. The primary objective is to supply standardized, superior data
conforming to European and global benchmarks, which can aid in regulating, anticipating, and
consolidating thejob market in the European Union for current, candidate, and aspiring countries
(Eurostat Statistics Explained, 2023b).
6. Conclusions
There can be many reasons for the diversity observed across candidate and potential
candidate countries' labour markets. Differences in the economic level, regulations, protections,
historical conditions, sectoral composition of employment, etc., play an important role.
Nonetheless, EU labour market policies and institutions also affect the speed at which the labour
markets of the candidate and potential candidate countries adjust. Differences mean that E U
labour markets will need time to absorb the large numbers of workers after EU enlargements.
This process can be supported by reforms of employment protection, cohesion policy,
legislation, and further efforts to enhance the flexibility of labour market regulations.
The sluggish recuperation following the financial and economic crisis in the EU and the
increasing indications of surging unemployment propelled the European Commission to release
a scheme of propositions regarding how employment policies interconnect with various other
policy domains in favour of intelligent, viable, and all-inclusive development.
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Practical implications
Since the enlargement, nations will steadily enhance the amount and quality of their
information for Eurostat. The results may function as a component of the employment policies
coordination of the EU member states to attain shared labor market objectives, allowing for the
traits of the candidate nations and potential candidates.
Limitations
The research conducted is limited by the data used in the study, which includes only the
indicators for activity level, employment, and unemployment found on the Eurostat website.
These indicators were obtained through a survey method in accordance with E U legislation,
principles, and practices adopted by all member states. Data from countries that are candidates
or potential candidates are collected according to standardized principles. However, disparities
in data collection and processing methods between the EU and World Bank methodologies may
result in variations in the outcomes of the study if alternative information sources are used. It is
important to note that results may differ when taking into account more extensive indicators.
Furthermore, the selected time frame must be considered.
To examine the correlation between the unemployment rate and GDP in the chosen
countries, we have selected the period from 2010 to 2020. Choosing a different period for the
study may change the results. Third, these are selected countries. Since only EU member states,
candidate countries and potential candidates were selected for the analysis, the outcomes may
differ if a similar study were conducted using data from other countries.
Future research directions
The further direction of the research is the study of individual scenarios of the
development of the labour market for the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, which received the
status of candidate countries in 2022.
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Appendix
Inflation rate in EU accession candidate countries and potential candidates (rate of change)
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo Serbia Montenegro Turkey
North
Macedonia
2010 1.3 6.2 8.6 1.1
2011 4.4 11.2 6.5 3.2
2012 6.3 7.4 9.0 1.8
2013 4.8 7.7 7.5 2.7
2014 4.3 2.3 8.9 0.0
2015 -0.7 1.5 7.7 0.1
2016 -1.2 1.3 -0.1 7.7 0.2
2017 3.2 -0.5 1.5 3.3 2.7 11.1 2.1
2018 1.8 1.1 1.1 2.0 2.6 16.3 2.3
2019 1.7 1.3 2.7 1.9 0.5 15.2 0.7
2020 2.2 -0.3 0.2 1.8 -0.5 12.3 1.2
Sources: Compiled by the authors on the data from Eurostat (2023b)
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DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2023.43.04
EU PROJECTS IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE:
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Olha IVASECHKO, Assoc. Prof., PhD
Lviv Polytechnic National University,
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ukraine.
ivasechko.201 l@ukr.net
Oleh TSEBENKO, Assoc. Prof., PhD.
Lviv Polytechnic National University,
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ukraine.
oleh.o.tsebenko@lpnu.ua
Yaryna TURCHYN, Professor.
Lviv Polytechnic National University,
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ukraine.
turchynj @ukr.net
Khrystyna IVANYSHYN, Master.
Lviv Polytechnic National University,
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ukraine.
kristinaivanishin@gmail. com
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Abstract: The article dwells upon the problems of implementing the EU defense strategy, taking into account the
leading European concept, strategic documents and the current initiatives in the EU security and defense sector.
It was proved that due to the divergent views of the EU member states, there exist thefollowing interpretations of
the leading defense concept, namely: I) "strategic autonomy / sovereignty" (France, Germany, Spain, Italy)
considers independence in decision-making, increased integration and generating of finances and resources; 2)
"strategic responsibility" (Netherlands, Finland, Estonia) is about greater collective contribution to the regional
security system, which provides for a balance of interests in the EU-NATO-USA partnership; 3) "open strategic
autonomy" (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, lithuania, latvia) deals with preservation ofpower only in priority areas
of EU activity. Thepeculiarities of the transformations of the EU defense strategy were identified, and thefollowing
three EU strategic documents were analyzed, i. e., the European Security Strategy of2003, the EU Global Strategy
of 2016, and the EU Strategic Compass of2022. It was determined that the Strategic Compass should introduce
consistency in the rules, the management structure of the defense initiatives, clarify the boundaries between
ambition andpragmatism, and integrate the defense sector. The strengths and weaknesses of the defense initiatives
both within theframework of EU treaties (PESCO, CARD, EDF) and outside them (EI2) were pinpointed. The set
of shortcomings detected in the abovementioned defense initiatives were outlined. The priority scenarios are
represented. It has been predicted that by 2030, under the conditions of preserving the ambition of "strategic
autonomy", it is necessary to take a set of thefollowing measures: I) to define a single vision of their cooperation;
2) tofind out the structure of the defense cooperation within theframework of EU treaties (PESCO) or outside the
EU (EI2); 3) to clarify the rules of the defense sector management and a special bodyfor decision-making.
Keywords: EU defense strategy, Strategic Compass, Russian-Ukrainian war, PESCO.
1. Introduction
Since the time of its foundation, the European Union has not assumed the role of protector
and defender in terms of military issues of the European continent, but took as its basis the
"theory of a non-military state". That is why the ability of the European Union to use military
force to settle conflicts on the European continent has always been low and unlikely. Obviously,
the E U tried to avoid direct confrontation in most of the conflicts that took place in the
neighboring countries of Europe. Security and defense factors came under the competence of the
North Atlantic Alliance, based on the fact that the member states of the Community are also the
members of NATO. However, the events in the modern world have forced the EU to reconsider
its security role on the world stage. With the changing security environment and geopolitical
challenges, Brussels began to position itself as the "security maker" on the European continent.
The discussions regarding the ability of the European Union to protect the European
continent from potential military threats began as early as 2014. However, such discussions were
not successful and considered inappropriate, since the main component which was paid due
attention to was the economic one. Besides, in 2022, the discussions on the strategic autonomy
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of the EU in the field of security and defense were intensified again in the context of Russia's
invasion of Ukraine. In this regard, back in October 2021, the head of the European Council,
Charles Michel, made a statement that 2022 was declared the "year of the European defense"
(Herszenhorn, 2021). Such a decision was intended to show that the E U states are capable of
resisting the widespread misconception that Europe is not capable of defending itself militarily.
The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell,
also emphasized that one of the many tasks which the European Union is facing deals with
relearning the "language of power". His words marked the beginning of a review of the global
role assumed by the association.
This position was supported by the head of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Alexander Schallenberg; he added that he was deeply convinced that the Russian war, which
was launched against Ukraine, forced the European community to look at the security situation
from a different angle. He claims that it was this military aggression that pulled political leaders
and society out of their false dreams of a post-national and post-historical Europe and inspired
large-scale changes that would not have taken place due to the organization's unwillingness to
look at the world affairs without rose-coloured glasses, thus giving the desired valid.
On March 25, 2022, a month after the start of the Russia's full-scale military invasion of
Ukraine, the Strategic Compass was adopted at the Community summit, which should provide
an explanation of the Europe's role in the defense sector and determine the vector of the E U
future defense policy. As the new Defense Strategy, the Compass tries to fill the gap between
the common objectives of the Community set out in the Global Strategy of the European Union
2016, the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the instruments for building up military forces
and capabilities (PESCO, CDP/CARD, EDF).
The new EU Defense Strategy gives the Community a chance to strengthen its influence
in solving global problems of humanity, namely, war, struggle for energy sources, climate
catastrophe and health crisis. However, no matter how ambitious the Strategic Compass may
seem, its scope and results will depend crucially on the extent to which European states are
willing to revise their national defense ambitions. This raises the issue of whether the EU will
be able to face security challenges and implement the defense strategy.
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The aim of the article is to research and analyze the key problems of the implementation
of the EU defense strategy and the prospects and possible trajectories of its development.
2. Literature review
Scientific studies that analyze the issues of the EU defense strategy implementation can be
divided into four main groups. The first group focuses on understanding the concepts of
European strategic autonomy and sovereignty in the field of security and defense. Within this
group, many contributions are focused on clarifying the term "strategic autonomy" (Bailes, 2005;
Erlanger, 2020; European strategic autonomy in 2021; Kempin, Kunz, 2017) and its
characteristics (Lippert, Ondarza, Perthes, 2019); Arteaga, 2017b). The researchers additionally
pay attention to the "strategic sovereignty" (Leonard, Shapiro, 2019; Lefebvre, 2021), and the
distinctions between strategic sovereignty and strategic autonomy (Arteaga, 2017a).
The second important group of studies is aimed at analyzing the regulatory and legal field
of security and defense of the EU. It was important to find out the origins of the idea of the
European defense (Franco-British St. Malo Declaration 1998) and subsequent documents
that contributed to the settlement of this issue (Implementation Plan on Security and Defense,
2016; Establishing the European Defense Fund: 2021). Special attention was paid to the
following documents: E U Strategic Course (Missiroli, Tocci, Mogherini, 2015; Myronova,
2022), "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe" or EU Global Strategy (Yildirim,
2021; Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 2016; Vincenti, 2016; Missiroli, Tocci,
Mogherini, 2015; The European Union's global strategy 2019; Le Gleut, Conway-Mouret,
2021) and Strategic Compass (Questions and answers: threat analysis 2020; Wagner , 2022;
For a European Union that protects 2022; Le Gleut, Conway-Mouret, 2021; Paul, Shea,
Chihaia, Ciolan et al, 2022).
The third group aims at outlining the challenges faced by the EU while implementing the
defence strategies. When considering the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security
and Defense (PESCO) platform, it was found out which countries are its members (Establishing
permanent structured cooperation (PESCO)2017), as well as the progression of the launching
projects (Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)) with their further prospects (Dorosh,
2023b; Dorosh, Ivasechko, Nocoh, 2020). The strengths (Development, Delivery and
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Determination: PESCO 2022; Peruzzi, 2022; Paolucci, 2021; Concerning a roadmap for the
implementation 2018) and weaknesses of PESCO were pinpointed and clarified (Le Gleut,
Conway-Mouret, 2019; Barigazzi, 2021; PESCO Strategic Review 2020, 2020). The EU's
Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) provides the opportunity to monitor all the
EU states' defense spendings and investments, including the research (Waard, 2020; Borrell,
2023). The strengths (Fiott, 2017) and the weaknesses (Report CARD 2020, 2020; Reybroeck,
2019) were clearly outlined. Having analysed the European Defense Fund (EDF) (Establishing
the European Defense Fund: 2021; European Defense Fund: EU to invest..., 2023), it is
possible to clearly identify their strengths (For a European Union that protects 2022; The
European Defense Fund (EDF), 2022; European defense fund - performance, 2021) which were
acquired in a short time of its existence and their weaknesses (Ilmonen, 2021; Nádudvari, Varga,
2019; Zandee, 2021), which are the obstacle for the work of the fund. The study also examined
the strengths (Letter of Intent between the ..., 2018; Mills, 2019; 2022 military strength ranking,
2022) and the weaknesses (Moiling, Major, 2018) of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)
(Sjokvist, Fnsell, 2023; "Vladimir Putin has jolted back NATO"..., 2023).
Finally, the fourth group of studies highlights the possible development algorithms in the
field of security and defense of the EU. The scenarios for the progression of European defense
events in the world in 2025 have been determined (Future of European Defence: reflection paper,
2017).
3. Theoretical and methodological foundations of the study
The defense strategy of the EU has always been a relevant research issue for the
representatives of scientific and political spheres, and in recent years it has increasingly begun
to emerge in the published works. The luminary of diplomacy Henry Kissinger (1962) in his
article "Unsolved Problems of European Security" clearly indicated which challenges the
European region faces when it comes to its security. In general, the issue of the E U defense
strategy was paid attention to by such researchers as Eric Brattberg, Tomasz Valašek (2019) and
Felix Arteaga (2017), who studied, identified and described the weak links in the defense of
Europe. It is known about the differences in the idea of the defense strategy of the EU, and,
therefore, scientists could not ignore the "strategic autonomy/sovereignty" as one of the
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interpretations of the leading concept and tried to clarify what is meant by this definition
(Koenig, 2020). Besides, Lorenzo Vai (2021) managed to describe the genesis and development
of the idea of "strategic autonomy" and explained the aspects of this term and which political
spheres are included in it. Sascha Lohman (2021) made an attempt to conceptualize "strategic
autonomy" through the prism of contextualizing its political genealogy and use. It is also
significant that such researchers as I. Yakovyuk, O. Tragnyuk and D. Boychuk (2020) are
convinced that the implementation of the idea of the "European sovereignty" in the area of
security and defense will not lead to direct competition between the E U and NATO, but take
more responsibility for its own security and the security of its neighbors and strengthen its role
in transatlantic relations. Henric Larsen (2022) notes that Russia's invasion of Ukraine represents
a new political reality in which European states are ready to strengthen their role in continental
defense. However, the main focus should be on "strategic responsibility" and not on the
"strategic autonomy", which is unrealistic both from the military and political viewpoints.
Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute (2019) in their report, which was considered with NATO,
suggested that "strategic responsibility" could be a better concept for the European Union.
"Strategic responsibility" is a more accurate term that encompasses Europe's efforts to take on
additional responsibilities for the security of its neighbors without undermining cooperation with
international partnerships and alliances (Helwig, 2020). Investigating the concept of the "open
strategic autonomy", Eric Van den Abeele (2021) highlights the origins of the term and
represents the evolution of the denoted concept of the "open strategic autonomy" in order to
analyze its foundations and further consequences. Mavluda Sattorova (2023) focused on
considering the fundamental principles of the open strategic autonomy of the European Union.
It is quite obvious that the transformations of the EU defense strategy (Violakis, 2020)
contributed to the development of the regulatory framework that regulated this issue, i.e., the
European Security Strategy of 2003 (Becher, 2004; Toje, 2005; Biscop, 2010; Anderson,
Brattberg, Haggqvist, Ojanen, 2011), EU Global Strategy 2016 (Smith, 2017; Pishchikova, Piras,
2017; Biscop, 2021), and EU Strategic Compass 2022 (Blockmans, Macchiarini, Paikin, 2022;
Sweeney, Winn, 2022; Gjoreski, 2022; Biscop, 2022; Dorosh, Lemko, 2022, Dorosh, 2023a).
The theoretical points of view were also presented for defense initiatives that are enshrined in
EU treaties, namely, PESCO (Wolfstadter, Kreilinger, 2017; Biscop, 2017; Biscop, 2020; Billon-
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Galland, Efstathiou, 2019; Blockmans, Crosson, 2021), CARD (Reybrouck, 2019), EDF
(Haroche, 2020; Sabatino, 2022); additionally, the EI2 initiative (Koenig, 2018; Zandee,
Kruijver, 2019) which is outside the E U agreements, was represented for better theoretical
awareness.
4. European strategic autonomy and sovereignty in the field of security and defense
The term "strategic autonomy" has an old French origin and is defined as the ability to
independently use one's own military power, while in the modern interpretation the concept of
"European strategic autonomy" is the ability to independently decide and determine one's own
priorities in the field of security and foreign policy, taking into account financial, institutional
and political resources, whether it is in partnership with third countries or, if necessary,
independently (Bailes, 2005; Erlanger, 2020).
Effective strategic autonomy is characterized by the ability to create, change and control
international rules, as opposed to unconscious submission to the rules of others. The contrary to
the strategic autonomy is dependence on strategic decisions made by other states (Lippert,
Ondarza, Perthes, 2019).
The traditional definition of autonomy has expanded its meaning, where in addition to the
concept of "hard power", there are issues of defense, energy, raw materials, medicine,
innovation, finance, etc. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the essence of the concept of the
"European strategic autonomy" is related to the ethical understanding of security (European
strategic autonomy in 2021).
The Spanish researcher Fernando Arteaga adheres to the vision that regardless of
terminology and interpretations, the viability of strategic autonomy depends on political and
financial prerequisites. The political prerequisite is the alignment of the strategic culture. After
all, it is not worth declaring a high level of political ambitions if there is not enough will to
implement them. In case of financial prerequisite, strategic autonomy requires additional
budgetary efforts (Arteaga, 2017).
According to the scientists Ronja Kempin and Barbara Kunz, the cornerstone of the
modern idea of strategic autonomy of the Community is the independence of the army and
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politics in the system of multilateral organization. Therefore, such autonomy has the following
three elements:
1) political autonomy (Strategy), achieved through a qualified majority to independently
decide on security policy issues;
2) industrial autonomy (Equipment) is developed via increasing defense potential to
achieve autonomy in military activities;
3) operational autonomy (Capabilities) deals with the ability to independently develop an
action plan for operations and implement it on a civilian or military scale (Kempin, Kunz, 2017,
p. 10).
It is worth noting that traditionally the term strategic sovereignty is often equated with
national sovereignty. However, the definition of the "strategic sovereignty" is explained as the
establishment of one's own rules in the international arena, and not deepening into the national
governance of European countries. The key goal of this type of sovereignty is to establish
favorable conditions where EU citizens have a common vision for the future of Europe (Leonard,
Shapiro, 2019).
The French diplomat, Maxime Lefebvre, claims that "the tool for achieving strategic
sovereignty is strategic autonomy". Such an integrating concept may seem less ambitious, less
politicized and more state-centric, but the adjective "strategic" enhances its importance, as the
French politician adds (Lefebvre, 2021).
A distinguishing feature of the strategic sovereignty from the autonomy is that European
sovereignty is still subject to limitations and relative character. Accordingly, the economy,
society, culture, education, health care, police and judicial system remain national prerogatives,
while the spheres of diplomacy, defense and finance belong to the principle of unanimity
(Arteaga, 2017a).
Concurrently, effective strategic sovereignty is the ability to achieve the expected result
regarding one's own rules and ambitions, and the prerequisites for such strategic sovereignty are
the shared strategic vision and the ability to act and decide (Leonard, Shapiro, 2019).
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5. Normative and legal regulation in the field of security and defense of the EU
The European Union is a subject of international relations, which implements the European
identity, expresses the position of EU citizens, directs policy based on democratic principles, and
has the appropriate attributes of power (currency, legislation), i.e., it is a sovereign within a
multilateral organization.
Initially, the idea of European defense autonomy appeared in the Franco-British
declaration of 1998. The clarity of the declaration is equal to its ambitious content: "in order to
be a full-fledged player in the international arena, the Community must have the opportunity for
independent actions, which are secured by military power, tools to make decisions, and the will
to respond to the international crises" (Franco-British St. Malo Declaration 1998).
Subsequently, the concept of strategic autonomy was transformed into the ambition of the
EU defense strategy from 2016. Thus, the Strategy encourages determination to act
independently to combat new security challenges (Implementation Plan on Security and Defense,
2016).
It is worth paying attention to the Regulation of the European Defense Fund (EDF) from
June 2021, the purpose of which is to promote the strategy of self-sufficiency and freedom of
action of the Community by strengthening the innovation potential of the industrial and
technological base (EDITB). Accordingly, this interpretation of the "strategic autonomy" gives
this concept even greater value (Establishing the European Defense Fund: 2021).
On December 12, 2003, the High Representative of the E U for External Relations and
Security Policy Javier Solana made public the project of the first strategic course of Europe,
which describes the global challenges in the security environment, delineates priorities and
highlights the expected consequences (Missiroli, Tocci, Mogherini, 2015).
The EU Strategic Course of 2003 characterizes the European security environment as the
space full of challenges of a low quality of life; the collapse of state governance; the struggle for
energy sources and resources; terrorism; the emergence of criminal groups; the escalation of
conflicts in the regions; the emergence and the use of new types of weapons that affect a large
radius of the territory both chemically and destructively. Terrorism is highlighted in the
European Security Strategy as the type of threat that is one of the components of social relations.
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The sources of terrorism can be corruption and a high level of crime (Missiroli, Tocci,
Mogherini, 2015).
In addition, the Javier Solana hoped that such a strategic course of Europe would bring the
following results:
1) the development and harmonization of the EU defense sphere with the priorities of the
foreign policy course and crisis management;
2) the growth of military and defense potential through mobile and operational models of
armies and convergence of the resources;
3) the integration of defense research into the common system;
4) increasing the role of diplomacy;
5) expanding the network of partners, primarily with Canada, Japan, China, India and
Russia (Myronova, 2022).
From the practical point of view, the European Security Strategy showed how to transform
its own values into precise mechanisms, where the Community was guided by the principle of
multilateralism, preventive actions and the comprehensive (complex) approach in solving
problematic phenomena. However, apart from the general acknowledgment of the threats and
methods, the strategy contains little explanation of the resources that are needed to achieve these
goals, i.e., how many and which ones are needed. In short, the first E U strategy codified the
objectives, but did not really take into account the capacity of the European Union and a clearly
defined implementation plan. Therefore, the European Security Strategy (2003) is not a strategic
course of the EU, but rather a leading concept for the development of the Common Foreign and
Defense Policy.
The next strategic document, entitled "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger
Europe" (or EU Global Strategy), appeared after world events such as the financial crisis and
the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, the Arab Spring revolution of 2010, the Russian-Ukrainian
war of 2014, and the Brexit decision of 2016. The Official Brussels was looking for the strategic
document that would combine more defense tools for two reasons: 1) to be able to face new
security challenges; 2) to consolidate the place of the European Union in the world market of the
defense industry (Yildirim, 2021).
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On June 28, 2016, Federica Mogherini, being the High Representative of the EU foreign
and security policy, approved the new course of European strategic planning, namely, the E U
Global Strategy. The key goal of the document is to change the way of strategic thinking of the
European Union from the concept of idealism about government powers with the manifestation
of values and ambitions to the pragmatic narrative about the system resistant to internal and
external challenges (Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 2016; Vincenti, 2016).
The preparation stage of the E U Global Strategy took place in 2015 together with the
strategic review of the High Representative for External Relations and Security Policy Federica
Mogherini; it represented five main issues for the EU, namely:
1) due to the emphasis on strategic relations only, the dynamics and relevance of the
European Security Strategy are lost;
2) insecurity with the shared logistical means, intelligence and army is accompanied by
dependence on other international actors;
3) low level of incentives of the European states regarding the increase in capacity directly
affects the growth of the degradation of industry, trade, and defense;
4) the participation of foreign aid in management and its standards does not allow directing
finances to urgent defense needs and priorities of the European Union's foreign policy, hence
financial and political instruments are not prone to flexibility;
5) the lack of coordination and policy fragmentation harms the EU role as one of the largest
aid donors and reduces its diplomatic activity (Missiroli, Tocci, Mogherini, 2015).
The Global Strategy of the EU, is of a rather blurred and generalized character. According
to the assessment of the Global Strategy of the EU, the world of the 21s t
century faces the
challenges of the consequences of globalization, cross-border problems, conflicts and crises in
the neighborhood, extremism, escalation of terrorism, and the emergence of a new type of threat,
i.e., hybrid, global warming, pollution of the environment, instability of the political and
economic system of the state, violation of human rights, health crisis and the insecurity of the
energy and digital sectors (Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 2016).
Thus, the EU strategic document from 2016 updates its action plan to more realistic tasks
that will be regularly monitored. Subsequently, the priorities of the Community are the protection
of the territories and the citizens, and the key vectors of the implementation of the Global
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Strategy of the EU are the protection of the Community, a comprehensive approach to conflict
stabilization, social and state stability of E U neighboring countries, regional partnership
structures and world management in the 21s t
century (Shared Vision, Common Action: A
Stronger..., 2016).
The review of the strategy took place during 2016-2020, and shows the following:
1) the range of threats is expanding to chemical attacks, propaganda and disinformation
and attacks on digital infrastructures. Therefore, in this context, a special achievement is the
Hybrid Fusion Cell - a tool for making political decisions based on the rapid analysis of
information from various sources;
2) due to irrationality in the distribution of defense finances, the Community spends a lot
of money on it, but does not reach the level of the defense union spending;
3) the potential for joint procurement of equipment is not used;
4) the Community is unable to act collectively and in a coordinated manner regarding the
stabilization of crisis phenomena and war, the key problem is the lack of consensus;
5) based on the experience of the E U member states, the inefficiency of the U N and
international economic institutions is noticeable;
6) The European Union does not expand cooperation with other continents of the world
such as Asia or the Middle East (The European Union's global strategy 2019).
In our opinion, the shortcomings of the Global Strategy are as follows:
- the lack of hierarchy of goals blocks the processes of both the strategy and the Common
Foreign and Security Policy;
- although the strategy points to a global dimension, it does not take into account external
challenges that directly affect the internal security of the EU;
- due to the large-scale range of tasks and the peculiarities of each European state, the
strategy does not provide for the establishment of specific tools to achieve the goals;
- the strategy does not set a time frame for the implementation of the tasks, thus, monitoring
its progress remains a complicated issue;
- the strategy still does not fix the mechanism for increasing the defense potential and
stabilizing the economy in Europe;
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- due to the priority of stability and readiness to stabilize crises, there are cases when EU
states and institutions do not pay much attention to problems related to the protection of people's
rights.
Undoubtedly, the geopolitical context has undergone changes over the past six years.
Therefore, the European Union is once more trying to increase its own potential as a global
player. It is obvious that the priority of the Community is its military ambitions, which are
focused on its own capabilities and partnership resources (Le Gleut, Conway-Mouret, 2021).
The research and preparation of the Strategic Compass began in late 2020 and was
completed in the spring of 2022. Thus, to create the third EU strategic document, the so-called
"360-degree Threat Analysis" was compiled, which included the intelligence data of individual
countries (Questions and answers: threat analysis 2020; Wagner, 2022).
The Strategic Compass intends to clearly describe and capture the concept of "strategic
autonomy" in the European defense environment. Subsequently, the plan of the strategic course
of the EU from 2022 consists in the flexibility of management in accordance with the set goals
(For a European Union that protects 2022, p. 11).
Although the "360-degree Threat Review" is a confidential document, it is safe to assume
that the results of this study were included in the Compass section, namely, "The World We
Face". This chapter states that the Community faces such challenges as hybrid warfare, crossborder
threats, weapons of mass destruction, terrorist acts, health crisis, etc. It is emphasized in
the text of the Compass that there is the need for greater responsibility of the Community for the
sphere of its protection both internally and externally, as well as the necessity to act promptly
and independently, or, if necessary, with partners (For a European Union that protects 2022,
p. 17).
Paradoxically, the full-scale war in Ukraine and the subsequent unplanned reviews have
led to a more motivated document, where each point is now analyzed mainly from the single
dimension, i.e., the place of the European Union in the even larger counterbalance of the
superpowers (Wagner, 2022).
The analysis of threats in the Strategic Compass, first of all, emphasizes the need for "hard
power" as the necessity for the Community. However, a thorough review of the threats of the
first chapter after the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war does not indicate a revision of the
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recommendations for actions presented in the following chapters (Le Gleut, Conway-Mouret,
2021).
Analyzing the Strategic Compass, David Rickels, the researcher at the European Policy
Center, highlights its strengths and weaknesses. In the group of the strengths of the Strategic
Compass, he singles out the following (Paul, Shea, Chihaia, Ciolan et al, 2022):
1) the Compass is an important step towards a strategic culture. For example, the
comprehensive assessment of threats has already managed to unite EU member states in the joint
strategic work;
2) the inclusive approach of the Compass presupposes a strategic course and a precise plan
of action. It sets a specific goal to strengthen the rapid response system by 2025, taking into
account both the operational tools and the decision-making method;
3) the role of the European Union as a promoter of the European security and the guarantor
of collective resilience (primarily against hybrid threats) is clearly stated in the Compass.
Some of the weaknesses of the Strategic Compass are as follows (Paul, Shea, Chihaia,
Ciolan etal., 2022):
1) the Compass does not correspond to the features of the strategy. The new strategic
planning of the EU did not take into account the fact that security also depends on such topics as
economy, energy, food, technology, migration and provision of resources in conditions of
scarcity;
2) the Compass is not sufficiently focused on geopolitics, for example, on the three
maritime hotspots, i.e., the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Baltic Sea. Therefore, we can
assume the probable status quo with China;
3) complex and convoluted military ambitions of the Compass. It would be of interest to
know what will happen to the defense goal "Headline Goal 2003" (joint armed forces of 60
thousand people in 60 days);
4) during the preparation of the Compass, the E U inter-institutional crisis management
system was not reviewed.
In general, Strategic Compass is a new chance for the E U in the area of security and
defense. It is ambitious and precise in addressing the known weaknesses in decision-making
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processes, structures, capacity and funding which are known to have prevented previous E U
strategies from acting swiftly and responsibly.
6. Issues of EU defense initiatives implementation
The success of the EU defense strategy directly depends on the adequate defense structure
of the European states, which is able to influence the system of military management and has the
appropriate tools to encourage the governments of the states to act as a single consortium, with
others, when possible, and autonomously, in case the need presupposes. Below is a detailed look
at several of these defense structures for Europe.
Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defense of the EU (PESCO) is a
platform for cooperation between European states in the security and defense area, the basis of
which is joint projects aimed to increase European defense potential; it began its work on
December 11, 2017 (Establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) ) 2017;
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)).
On May 23, 2023, the European Union approved 11 new defense projects within the
framework of PESCO. These projects joined the 57 already existing within the Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO). All of them include training, artillery countermeasures,
ammunition, medium helicopters and air-launched missiles. According to Josep Borrell, due to
11 new EU projects, it will be possible to strengthen Europe's ability to conduct high-intensity
warfare.
PESCO can be considered as an important mechanism of military integration of E U
member states, launched with the aim of achieving significant results for a more effective defense
of Europe and ensuring better coordination and cooperation in the areas of investment, capacity
building and operational readiness. Hence, further prospects arise, namely, the increased
cooperation in these areas will reduce the number of different weapons systems in Europe and,
ultimately, increase operational interoperability between EU member states (Dorosh, 2023b, p.
5).
Having analysed the information on the operation of PESCO, we have identified the
strengths and weaknesses of this defense structure.
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PESCO strengths:
1. Projects that cover critical gaps. It is worth considering the following PESCO projects:
European MALE drone; early warning and interception based on space surveillance
(TWISTER); strategic air transport for oversized cargo (SATOC); and European Medical
Command (EMC) (Development, Delivery and Determination: PESCO 2022; Peruzzi,
2022).
2. Smart Defense cooperation model. PESCO provides sustainability of commitments,
project management and accountability mechanisms. In general, the advantage of this PESCO
model is that it managed to integrate such different vectors of states as Germany, Poland and
France (Paolucci, 2021).
3. PESCO Roadmap. In March 2018, the Permanent Structural Cooperation on Security
and Defense of the EU published a separate strategic document, the PESCO Roadmap. The
PESCO strategy includes three vectors: 1) growth of PESCO due to the creation of high-speed
mobility of the armed forces within the European Union; 2) expansion and establishment of
strategic partnership both within the structure and outside it; 3) investing in current defense
initiatives, taking into account funding for new military technologies and inventions (Concerning
a roadmap for the implementation 2018).
PESCO weaknesses:
1. Inconsistent achievements and lack of coordination. Most countries do not distinguish
between NATO and PESCO projects, so often the wave of Permanent Structural Cooperation
projects on security and defense of the E U is slow, or its certain projects are canceled
immediately (Le Gleut, Conway-Mouret, 2019).
2. Failure to fulfill obligations. On November 20, 2020, the Strategic Monitoring of
PESCO activities was held. The monitoring report highlights the following notable obstacles in
the functioning of PESCO: 1) so far, the projects have not received the necessary investments
from the participating states; 2) the representatives of the Community institutions do not receive
proper review of certain projects (Barigazzi, 2021; PESCO Strategic Review 2020, 2020).
3. Interaction with other international actors. According to the new EU defense strategy,
dated from 2022, PESCO should establish contacts not only with NATO, but also with the
African Union, Norway, Japan, Britain, etc. (For a European Union that protects 2022).
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Coordinated Annual Review on EU Defense (CARD). The Coordinated Annual Review
on Defense (CARD) provides a comprehensive overview of EU states' defense spendings and
investments, including research. This provides the opportunity to have a look at the European
defense planning and the development of its capabilities while listing gaps in relation to the CDP
(Waard, 2020).
Until now, the CARD reports have not received the attention they deserve. CARD should
now serve as the compass to guide the necessary joint development efforts. However, the
implementation of such coordination requires specific measures and the use of the Community
funds to facilitate the interaction between demand and industrial supply in the Member States.
This requires further cooperation to provide the European region with the necessary defense
capabilities, since, according to the CARD 2022 report, less than 20 per cent of all investments
in defense programs come from cooperation. This leads to the conclusion that defense
cooperation remains in the mode of exception rather than the rule (Borrell, 2023).
Due to the detailed analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of CARD were identified.
CARD strengths:
1. The mechanism of collective defense planning. The main idea of the CARD is to create
favorable conditions for collective European defense avoiding duplication of projects and waste
of money. Whereas a similar approach of the Capacity Development Plan (CDP) was invaluable
as of 2018. Subsequently, the CARD is a mechanism for implementing the goals of the European
defense strategy through the joint defense planning and consultation (Fiott, 2017).
CARD weaknesses:
1. Predominance of national interests over the Pan-European. This aspect leads to
different priorities, approaches to security and defense of the European Union and is
accompanied by the reluctance of the EU member states to share their own defense plans (Report
CARD 2020, 2020);
2. Criticism regarding the regulatory documents. The representatives of the private sector
and national structures criticized the Capacity Development Plan and the CARD 2020 Report.
They stated that the identified priorities and capabilities did not take into account their own
defense objectives; the six selected CARD sectors are too limited and short-term, and that the
reporting documentation is dominated only by defense industry gaps (Reybroeck, 2019).
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Having started its work on January 1, 2021, European Defense Fund (EDF) is a longstanding
French project supported by Germany. The basis for the European Defense Fund (EDF)
began to be prepared back in May 2017 (Establishing the European Defense Fund: 2021).
The European Commission has taken a revolutionary step, since this is for the first time in
the history of the existence of the European Union that its money will be used to invest in the
European sphere of protection. Although the key innovation of the European Defense Fund is
the specific allocation of the Community finances for the defense projects, which is completely
unprecedented.
On June 26, 2023, the European Commission announced the results of the 2022
competition for €832 million in funding from the European Defense Fund (EDF) to support 41
joint defense research and development projects in the EU. The selected projects will contribute
to the further development of high-quality defense capabilities of the EU in such key areas as
naval, land, air, space early warning systems and cyber defense (European Defense Fund: EU to
invest..., 2023).
Overall, based on the data, it is possible to highlight EDF's strengths and weaknesses.
EDF strengths:
1. The centerfor Defense Expenditures andIncentives ofDevelopment. In accordance with
the new E U defense strategy of 2022, the European Defense Fund consists of "windows for
defense research" and "windows for the development of defense capabilities". The goal of the
fund, according to the strategy, is to encourage E U states to collectively purchase equipment
and, with the help of joint defense research and innovation, to strengthen the European defense
technological and industrial base (EDTIB) (For a European Union that protects 2022; The
EU's Defense Technological and 2020).
2. Bonus system. As per the assignment structure, the amount of the bonus varies as
follows: 1) the EU Permanent Structural Cooperation on Security and Defense (PESCO) bonus
provides for a 10% bonus for all actions related to innovation and technology projects; 2) midcap
companies receive a 15% bonus for activity in the EU and 10% outside the EU; 3) the bonus
of 77 small and medium-sized enterprises defines a 5% bonus for non-cross-border enterprises
in the EU (or outside) and 10% for cross-border enterprises in the EU (or outside). Besides, the
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bonus can be doubled (x2%) under special conditions of cooperation (The European Defense
Fund (EDF), 2022).
3. National coordination centers. The European Defense Fund has a wide network of
representative offices, the main activity of which is informational and advisory support of
potential partners and investors of the EDF program throughout the entire project cycle. A
special pride of EDF is the national coordination center in Norway (European defense fund performance,
2021).
EDF weaknesses:
1. Lack of expertise and experience. Since it is a strategic need for EDF to support crossborder
partnerships, it must be able to create and coordinate such relationships. The EDF
awareness particularly differs between large and small businesses. The reason for this is the lack
of an effective long-term plan that would describe the goals, risks and methods of preventive
actions for the participants of EDF joint projects (Ilmonen, 2021);
2. Not suncronized budgets planning. So far, the planning periods and budget cycles of the
EU member states are different, which is a significant restraining factor for joint acquisition and
as a result, the pace of development of military innovations is imperceptible and insignificant
(Nadudvari, Varga, 2019, p. 6);
3. Limited strategic partnership. When it comes to the EDF's cross-border cooperation, it
should meet its specific requirements (three legal entities in three different states, given the
invitation of the foundation). Thus, the choice of the partners is a semi-strategic and semipolitical
decision, which cannot be taken by the industry sector independently, it requires the
approval and invitation of the EU member states. Therefore, the potential partners will not be
able to submit a request for cooperation on their behalf only and without the invitation from the
EDF (Zandee, 2021).
European Intervention Initiative (EI2). EI2 does not contain significant differences from
the abovementioned groupings.
The French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2) is an example of the structure that
allows for the formation of a strategic culture and strengthening cooperation with France as the
key country in operational commitments (Sjokvist, Frisell, 2023, p. 30(59)).
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On May 31, 2023, in his closing speech at the Bratislava GLOBSEC Forum (Slovakia),
the French President Emmanuel Macron stated that strategic independence and military
sovereignty require industrial efforts. The emptying of the arsenals in recent months has become
a clear signal that the EU only owns what it produces. He also noted that it remains clear that
some countries are increasing their defense spending to purchase large quantities of nonEuropean
goods, which could cause problems for these countries in the future. President Macron
emphasized that European states should use this opportunity to increase production in Europe. It
was due to this that significant progress was achieved in providing assistance to Ukraine.
European standards need harmonization and there are more differences in European than in
American standards. Although, at the same time, it is necessary to develop European defense
technologies and industrial base in all the interested countries, as well as to deploy fully
sovereign equipment at the European level. We need to reduce dependency and continue to build
strategic proximity in these joint efforts. Naturally, Emmanuel Macron meant the European
intervention initiative, which was launched five years ago, and, in his opinion, remains relevant
today ("Vladimir Putin has jolted back NATO"..., 2023).
Thus, based on the analysis, the following strengths and weaknesses of EI2 can be deduced.
EI2 strengths:
1. The Framework Nations cooperation model. E12 is an exclusive and flexible club of
the states whose main vision is to promote interoperability and responsiveness. EI2
corresponds to the Framework Nations model functioning on the basis of one national package
of capabilities (France) or on the basis of two (United Kingdom of Great Britain and France)
(Letter of Intent between the 2018; Novaky, 2018).
2. Autonomy regarding decision-making. EI2 keeps its focus on Europe, though its
decisions are not subject to NATO and EU structures subordination. While maintaining this
type of autonomy, EI2 is open to countries such as Denmark, which does not participate in the
EU Common Security and Defense Policy, and the United Kingdom, which left the European
Union in 2020 (Mills, 2019).
3. Exclusive club of the leading armies of Europe. According to the international ranking
of military strength "2022 Military Strength Ranking", most of the E l 2 member states belong
to the top 25 armies of the world among 142 countries (2022 military strength ranking, 2022).
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E12 weaknesses:
1. Undermining European solidarity. The concerns of EU member states about the
European intervention initiative (El2) were expressed in the statement that El2 may threaten the
values and intentions of the European Union. For one reason, El2 still maintains the rule of
participation "by invitation" and does not consider an inclusive approach for all willing European
states (Moiling, Major, 2018).
2. Humble coordination. E12 is resource neutral and will use already established
institutions and military communications systems. The majority of the Europeans do not approve
of the targeted increase in investment in weapons, military technology and the involvement of
their allies in dangerous missions of the neighboring states (Novaky, 2018).
7. Possible development algorithms in the field of security and defense of the EU:
forecasts and scenarios
As stated in the report of the European Defense Agency entitled "What the first
Coordinated Annual Review on Defense reveals: CARDs on the table", "prediction is a much
broader shaping of the future than its reality" (Waard, 2020).
Therefore, it is possible to assume the likely algorithms of the development of the
European defense events in the world in 2025 as follows:
Scenario 1. Partnership in the defense and security sector. The member states of the
Community will maintain partnership relations, taking into account their voluntary nature.
Interaction will occur frequently, primarily in special cases. For example, in case of financial
failure in the defense sector, the Community will, first of all, use the principle of general
economy;
Scenario 2. Collective security and defense. The Community member states will take the
first steps towards integration, i.e., greater industrial and financial cooperation in the defense
sector and regular participation of a significant number of states in joint projects, missions and
operations. The investments in the defense sector will come through the established link between
the contributions of the states and the income from the European assets in the military industry
market;
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Scenario 3. Single European protection. Community member states will achieve deep
integration in the Europe's defense sector. Cooperation and solidarity will be the norm, and
military capability will be bolstered by the close pooling of both armies and resources. Due to
the increase in joint defense spending, the innovativeness and professionalism of the military
industry will increase and the Community will rise in the ranking among security promoters
(Future of European Defense: reflection paper, 2017).
Obviously, it is almost impossible to predict the course of events in the context of the
modern international order, but it is possible to assume, based on the lessons of the past, what
needs are to be implemented to guarantee the effective protection of Europe. Therefore, we offer
the following set of recommendations:
1. The Security Council of Europe is the necessary governing body that the European
Union and its member states must implement to achieve consensus in decision-making.
2. Europe should avoid organizational redundancy in the defense sector, namely, there is
no need to create a multitude of defense initiatives that are left as paper tigers. In our opinion, it
is worth focusing on one framework of cooperation that will bring coherence in defense
planning, innovation and a reliable and operational European army (Headline goal 2003).
3. We must jointly oppose the external aggressor. In this context, civil security plays an
equally important role. The methods of protecting the consciousness of European citizens from
disinformation and propaganda must be developed together with other military technologies.
Therefore, European protection requires reform and a clear position from the EU member
states, i.e., what is what they really need - the autonomy or the protectionism. Considering that
the modern approach of strategic autonomy is defined as a long and endless way of implementing
European defense potential, the European Union must intensify its joint efforts to prevent
aggressors who pose a threat to free societies.
8. Conclusions
Over the decades, the strategic course of the EU has changed three times. The European
Security Strategy of2003 reflected the model of a liberal order (effective multiculturalism) based
on the model of the UN Security Council, where the role of diplomacy and in some cases the use
of "force" was first of all given way. Consequently, the first strategic document of the E U
confirmed that international law is not enough in the fight against financial stagnation, terrorist
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threats and conflicts. The 2016 EU Global Strategy took a new level of "strategic autonomy" to
protect the Europeans and institutionalize the Europe's defense sector through individual
initiatives, namely, CARD, EDF and PESCO. However, the mechanisms of the E U Global
Strategy proved to be insufficient under the influence of Brexit, the health crisis and the RussianUkrainian
conflict. Thus, starting from the "peace project" to the build-up of "hard power", the
Community has high hopes for the Strategic Compass 2022, which combines the autonomy
course and the 2030 action plan, defining its goals based on Europe's specific military gaps and
threats, and therefore aims to intensify the already started initiatives.
It has been asserted that the Permanent Structured Cooperation of the EU on Security and
Defense (PESCO) is a forum for the interaction of states and a permanent provider of critically
important projects of the European military industry. The most significant shift in the PESCO
Roadmap is the "Military Mobility" project, which facilitates military and civilian logistics and
has the potential to grow into a "military Schengen zone".
It was determined that the E U Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) is a
relatively unknown EU defense initiative, though it is the most significant one in the context of
the functioning of PESCO and EDF. The CARD cycle is long-term, hence its results are not
immediately visible. Besides, CARD is an intergovernmental tool of the EU, involving not much
of public participation. This is a key weakness of CARD, which threatens its effective
implementation, in case the countries do not provide exclusive information to the European
Defense Agency.
It was found out that the European Defense Fund (EDF) is the center of the EU defense
spending, which makes it possible to make the right investment decisions, develop a network of
coordination centers and, due to the system of bonuses, encourage the states to cooperate in joint
defense projects. EDF represents a unique opportunity in the single defense mechanism CARDPESCO-EDF,
thereby covering all the needs of the European defense sector.
It has been highlighted that the European Intervention Initiative (El2) is a French decision
independent of the EU and NATO in building a strategic culture and reviving the idea of combat
groups. The exclusive participation of the 13 leading armies of Europe is both an advantage in
the possible European defense integration (in particular for the participation of the forces of
Denmark and Great Britain) and a violation of European solidarity.
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Scenarios that predict the development of the E U in the field of defense, despite the
difficulties along the way, are considered. It should be understood that after the Russia's fullscale
military invasion of Ukraine, the priority of the organization is the protection of the member
states and its partners. In the future, the European Union should continue to deepen cooperation
in the field of defense and develop its potential in this direction, because it is impossible to
predict what events may unfold on the continent in the future, and security is the key to stability.
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DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2023.43.05
ACCESS TO IN-VEHICLE DATA IN THE MAELSTROM OF
PROTECTED RIGHTS AND LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AS AN
URGENT CHALLENGE FOR EU LAW
Václav SMEJKAL, Associate Professor, Ph.D.
Skoda Auto University, Czech Republic
vaclav. smeikal@savs. cz
Abstract: What will be the mode of the data that today's connected cars accumulate has become a critical issuefor
the entire automotive sector and its related supply and service industries. If quanta of highly usable data remain
largely with car manufacturers, they will become gatekeepers and the entire aftermarket will either fall into
complete dependence on them or lose the ability to innovate and compete. Aftermarket leaders and EU institutions
are working to ensure that this data is sharedfrom manufacturers to other supply and service providers. However,
the most sensitive data is of a personal nature and its widespread sharing in the name of open competition may
conflict with the right to privacy and the protection of drivers'personal data. Protecting both competition and data
at the same time can be awfully expensive, with negative impacts on consumption and available mobility. Thispaper
seeks to explain this straitjacket of three not entirely consistent requirements and to show the possibilities for
emerging legislation within itsframework. It shows that there are not only convincing arguments but also strong
lobbies behind each of the demands, which makesfinding a compromise solution even more difficult. At the end of
the analysis, a solution isproposed which, taking into account all the constraints, appears to be the least detrimental
to the preservation of allprotected rights and legitimate interests.
Keywords: In-vehicle data; connected cars; data sharing; competition; privacy; data protection.
1. Introduction
"Give car drivers control over their own data!", MEP Caroline Nagtegaal wrote in her
question to the European Commission on 3 April 2023. She was critical of the fact that the
Commission has not yet put forward sector-specific rules on access to vehicle function and
resources, pointing to the urgency of the problem. The difficulty of it lies in the need to quickly
ensure that all the actors around car manufacturers and their clients have access to the data
generated by ever smarter vehicles, without compromising the safety, security, and privacy of
those who drive them. Yet it is not easy to satisfy three groups of stakeholders who need each
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other and at the same time have completely different views on what should be done with invehicle
data. For car manufacturers, this data is an extremely valuable resource over which they
have now an almost exclusive control. They also have several reasons why they would not and
should not want to lose it. The entire automotive aftermarket, including garages, insurance
companies, roadside assistance, and leasing companies, as well as manufacturers of navigation
and traffic management apps, desperately need this data. Without it they will not break free from
their dependence on car companies, and from being left behind by competitors linked to the
automakers. Drivers, both individual and business owners of cars, and along with them consumer
and personal data organizations, warn that the massive sharing of data that smart cars collect
about themselves, their driving, and driver behaviour may put an end to the privacy, autonomy,
and security that buyers have traditionally associated with the purchase of a personal.
The problem clearly has a legal dimension (even constitutional-legal, since it involves
the protection of fundamental rights), economic, technical and, given its sensitivity, political,
since it is directly related to affordable and safe mobility for ordinary citizens on the one hand,
and at the same time to Europe's competitiveness in the global competition for technological
dominance or independence on the other. Although the question "Who will have access to invehicle
data and under what conditions?" appears at first sight to be very partial and limited in
scope, it focuses on much broader and more significant conflicts and dilemmas of our time. The
following analysis seeks to be aware of all these important overlaps and contexts of the question
at hand, but without wanting to describe and explore them all. It aims to show what hinders the
finding of an appropriate legal regime for access to in-vehicle data, to describe analytically what
legal proposals are already on the table (or are at least mentioned in the literature), and finally to
show what regulatory path could and should be followed by the EU, which is eagerly awaiting a
legislative initiative from the Commission.
The following text, divided into four parts, will first deal with the phenomenon of data
generated by car traffic. In the second part, it will be shown what accounts for the difficulty of
finding an acceptable legal regime for sharing in-vehicle data, from the perspective of three
different coexisting interests: i) to choose from competing offers, ii) to have affordable cars, iii)
to maintain a high level of privacy and data protection. The third part will discuss the European
Commission's work to date on this issue and finally the fourth part will discuss the solution that
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seems most likely to be practically achievable. The focus will be on the legal aspects of the issue
under examination, in particular the protection of fundamental rights, the protection of
competition, the protection of consumer rights and, to a lesser extent, the protection of IPR. The
main sources of data for the analysis are, on the one hand, materials published on the website of
the European Commission, which has already outlined scenarios for solutions in 2022 and has
long been in discussion with various stakeholders on the topic of in-vehicle data. It will also
include the relevant opinions of car manufacturers, independent suppliers and service providers,
data protection organisations and consumers, as well as expert comments and discussions
conducted today mainly in virtual space.
The dynamics of change and the reality of the ongoing search for a legal solution to the
problem at E U level mean that any conclusions drawn from the following analysis will be
constantly "threatened" by further future legislative developments. Nevertheless, the author is
convinced that many of the conclusions offered below have lasting validity and will represent
the necessary boundaries within which future legislative solutions will have to fit, whatever their
concrete form.
2. Connected cars' data as a legal issue
From the outset, it should be made clear that the issues raised are not the prerogative of
so-called autonomous vehicles with autopilot and the problems discussed below are therefore
not, for the most part, futuristic speculation. Connected cars are nowadays commonly produced
cars even by non-premium brands because they are also equipped with software communicating
with many sensors sensing everything possible inside and outside the car1
, usually with built-in
navigation and communication plus infotainment equipment. It is reported that even the least
connected cars today generate up to 25GB of data in an hour (Gooding, 2021). Ordinary users
are increasingly aware that their cars are "computers on wheels" and should know that they are
rather more than that, because they are technically more complex, have a longer lifetime, are
Keeping an eye on seat belts, driving in lanes, hands on the steering wheel, as well as obstacles around the vehicle, is now commonplace in
new cars, as is the traditional indication of mileage, average consumption, the condition of the tank or battery, oil and other fluids, tyre
pressure... and days until the next technical inspection. Premium cars are of course equipped above this standard. There are about 200
data points in cars today (with at least 140 viable business uses) (Plungis, 2018).
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more expensive to acquire, maintain and secure, and the risks associated with them are greater
than with a regular pc or smartphone.
Much of the data that connected cars generate is not personal and sensitive. They relate
to distance travelled, wear and tear on components, fluid condition, tyre pressure, temperature,
etc., but in the context of other data, focused on the location of the car or driver behaviour, they,
in conjunction with the VTN or registration number of the car, compose a very specific profile of
the car user.2
They are then information about how we drive, but also where we regularly go,
whether alone or with someone, who we communicate with from the car, what we listen to,
where we take petrol or charge the battery, what services we order via the communication
system, etc.3
This is why the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) warns in its Guidelines
that "most of by vehicle generated data can be considered personal data", since the natural person
is ultimately identifiable by their clever processing (EDBP, 2020, p. 3).
However, the personal nature of the data generated by connected cars (and thus their
treatment under the EU e-privacy directive 2002/58/EC and in particular the regulation 2016/679
- GDPR) and the potential threats to privacy are only one of many sides of the issue. An
immediately related conundrum is the question of whether such data constitutes private property
at all, and who is their possible owner, or whether and when it can be protected as IPR (Amrit,
2017, Mikes, 2019). This legally-theoretically and practically complicated problem does not
have a clear and satisfactory solution yet, and also the upcoming E U legislation (the Data Act
proposal being discussed by the European Parliament and the Council (Europa.eu. 2022))
addresses the regime of access right to machine-generated data and right to portability of that
data, without trying to constitute ownership rights nor IP rights (Geigerat, 2022). Indeed, the EU
legislator's aim is not to resolve the issue of ownership but - as the title of the Data Act suggests
- to ensure fair access to and use of data. This aspect of the data accumulated by smart devices,
For instance Ford US Privacy Notice categorises the data generated by the car's operation as follows Vehicle data (Information about the
vehicle, its components and parts), Driving data (driving characteristics and behavior), Vehicle location (precise location and travel
direction, information about the environment where the vehicle is operated), Audio/Visual (voice command and other assistance
devices), Media analytics (information about what is listened to in the vehicle), Vehicle analytics (information about the usage of vehicle
features, service and technology (Ford Motor Company, 2023).
In-vehicle data could carry directly personal or even potentially sensitive information such as location data, heart rat, or driver fatigue etc.
(Gazdag and Lestyan et al., 2023).
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and in the case of connected cars mainly by their manufacturers, i.e., car companies, is an even
more pressing issue.
As the economy becomes more digital, the internet of things and artificial intelligence
develop, the data becomes essential new fuel without which it is difficult to do business and
compete. The exclusive possession and use of this data may lead to market super-dominance by
entities that we already commonly refer to as gatekeepers (Smejkal, 2021), which, at least
according to the warnings of the European left, could develop into so-called techno-feudalism,
i.e., domination of more than just markets (Varoufakis, 2021). And although it is now reported
that up to 80% of industrial data collected is never used and not all in-vehicle data is held by car
manufacturers (ACEA, 2022, p. 5), it is nevertheless the car companies and their emerging ecosystems,
made up of service providers linked to them, who are poised to become gatekeepers.
The value of the in-vehicle data market is currently estimated at US$435 billion with steep
growth potential (Reuters, 2023) as the transition to electric vehicles is expected to be the key
driver behind sharply increased, and data generating, connectivity. Qualifying as major players
in this market, on which all its other participants more or less depend, is certainly tempting.
Standardised access to the information necessary for vehicle repair and maintenance is
already ensured in some respects by Regulation 2018/858/EU on the approval and market
surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate
technical units intended for such vehicles.4
However, according to complaints from the
aftermarket, this is not a regulation providing the necessary access to data that can be extracted
from today's cars and their producers do not provide open enough access to data for the rest of
the industry (CLEPA, 2023). In the submission of those who are pulling the short end of the
rope, there is an acute risk that the independent aftermarket will disappear in the automotive
sector and a closed eco-system of car manufacturers as gatekeepers dictating to everyone else
will emerge (Gill, 2022, p. 4-5). here is therefore a competition problem, because the threat of
super-dominance of gatekeepers means a significant restriction of free and undistorted
4
Regulation (EU) 2018/858 obliges, inter alia (see its Art 61), car manufacturers to provide independent repair and maintenance providers with
on-board-diagnostic information, diagnostic and other equipment, tools including the complete references, and available downloads, of
the applicable software and vehicle repair and maintenance information.
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competition and, for the EU as a whole, a possible international competitiveness problem if the
equation less competition = less innovation applies.
The big online platforms, typically the so-called GAMA quartet5
, in their capacity as
gatekeepers, already have their prohibited and mandated conduct in the E U dictated by the
current Digital Markets Act (EU Regulation 2022/1925). A general regime for the transmission
and sharing of data generated by smart devices should be established by the Data Act currently
under discussion, which, according to the Commission's published proposal, seeks to empower
users (Europa.eu. 2022). The users of connected devices will, in short, get the right to have access
to data generated by the devices and the right to ask the car manufacturers to share "their data"
with third parties, based on an B2B agreement concluded between the manufacturer and the
independent service provider. However, according to independent experts, the proposal sent to
the legislative process favours the users and the interests of car manufacturers rather than giving
broad options to third parties6
, even if the data holder is in principle obliged to share data on
FRAND terms. Contrary to the fact that consumers in their majority act emotionally rather than
rationally in relation to their data, that behavioural economics has long since revealed a consumer
status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) that implies the majority is usually staying
with a pre-set and more or less workable solution, the basic premise of the Data Act is that the
individual will be willing and able to make decisions regarding the use of the rather opaque and
difficult to value quantity of data generated by the machine or device he/she uses (Kerber, 2022).
In addition, from the perspective of the issues examined here, the Data Act is a general
horizontal regulation for the entire Internet of Things, so it will not be specific enough to fully
address the issues related to in-vehicle data. At least that is what the aftermarket thinks, and so
does the Commission, which has already presented options for a follow-up sector-specific
regulation for in-vehicle data in March 2022. While the Data Act already passed its first reading
in the EP in spring 2023, the in-vehicle legislation promised by the Commission for Q2 2023
G A M A = Google, Apple, Meta (Facebook), and Amazon are typical, but not the only gatekeepers affected by D M A regulation.
The aftermarket would essentially depend on the driver taking the initiative to ask the car manufacturers to enter into an agreement with the
selected independent service provider and then to provide (start providing) data to the car manufacturer on the basis of the agreement.
This assumes a valued initiative and some awareness on the part of the driver and then a willingness of both professionals to come to a
workable B2B agreement on FRAND terms.
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had not been presented by mid-June. Before discussing the possible shape of this sector-specific
regulation, it is necessary to outline the "straitjacket" into which it must fit.
3. Dilemmas, trilemmas, quadrature of the circle
The following dilemma emerges from the situation described above: volumes of data,
which in the case of car drivers may be of a personal nature and should therefore be adequately
protected, are to be shared with hundreds of actors across the sector to limit the market power of
potential gatekeepers, preserve the openness and fairness of the downstream sector, i.e.
competition with all the expected benefits for society and consumers. We therefore have two
fundamental, legally protected values, competition, and privacy (personal data), which should
not cannibalise each other, although their parallel provision is by no means automatically
guaranteed. "Privacy must not be diluted at the altar of competition", wrote R. Matthan in March
2021, in a note warning that the objectives of protecting fair and open competition in the
marketplace may come into conflict with the protection of clients' privacy through the handling
of their data (Matthan, 2021). He thus condensed into a single sentence the impending conflict
that had already been highlighted by some decisions of competition authorities7
and warnings
from authors dealing with the issue (Carugati, 2021; Smejkal, 2021; Stucke, 2022; Gorecka,
2023; Bejcek, 2023).
The fact that privacy and competition protection can be pitted against each other is a
reflected reality also in the automotive and in-vehicle data sector. "There is a trade-off to owning
a connected car... the manufacturer can fix bugs and add new features over time, but you also
lose some control over your vehicle," expressed an US Consumers Union representative
(Plungis, 2018). The loss of some control is due to increased connectivity, from which cannot be
separated the increased data transfer between the vehicle and the entities around it, firstly the
manufacturer and secondly all others who will access the data or with whom the data will be
shared under certain conditions. While some data will not be stored anywhere, and others may
be anonymised and will only be used to make technical improvements to a particular component
7
In the US, for example, this is a court case Linkedln Corp., 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019), where the District court ordered Linkedln to refrain
from putting in place any legal or technical measures with the effect of blocking a third party's access to public profiles. In the EU, this
includes warnings to Apple or the initiation of proceedings (both at E U level and in some Member States) when it tried to enhance
privacy of its users by limiting third-party's application access to its platform (Ikeda, 2021).
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in the car or to make traffic management more efficient in cities, however, the really profitable
services, from car maintenance planning and insurance to infotainment and all the comfort
improvements that use geolocation, driving style and driver fitness, can only benefit maximally
from data that allows individual targeting of a particular individual in a particular car.8
Although
the dashboard does not ask what the driver wants to do with the generated data every time the
key is turned, drivers instinctively know that their car is generating data and privacy concerns
are the most common reason for refusing to share it (Gooding, 2021). A solution must therefore
be found that subjectively and objectively ensures sufficient data protection and privacy (i.e.,
effectively enforcing compliance with GDPR on all those who will process in-vehicle data) so
that there would be the necessary legal titles to share data with entities outside the car
manufacturer's eco-system and free competition would be maintained.
Of course, privacy and competition protection are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
One can imagine, on the one hand, competition between manufacturers and service providers to
provide a higher standard of data protection and, on the other hand, IT and organisational
solutions that ensure data sharing with a reasonable level of data protection. However, in addition
to the question of the political-legal-technical feasibility of such an ideal, we must immediately
ask about the price that will have to be paid for combining privacy and competition. There are
techno-optimists who expect not only greater security from the use of more data from connected
cars, but also efficiency and savings from their operation, maintenance and servicing (Aggarwal,
2022). In doing so, they are thinking along the same lines as when they anticipate the benefits
expected from ever more sophisticated robotics, automation and AI deployment in industry to
enable perfect 24/7 production without inaccuracies, breaks, human failures, etc. But the "factory
analogy" can only work in the case of cars if we move to random and short-term ad hoc sharing
(which is perhaps, as some have claimed, the mobility model of the coming generations
(Bettendorf, 2017)). However, as long as we buy or rent cars for long-term use, care for them,
adapt them to our needs (not to mention the car as an accessory to personality or directly as an
object of emotional relationship), the analogy of the car to the modern factory will give way to
Thanks to connectivity, a growing range of car features are becoming a matter of subscription for the service provided, or an over-the-air
upgrade. For the car company and downstream service providers, connected cars are thus becoming a continuous source of revenue
(Wucher, 2022).
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the analogy of our relationship to our personal health and fitness, or even to our own homes.
With those assets that we personally care deeply about, our psychological price ceiling has no
limit.
The sector already has something of an automotive data management market, whose
global size was estimated at USD 2.19 billion in 2022 and is expected to hit around USD 14.29
billion by 2032 (Precedenceresearch, 2022). Even without a deeper analysis, it is clear that these
are volumes estimated based on the turnover of companies, "vehicle data hubs", which monetise
the services of processing (sorting, packaging), securing and transferring from source to
stakeholder data for further business use. CLEPA - the European Association of Automotive
Suppliers, the lobby for the aftermarket, explains in its position paper (CLEPA, 2023) the need
for this kind of services by saying that each connected vehicle today delivers a distinct set of
data points and there is no larger overlap of data points supported by many vehicles. Downstream
services then need to be oriented towards individual brands or even model ranges without
becoming cross-brand and serving the whole market. Intermediaries that provide aggregation
and adaptation of such data on a commercial basis will enable just such cross-brand servicing.
However, the proposed Data Act does not envisage regulating this born-in-practice intermediate
for the EU (Kerber, 2022, p. 125). While this may reduce the price of shared data by the profits
of intermediaries, it does not reduce the cost of the services that the use of data generated by
connected cars facilitates.
These services would therefore have to be provided by car manufacturers in the absence
of partial sectoral regulation, and for them CLEPA essentially calls for price regulation in the
form of uniform guidance on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory fees and a guarantee that,
in the case of SMEs, compensation for data will not exceed the costs directly related to making
data available (CLEPA, 2023, p. 8). ACEA - the European Automobile Manufacturers'
Association, in its policy paper on the E U Data Act (ACEA, 2022) proposal, protests against
this, arguing that such data sharing obligations will require substantial investment. Increased
costs are imminent for two reasons. According to ACEA, only a small part of the data generated
by vehicles is currently actively stored and used. If the definition of the data that will be subject
to any new regime is expanded, car manufacturers will have to invest in how they design and
build cars, or what they equip them with, to be able to store and communicate such volumes of
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data (ACEA, 2022, p. 5). Besides, there are those operational costs from collecting, storing,
protecting, managing and disseminating via electronic means data generated by cars. Such costs
may become, according to ACEA, unsustainable for individual manufactures and will severely
undermine the incentives to invest (ACEA, 2022, p. 8). In short, both the car manufacturers'
lobby and the aftermarket lobby, and ultimately the European Commission, understand the cost
of ensuring data sharing and protection at the same time could be uncomfortably high. With a
high degree of probability, it can be predicted that most of it will eventually be passed on to
those who buy and rent cars, thus impacting the easy availability of car-mobility for a significant
part of the population (let us disregard in this analysis the possibility that this is a development
welcomed by those who aspire to a car-free future).
This puts us in a situation where the dilemma becomes a trilemma. We can imagine (and
achieve) affordable data sharing at the expense of data protection and privacy. Equally, we could
more easily protect the data by limiting its sharing, because GDPR compliance by a dozen large
car companies and their eco-systems can be better controlled than spreading the data across
markets, and it will be controlled at a still affordable price. Ultimately, we can move towards a
high level of data sharing and data protection, but all indications are that it will not be cheap, and
the prices of new cars and modern mobility services may be far from the average consumer's
purchasing power. Of the triad of competition - privacy (personal data) - consumption (costs),
only 2 out of 3 are always within our reach, and the challenge becomes achieving all three goals
at once, which is what we need for a balanced functioning of not only the automotive sector but,
in fact, of society. However, nothing in the proposals and discussion to be analysed in the next
section suggests that a solution to this squaring of the circle is on the horizon.
4. Commission's initiative and responses to it
The European Commission has already launched a public consultation in March 2022 on
a proposal for sector-specific legislation that would provide an appropriate solution for in-vehicle
data sharing (European Commission, 2022). It has proposed 4 scenarios (Options 0-3) to the
interested public, varying in increasing regulatory intensity. Briefly, these are:
• Option 0: Only the Data Act applies, there is no specific sectoral act. Such a solution
represents a lesser regulatory burden but also highly likely does not ensure sufficient
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data sharing. The specific needs of aftermarket and mobility services are not taken into
account. Apart from the fact that regulation will not hinder spontaneous developments
in the sector, such a solution will have all foreseeable negative consequences.
• Option 1: Specific sectoral act mandates equal and non-discriminatory and transparent
access to data. However, the regulatory intervention is reduced to the minimum
necessary: just a public list of data generated by each car model. To this and to
downstream functions (e.g., the possibility of remotely unlocking the vehicle door for a
shared mobility service) and resources (charging / discharging of batteries) equal access
for all parties will be ensured. No new risks for safety and security will arise, new
ongoing costs and obligations for manufacturers and the public sector should still be
acceptable.
• Option 2: Beyond what Option 1 would require a standardized minimum list of data,
functions, resources to must be made available. Permanent and secure access to onboard
diagnostics and to bi-directional communication with the driver will be
provided. This will require additional measures at the level of cybersecurity and
privacy. It will therefore be a more elaborated, ready-made solution increasing
accessibility and efficient use of generated data. However, costs become higher,
administrative surveillance more complicated.
• Option 3: Beyond what is required by Options 1 and 2, it will be defined in what ways
and modes data access will be provided and how this will be controlled. These detailed
and constantly updated governance rules on access to data look like the best solution
for competition, innovation, consumer choice, privacy, and data protection. However,
the Commission acknowledges that compliance costs will be higher overall, for all car
manufacturers and third parties, public budget, legislators, enforcers.
The ratio of pros and cons of the different options is logical and clear: from a free safari
that is relatively easy to supervise and maintain (Option 0) to a costly but clear and safe zoo
(Option 3). The individual options are difficult to evaluate from an external perspective, as we
do not even know the final form and practical implications of the Data Act yet, so the
functionality of upgrades to the standard required by it can only be speculated. Moreover, the
proposals are not sufficiently specified to the extent that it is clear which data is already being
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shared and only the standards for such sharing will possibly change, and which data will be
affected by the new obligation and standard for the first time, which of the data will be purely
technical or anonymised and which will instead require a strict privacy regime.
The external observer's appreciation is not helped by the subsequent discussion of the
proposal, which is also available on the Commission's website (European Commission, 2022). It
shows that, at least in the first reactions, none of the influential lobbies stands in the middle, none
of them advocates "something between" Options 1 and 2. The car manufacturers, represented by
the aforementioned ACEA, the American Automotive Policy Council (AAPC) or the
Autonomous Vehicle Industry Associations (AVIA), would prefer the Commission to follow the
baseline scenario approach, i.e. if possible Option 0 would prevail. Conversely, virtually
everyone outside the circle of car manufacturers, be it the aforementioned CLEPA, the Council
for Motor Trades and Repairs (CECRA) or the European consumer organisation BEUC, prefers
Option 3. Individuals, often expressing themselves anonymously, would probably agree on the
slogan "my car, my data!", as they demand the fullest possible control over all data generated by
cars, i.e. no automatic transfer of data outside the car and free decision-making on whether data
is deleted, anonymised or, subject to individual informed consent, used and shared. Given what
has been written on the subject above, this is a division of positions that is to be expected and
justified by the priority interests of each of the groups concerned.
However, viewed through the prism of the described trilemma "competition - privacy
(personal data) - consumption (costs)", both extreme options (i.e., 0 and 3) are not a satisfactory
solution. Leaving in-vehicle data in the Data Act regime, i.e., option 0, overlooks the difference
in how the car market works with all its traditional and emerging aftermarket and other services,
compared to e.g., smart fridges or phones. It is hard to imagine that a robust and thriving
aftermarket could expand just by accessing all the necessary in-vehicle data on the basis of
requests from individual users of these cars, or by making do with the basic technical data already
provided today under Regulation 2018/85 8/EU on the approval and market surveillance of motor
vehicles. This is supported by empirical data on the use of Article 20 of the 2016/679 GDPR on
data portability, which is based on a similar principle. This has shown that without the addition
of the necessary "functioning infrastructure for direct data portability between multiple
providers", its potential remains untapped (Symoudis and Mager, et al., 2021). Similarly, the
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potential for competition and innovation would remain untapped if most valuable data remained
with car manufacturers.
In contrast, the overregulation that Option 3 seems to promote is not only costly but
potentially bureaucratic, and therefore usually a brake on competition and innovation (Bejcek,
2023, p. 25). Option 3 looks on paper like a solution combining high protection of competition
and privacy, but the Commission itself recognises its cost to all stakeholders and the ongoing
need to continuously update regulation to avoid slowing down innovation, which could run up
against rapidly outdated rules on what data, how categorised and processed, with what security
and under what FRAND conditions, should be made available. This already shows the
extraordinary intellectual, organisational and, ultimately, financial costs that the effective
operation of such a system would require.
This brief assessment shows that the first positions formulated in relation to the
Commission's proposal are rather negotiating positions and that both poles of opinion are aware
of and may gradually accept the necessity of a compromise that will better address the trilemma
of competition-privacy-consumption. The EU can afford to sacrifice neither fundamental rights,
which are privacy and personal data protection (Articles 7 and 8 of its Charter of Fundamental
Rights (CFREU)), nor free and undistorted competition, which is part of its priority objective of
the functioning of the internal market (Article 3(3) TEU and Protocol 27). Needless to stress that
the provisions protecting competition are among the EU's public policy norms (European Court
of Justice, 1999) and they are also directly related to safeguarding the economic rights of the
European consumer (Article 169 TFEU and Article 38 CFREU). The most that can be considered
is the intensity and priorities of the enforcement of EU instruments for the protection of privacy
(personal data) and competition and weighing them against the costs that different options for
setting their relationship will bring to the burden of stakeholders and, ultimately, consumers.
5. Probable and possible solution(s)
In view of the above, realistic expectations can only be linked to Options 1 and 2 of the
European Commission's proposal, or combinations thereof, as well as to variations on the
measures they propose.
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The starting point for the search for a solution was undoubtedly indicated by the
numerous responses to the four European Commission options, which called for a more precise
definition of the distinct categories of data involved. For example, ACEA, representing car
manufacturers, argues that only a very small portion of the in-vehicle data is of interest to service
providers as most of vehicle-generated data are primarily of a technical nature. This mainly
performance data than helps to ensure safe operation of the vehicle, exist only temporarily, are
used locally within vehicle systems, and are never stored (CarDataFacts.eu). Logically, we are
talking here about the quantity of data, not its value for further use, let alone its value in case of
monetisation. In any case, however, it is good to remember that the demanding management of
sharing would only concern a minority of the data generated by cars.
Among these further usable data are those that can be separated from the VIN and the
vehicle registration number without losing their usefulness (for urban traffic management, for
troubleshooting a given vehicle type, etc.). The challenge then remains, in particular, to define
and establish a regime for sharing and permitted use of that category of data which is of high
value for further use. Inevitably, this value depends on being able to personalise offers of goods
and services based on the personal data processed (insurance or leasing terms and conditions,
assistance services, infotainment and, of course, other supplies and services that can effectively
arise from the evolution of individual drivers' needs).
The regime for handling this potentially sensitive category of data should of course be
primarily based on the GDPR (i.e., in the case of sharing such data between data processors only
based on a legal requirement, or prior consent of the data subject). However, already defining
and separating this data from the rest is a challenge, and it is followed by another one in the form
of categorizing, processing, packaging... simply making the data suitable for further use, as most
third parties will not be able to use simple access to a part of the server (whether under the control
of a car manufacturer or a neutral trustee) and the raw data stored in it. CLEPA, representing the
aftermarket, therefore asks that sectoral regulation should ensure, inter alia, the definition of a
pre-set standardised minimum dataset; provision of a common automotive application
programming interface to ensure data flow from the sensor to the service; a governance body or
structured forum to set a framework to assign respective roles, rights, authorisations, and
liabilities... (CLEPA, 2023, p. 3).
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While the legal obligation to prepare the data in this way beforehand would be a
justification for processing it under the GDPR, such processing requires an intellectual and
financial investment. In addition to the issue of cost, and thus the cost of further provision of
such prepared data, there is also - as car manufacturers in ACEA point out - the issue of trade
secrets, of protection of original databases, of copyright, etc. The very act of sharing or
transferring large volumes of such data may, of course, raise additional issues of transferring
responsibility for its security and, consequently, liability for data breaches, loss, misuse, which
is alluded to by the requirement to define the interface for its transfer and the distribution of the
burden represented by the operation of the whole rather complicated system.
A regulation that would adjusts all that, if it wants to satisfactorily address the trilemma
described above, faces a different dilemma: between generality and detail, between under- and
over-regulation. From the problems outlined, it should be as specific as possible and the regime
for sharing the sensitive part of in-vehicle data, roles and responsibilities of all parties should be
defined and standardised as much as possible. It is beyond the scope of this analysis and its
author to determine whether this is possible without regulation hindering innovation and the
dynamic development of the sector. However, if setting up a data sharing regime is the main task
of sectoral regulation, it should try to be extremely specific on the one hand and flexible and
open to change on the other.
Under the pressure of these rather contradictory requirements, it seems most realistic to
seek some regulation not for the actual form and content of multi-sharing between car
manufacturers and amount of third parties of the aftermarket (and millions of drivers), but rather
for the data management market regime. The solution seems to be to bring independent data
aggregators and dealers into the game, i.e., data professionals, who will relieve automakers, but
more importantly the independent downstream providers of goods and services (and ultimately
individual drivers), from having each to become higher-level data professionals. Car
manufacturers will not be the main data custodians, nor will it lead to the combinations of
DigiTech companies with car manufacturers. All car-generated data would go to a neutral trustee
who would secure and distribute them in some standardized way. It would make car
manufacturers, downstream service providers and possibly even drivers, mere clients of a few
strictly licensed and regulated (even in terms of operating costs and margins) data companies
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that would ensure that the necessary level of protected data is available in usable form at an
affordable price (something along the lines of health insurance companies in the post-Bismarck
model of health insurance system (Wallace, 2013)). This is the most interesting solution
discussed in the literature (Kerber, 2022), but not yet reflected by the Commission, while it is
becoming increasingly clear that this solution could bring security, transparency, and possibly
also cheaper operation of the whole complex data sharing system.
Time will tell whether this, undoubtedly demanding solution will be implemented, and
before that happens, perhaps a series of follow-up analyses will bring it closer. In any case, the
broader context, which was only mentioned in the Introduction, but was not included in this
analysis, also works in favour of the proposed solution. Turbulent developments in all socially
sensitive markets, from finance to energy, to pharmaceuticals and health care or housing, are
leading in the E U to stricter regulation, to a higher share of the state or straight to a mixed
economy. It would be surprising and especially counterproductive if the market with the essential
oil for Industry 4.0, i.e. with data, was left with only the existing regulation preventing the abuse
of market power and the abuse of personal data. We are gradually becoming as dependent on
data as we are on the access to capital or electricity. If the EU does not want to become lagging
behind or even dependent in relation to other great powers in this respect, it cannot afford to
leave in-vehicle data without sophisticated regulation.
6. Conclusion
An attempt to polemically present what all the legislative solution to a certain ripe
problem, complicated by the clash of conflicting interests, but also not always compatible
fundamental rights and freedoms of EU law, must deal with, can hardly lead to a clear and
satisfactory conclusion.
As has perhaps been shown convincingly enough, only unsatisfactory solutions are easily
achievable. The easiest to achieve is poor data sharing and therefore poor competition in the
sector, but at least with privacy protection at the level we have so far. Alternatively, the sharing
of data can be expanded while its protection is reduced, which will become the price for more
open competition and higher efficiency in downstream supplies and services. Or - if the
authorities promoting competition and data protection are up to the task of effectively enforcing
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compliance with the regulations - we can expect better data sharing with their strict protection,
but at a significantly higher price for all involved, which will ultimately burden the buyer and
the taxpayer. Better than these solutions is the technically, economically and legally demanding
search for a form of regulation that avoids both extremes (leave unregulated vs. regulate as much
as possible) and focuses primarily on the regime of those data that are the most sensitive from
the point of view of privacy protection and at the same time the most valuable in terms of further
commercial use. A specifically regulated market should be created for in-vehicle data, at the
centre of which will be the specialized subjects of licensed and closely supervised data
companies.
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DOI: 10.24193/OJMNE.2023.43.06
ANTITHESIS AS POWERFUL LINGUISTIC TOOL OF PERSUASION IN
POLITICAL SPEECHES IN KOSOVO
Venera LLUNJI, PhD
AAB College, Kosovo
venera. llunn@universitetiaab. com
Albert PACARIZI, PhD c*
AAB College, Kosovo
albert.pacarizi@universitetiaab. com
* corresponding author
Abstract: Political speeches play a vital role in the communication strategies of political leaders, enabling them
to express their ideas, mobilize support, and persuade the public. Within this context, the effective use of
rhetorical devices assumes paramount importance in conveying messages. This paper aimed to investigate the
role of antithesis as a potent linguistic tool ofpersuasion in political speeches, specifically within the context of
Kosovo. The paper sought to examine the prevalence andpatterns of antithesis in political speeches delivered by
Kosovo politicians, analyze its rhetorical effectiveness in shaping public opinion and influencing political
discourse, explore sociopolitical and culturalfactors that influence its usage, and assess its impact on audience
perception and receptiveness to political messages. The paper employed methodologies such as corpus analysis,
rhetorical analysis, and sociopolitical analysis, to achieve its objectives. The expected contributions of this paper
lie in advancing our understanding ofpolitical rhetoric in Kosovo, highlighting the significance of antithesis as
a persuasive linguistic tool, and enriching the knowledge base in the field ofpolitical communication.
Keywords: antithesis, political speeches, persuasion, rhetoric, Kosovo, linguistic tools
1. Introduction
Whenever people speak and express their ideas, they not only want to make others listen
to them but also want to achieve the effect of their words. Undoubtedly, such an effect does not
depend only on the situation we are talking about, but also on the person who conveys such a
message to the listeners or the readers. Creativity during the expression of thoughts and ideas,
creativity in the way of the ability to interpret the other's message has its importance as well.
Therefore, everything we say is related to our ability to express it, to the style of communication,
to the choice of vocabulary when perceiving the message, in other words, our communication,
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whether written or spoken, depends on many factors. In the field of politics, communication is
the essence of an individual's presentation. There you can see apart from the intellectual and
academic development, the attitude, the courage, and the creativity to say what one thinks and is
necessary to say in front of the citizens, and in particular, this affinity is noticeable during the
electoral campaigns.
Politics is the art of the impossible, but also the art of the possible, it is the art of
negotiations and it is part of different social and political arrangements, that of democracy but
also of dictatorship. The language discourse used by politicians is the one that decides the choice
to vote most of the time. The discourse of the politician is the distinguishing emblem in
conveying the message to the voting electorate; it is the tool that convinces the other how to act.
Linguistic discourse is, therefore, the most powerful weapon during various speeches, whether
they are electoral speeches or speeches on different occasions: fundraising, negotiations, or
solutions to various disputes, be that state, national, or international occasions. Hence, this paper
aimed to explore the role of antithesis as a powerful linguistic tool of persuasion in political
speeches, focusing specifically on the context of Kosovo. By investigating the prevalence,
effectiveness, and underlying sociopolitical and cultural factors, this paper aimed to shed light
on the significance of antithesis in shaping political discourse and influencing public opinion in
Kosovo.
When Albin Kurti1
entered the political scene of Kosovo, his communication skills
through powerful rhetoric became the main component of his public persona and his political
success in addition to his demonstrated courage and skills in dealing with Kosovo's national
political issues especially during the years 1997-1999 and in the years to come.
Taking into account the importance of his public appearances as a political person, it is
seen as very important to analyze his speeches, not only the electoral ones but also his
appearances in the Assembly of Kosovo as a representative of the opposition (when the party
Levizja Vetevendosje!' was an opposition party) and as Prime Minister of the Republic of
Kosovo. His eloquence is special because it represents his communication style in every
situation. Therefore, the questions that were addressed in this article cover the following: a) the
1
Albin Kurti is the President of the biggest political party in the country, Levizja VETEVENDOSJE! (LVV), as well as the fourth and now the
sixth Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosova since the country's declaration of independence.
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frequency and distribution of antithesis in political speeches in Kosovo; b) the use of antithesis
as a contribution to the persuasive discourse in political speeches in Kosovo; c) the sociopolitical
and cultural factors that influence the deployment of antithesis in political speeches in Kosovo;
d) the extent of the use of antithesis in order to shape audience perception and influence political
discourse in Kosovo. This paper initially presents a review of the existing literature on linguistic
discourse, then we identified and analyzed antithesis as Kurti's rhetoric during his public
appearances. The examples taken from those speeches were given translated from the source
language (SL) i.e., the Albanian language, into the target language (TL), i.e., in English. The
political, economic and social, and cultural significance in the context of Kosovo was also
explained.
2. Discourse in political speeches
The nature of language is closely related to the demands that we make on it and the
functions it has to serve. In concrete terms, these functions are specific to a culture. Therefore,
one of the important features of discourse analysis is to study authentic text and conversations
in the social context. According to Halliday (1978), texts should encode both personal and social
processes.
In other words, texts should be generated, comprehended, and put into a social context,
thus, both linguistic and social analyses are important. "The particular form taken by the
grammatical system of language is closely related to the social and personal need that language
is required to serve", states (Halliday, 1978, p. 142). Discourses, as such, are interpreted as
communicative events because discourses between people convey messages beyond what is said
directly. What is important in such discourse is the social information that is transferred
allusively. Whenever people have to vote be that for one person or one party, it is most likely
that their decision on who to vote for is based on communication through language and the
influence of that language upon the decision of the voter. As Charteris-Black (2005) states
"Within all types of political system, from autocratic, through oligarchic to democratic; leaders
have relied on the spoken word to convince others of the benefits that arise from their leadership"
(Charteris-Black, 2006, p. 1). As such, political speech is considered to be a pervasive
longstanding political genre because power relationships in societies are mainly expressed
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through language and practices, which according to the theories of Michael Foucault (1972)
consist of statements that are organized regularly and systematically. Organized statements are
part of the linguistic discourse which, "integrate a whole palette of meanings' bearing in mind
that 'discourse is a broad term with different definitions" (Titscher, 2000, p. 42).
In political speeches, ideas and ideologies are conveyed through language. Words and
expressions are used to affect meanings in the way in which they are planned to affect. Political
speeches are composed by using persuasive language and the language of a speech may be of
crucial importance in winning the elections. And using rhetorical devices in a speech may be
considered the key to success.
The use of a figure of speech or any other literary device in a speech be it written or
spoken, cannot pass unnoticed as the text in point becomes stylistically marked. The stylistic
analysis of such devices aims at pointing out the effects that they achieve on the recipients and
the possible reasons why they were employed in a particular place in the text, as this can account
for the speaker's personality in terms of education and psychological traits of personality such
as intentions, emotions, and attitudes. The truth is that the effects of any stylistic device "differ
from text to text and within texts, depending on the immediate context". The beauty of orations
resides mainly in the stylistic devices used for a better illustration of ideas. Thus, in speeches
intended to influence people, rhetorical devices go hand in hand with stylistic devices.
Giambattista Vico's (1996) opinion that "to persuade is to instill in the listener conformity to the
spirit of the oration so that the listener wills the same as that which the oration proposes" (Vico,
1996, p. 5), is worth emphasizing, as in this definition Vico does not refer to the orator, but to the
oration as a text with a message only.
Political speeches are a specific sub-genre of political texts which are products of the
political discourse. The term discourse in this formulation is used according to Norman
Fairclough's (2013) critical discourse analysis integrative approach. This means that their form
and content, i.e., the linguistic structures and the message 'transmitted' by the political texts,
"are related to larger contexts of communicative settings and political functions" (Schaffner,
1996, p.202).
A political speech is generally seen as a rhetorical product created and delivered in a
political context: "Political texts are a part of and/or the result of politics, they are historically
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and culturally determined" (ibid.) Let's not forget that campaign communications are carefully
constructed with specific political objectives in mind.
Linguistic performance is considered the most important skill required for political
success. The choice of language a politician opts to use while addressing people publicly is
essential for acquiring a leader's status. The mental aspects of language production and
recognition as seen by cognitive linguistics give means to political consultants, speech writers,
and politicians to successfully manipulate the ideas and images they produce in the people's
minds. Language and discourse according to Van Dijk (2006) have "a broad range of structural
possibilities to emphasize and de-emphasize information and hence also the ideologically
controlled opinions about in-groups and out-groups" (Van Dijk, 2006). As such, discourse
structures function as "strategic means" to influence the mental attitudes and behavior of the
people.
We must first stop at the theory of argumentation which considers persuasion as an act
of communication and as a term that emphasizes both situations, i.e., persuasion and the
persuaded in order to analyze the antithesis as a form of rhetoric in political speeches. Various
authors have dealt with 'persuasion' as the goal of rhetoric. Let us emphasize that in the Albanian
language, the term 'persuasion' has the same connotation compared to the two terms used in the
English language, the term "convince" and the term "persuade". Is there a difference between
this term in the English language when talking about political rhetoric, or when literary tools are
used in political rhetoric to reach listeners and readers, and in our case, voters? It seems that
different researchers have also given different definitions. For example, Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1984, 1992) prefer the term "convince" (van Eemeren, 1984); (van Eemeren H.
a., 1992) while Walten and Krabbe (1995) consider it more appropriate to use the term
"persuade" (Walton, 1995).
In the Albanian language, both terms have the same meaning, so it does not matter if one
term or the other is used, as long as the purpose of use and the strategy of use in a political
discourse achieves its aim, that of convincing the listeners and conveying the message to them.
The persuasion through the message sent to the listener and the voter and the power that a
message transmits depends on the ability of rationality of thinking and logic not only of the
sender of the message but also of the listener: the ability to correctly understand and absorb the
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argument of what they say and the message that is conveyed. Undoubtedly, the effort to convince
the other and to change either the attitude or belief depends on the way of argumentation and the
ability to achieve the intended goal on the part of the speaker. Therefore, the approach through
which the message is given, the goal to convince the other, and the aim to achieve the goal is the
main advocate of each speaker against the target audience. It seems that if we want to convince
someone to change their approach, conviction, belief, and attitudes, then we must be able to win
the conviction and trust through objective and accurate argumentation. Argumentation should be
seen as a factor or element which affects both the logic and the emotion of the other so that it
can be converted into conviction/persuasion. The argument must be used to prove what the
sender of a message wants to reach within his audience, and in this specific 'art', everything the
politician wants to reach is the voter. That being said, every argument must aim to convince the
other. This is how a politician who speaks in front of a certain audience of voters should do with
the arguments to convince. However, this does not guarantee that the success will be undeniable
because there are many cases when the politician fails, through the speeches and arguments they
present, to offer convincing arguments at the right level which would change the attitude of the
voters and make them obey the arguments presented in a speech or a public presentation. Does
this mean that the arguments are not enough? Not necessarily, but this means that the arguments
depend on what persuasive power is presented to the listener, and in our case, to the voter.
Argumentation cannot be considered complete if a speech or public presentation is related to
only one argument. On the contrary, in every public appearance of each politician, the argument
must be a continuous connection of the arguments presented so that the voter is convinced of
what is conveyed as a message. The range of arguments must be logical, correct, and above all,
convincing. Arguments must be supported by the reasonableness of their submission. If a
politician tries to convince the voters by offering an argument or several arguments related to
certain topics and tries to convince them of the political positions offered, then the reason should
be the connected string of logical thinking and should contain the clarifications properly
presented on many levels and with eloquence. This brings us to the definition given by Simons
et al (2001) who says that persuasion is "human communication designed to influence the
autonomous judgments and actions of others" (Simons, 2001, p. 7). This means that the sender
of the message wants to influence the receiver of the message in a certain, structured, and planned
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way. The sender of the message does this by influencing the feelings, way of thinking, and
communication of the recipient of the message, that is, in this case, the voter. The way of
communication, the eloquence of conveying the message, and the appropriate and purposeful
argumentation represent an appropriate and subtle form of conveying the message to its recipient.
In political rhetoric, persuasion undoubtedly represents a main concept because it aims to
convince the audience to accept the views and positions presented by the party that wants to
achieve its goal (Walton D., 2007, p. 87). So, one might raise the question of when can a
persuasion be called successful. Only when the purpose intended by the sender of the message
is achieved; only when the recipient of the message is consciously convinced that what has been
offered to him/her is sufficiently argued to influence the beliefs, emotions, and decisions he/she
will make in a given situation. In our case, persuasion is considered successful when the message
carrier manages to influence the voter's decision as a result of ample argumentation in favor of
the given party; a theory of attitude change that posits that the persuasive power of a given
message depends on how different the position advocated in the message is from a person's
attitude. We can say that every decision that the individual takes about a certain situation, for
example, the decision of which party to vote for in the upcoming elections, depends on the
information that he/she receives and what is offered to him/her through that information. For a
voter, it is important how every word and every argument of the sender of a message related to
a certain party in the electoral campaign will affect the decision he/she will make during the vote.
In other words, people make their evaluations according to the content of the message and the
argument behind that message to decide whether the message will ultimately be acceptable or
not for them. In persuasion theories, this position is known as social judgment theory and is
attributed to American psychologists, Carolyn Wood Sherif (1922-1982), Muzafer Sherif, and
Carl I. Hovland. What level of argumentation will emerge during the transmission of messages
to the voter, depends on the argumentative power of that message. If this argumentative power
is emphasized, then the voter will resonate based on those arguments, and any doubts or
insecurities that the voter may have had beforehand, he/she will fight precisely by relying on the
strong arguments that are given. If the argumentative power is weaker, then this will cause either
uncertainty in the voters and wavering in their decision to vote, or it will make them lean towards
the opposite of what is being argued.
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In other words, when we talk about different tools that politicians use to convince their
audience about issues that they can consider as facts and arguments to win the support of voters,
we must also look at the rhetoric that they use in this regard. A politician who aims to have the
support of the majority is clear that he/she must find a way to approach the voters. So, the
argumentation of the truths that a politician tries to present to the general public is related to the
way he/she can argue it. Will the politician do this through facts that can be argued, or will the
politician be able to convince the voter that the argument which seems to be a fact, is just a skill
of the politician to present that 'argument' as a fact through means that will convince the voter in
question? So, voters in such a dilemma will either remain neutral and not vote at all, or they will
rely on weak arguments and vote for the party that gives strong arguments and makes them
believe and change their attitude by leading to a certain conviction. Such a situation makes us
see another approach to the theory of argumentation known as the New Rhetoric which was
promoted by two Belgian philosophers, Chaiim Perelman, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in 1958.
What plays the main role in such an approach is also related to the necessity of having a listening
audience if the politician is not sure (that) that audience is stable and believes the arguments that
the politician offers since the politician's goal is known: to touch the audience and influence the
audience, then convince the audience through the arguments that the politician offers as facts or
simply as arguments to promote the attitudes but also the goals in the realization of the political
platform. To achieve the political goal, every politician must build the argumentative rhetoric
knowing to whom it is directed, what is the educational, social, and economic level of that
audience; it must be clear what are the expectations of that audience; what could upset them or
what could encourage them and convince them in the arguments offered. Every politician should
know what social norms this audience supports and gives its support to a certain politician or
party. All these elements help to build the argument and/or rhetoric on which a politician will
try to convince the audience to support and vote in his/her favor or in favor of the political party
that is represented at a given time and situation certain. Let us agree with Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) definitions of the new rhetoric "as the study of the discursive
techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for
its assent" and 'audience' as "the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by
his argumentation" (al, 2014, p. 262-263). So, every approach and behavior of a politician to
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achieve his goal towards the audience is related to the politician's ability to reach the specific
audience and convey the message to the specific audience. The arguments that the politician used
in conveying the message and trying to convince the audience are also given very well by two
other theorists, Baker and Huntington, (1905, p.7), who are cited in "Handbook of
Argumentation Theory" (2014). They state that both conviction and persuasion are important in
the view of argumentation: "Conviction aims only to produce an agreement between writer and
reader," they say, while "persuasion aims to prepare the way for the process of conviction or to
produce action as a result of conviction" (al, 2014, p. 428).
In this respect, antithesis is a powerful persuasive tool in the political discourse because,
in speeches, language is an important device by which conveyance can be made. Therefore, in
political speeches, the speakers are often very careful in using language because they aim to
achieve the required power in them. To characterize a phenomenon from a specific point of view,
it may be necessary not to find points of resemblance or association between them and some
other phenomena, but to find points of sharp contrast, that is, to set one against the other.
As Jones (1994) puts it, [a]t the micro level we use a variety of techniques to get our way:
persuasion, rational argument, irrational strategies, threats, entreaties, bribes, manipulation anything
we think will work. (Jones, 1994, p. 5)
That is the reason why stylistic opposition, which is given a special name, the term
'antithesis' has long been a favorite device of accomplished speakers. Antithesis means opposite
and is used as a literary device to put two contrasting ideas together. It emphasizes the difference
between the two ideas and the effect of the contrast between the two ideas because it is built on
that contrast of concepts that can be compared but which are not a common discourse in an
ordinary speech. The message or focus is usually on the second idea.
3. Approach to the article
The approach in this article focused on the analysis of antithesis in the linguistic discourse
of political speeches of Kosovo Prime Minister, Albin Kurti. The excerpts of speeches were
taken from portals and social networks, and the party's official website "Levizja
Vetevendosjel'VSelf-determination Movement!". To achieve the research objectives and answer
the research question(s), the following methodology was employed: a) Corpus Analysis: A
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comprehensive corpus of political speeches delivered by Kosovo politicians, i.e., by Prime
Minister Albin Kurti was compiled and analyzed to identify instances of antithesis, b) Rhetorical
Analysis: The identified instances of antithesis underwent a meticulous rhetorical analysis to
examine their persuasive impact and effectiveness in shaping political discourse, c)
Sociopolitical Analysis: A short introduction was given to present the sociopolitical factors that
influence the usage of antithesis in political speeches in Kosovo. Excerpts have been identified,
described, and translated from the Albanian language as the source language (SL) into English
as the target language (TL) to understand their meaning.
In other words, taking into consideration the fact that corpus analysis and rhetorical
analysis can be considered as complementary methodologies that are employed in a language,
we may say that even for this paper the two although being distinct play that complementary
role, especially in the context of political speeches. Antithesis is used as a literary device in
political speeches, therefore authors, i.e., researchers through such analysis gain an
understanding of different corpus to identify such patterns and the frequency of those patterns
used. In the case of antithesis in political speeches, researchers may compile a corpus that
comprises speeches from politicians to identify either common features or differences and
variations in the use of antithesis as a political speech structure. This has to do with the
quantitative perspective of analyzing the corpora. However, this paper uses a qualitative
perspective and through its rhetorical analysis, it explores the nuances of how antithesis functions
rhetorically in trying at the same time to persuade its audience and engage it into accepting the
rhetoric and messages sent to them. In other words, rhetorical analysis tries to analyze the
strategies used by its speakers to persuade its audience until it achieves its goals. In this sense, it
consists of ideas, memorable phrases, and the construction of such phrases so that they resonate
with the audience. It emphasizes linguistic features, contextual nuances, and the rhetorical
significance of antithesis. This qualitative analysis involved as such an analysis of individual
instances of antithesis within the selected speeches of the Prime Minister of Kosovo. The purpose
of his usage of antithesis in his speeches is to contrast, to give a memorable phrase, and to evoke
the emotional response, at the same time. It includes the approach toward the broader context of
his speeches, while including the political climate, voters' expectations, and specific events and
issues addressed. Having qualitatively analyzed the antithesis within the corpus, the authors in
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this work endeavored to examine and describe the intricacies and peculiarities of its usage,
providing a nuanced understanding of how this literary figure operates in the realm of political
discourse. This qualitative approach adds depth to the overall academic inquiry, offering
valuable insights into the rhetorical strategies employed by political speakers and the
communicative power of antithesis in shaping public opinion. Hence, the basis of this paper is
comprised of phrases and sentences that can be considered sufficient examples of the usage of
antithesis as a rhetorical device mentioned above. Speeches that were addressed to the general
public and the language that was carefully organized served specific communicative and political
purposes. In political speeches such rhetorical devices are carefully chosen and constructed being
that such language is artificial and highly figurative designed with premeditated intent.
4. The social, economic, political, and linguistic situation
Kosovo is a new state in the community of states, but it is an ancient country in the
Balkans. In 1999, it faced its last fight to preserve its existence and that of its people. Over 1
million people became refugees. Helped by NATO and other allies, the war stopped, and the
displaced population returned to find great destruction of houses and properties but to resume
life in a country freed from the chauvinism and repression of Serbia.
In 2008, Kosovo was declared an independent state. Another phase of social and political
circumstances and a great challenge for economic development began. The country was
devastated for years even before the war of 1999; there was no economy and no industry.
Education was at a low level; the infrastructure was weak for a country that is considered to be
in the heart of Europe. Kosovo has a great wealth of underground minerals, it is rich in coal, and
it has natural wealth, but all of these were exploited, damaged, and destroyed for decades by
Serbia. The help of powerful international organizations and institutions helped to start the
reconstruction of the country in all spheres. Kosovo today has about 10,000 square kilometers
and about 1.8 million inhabitants. 93% are Albanian and the rest are other ethnic communities:
Serbs, Turks, Bosnians, etc.
Kosovo is a secular state and its political organization is that of parliamentary
government. It has its Government, Assembly, and President. It has its own Constitution and all
other legislative units.
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The democratic development of the state based on pluralism has created political parties.
The election of the representatives of the Government and the Parliament, the election of the
President, the Speaker of Parliament, and deputies in the Parliament of Kosovo, also shows
political pluralism.
Today, Kosovo as a state coexists with its minorities, such as Serbs, Turks, Bosnians, the
community called RAE, which includes Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians; as well as a group of
other minorities, such as Croats and Montenegrins. In Kosovo, the majority of the population
speaks the Albanian language since 90% of Kosovo consists of Albanians. According to the Law
on the Use of Languages, which was approved in 2006 and confirmed in the Assembly of Kosovo
in 2008, the Albanian language and the Serbian language are the official languages in Kosovo.
According to the Law on the Use of Languages, all public institutions are obliged to publish all
documents in both languages, while the presence of a professional translator is necessary in all
events. It should be emphasized that the language in Kosovo is not only a common means of
communication, but it is also a powerful means of identifying the ethnic, historical, and cultural
identity of each of its members. Hence, Kosovo's linguistic landscape is a dynamic tapestry that
reflects the region's rich historical complexity and diversity. Language(s) plays a crucial role in
the larger conversations about identity, inclusion, and the sociopolitical structure of Kosovo
because it not only reflects the coexistence of various communities but also the ongoing social
and political complexities. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of linguistic diversity
in comprehending political discourse in Kosovo since language acts as a complex lens through
which political narratives are expressed and understood. Since Albanian and Serbian are
recognized as official languages, the region's linguistic diversity is representative of its intricate
historical and cultural context. To convey ideas that connect with a variety of communities and
highlight the value of inclusive governance, political leaders must navigate this linguistic
diversity. The choice of language in political discourse reflects historical narratives, identity
politics, and power dynamics, influencing how political messages are received across different
linguistic groups. In a region with a history marked by ethnic tensions, linguistic diversity shapes
the nuances of political debates, negotiations, and policy discussions, impacting the effectiveness
of communication and the building of consensus. Therefore, understanding the intricacies of
linguistic diversity is an integral part of deciphering the layers of meaning embedded in political
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discourse and fostering a more inclusive and nuanced understanding of the political landscape
in Kosovo.
Serb political leaders frequently emphasize their points of view and deliver nuanced
messages by using figurative language, particularly when discussing Kosovo. By employing
metaphorical language, these characters can shape the story to suit their political viewpoint by
using symbolic expressions that connect with historical or cultural imagery. For instance,
metaphors pertaining to territorial integrity, sovereignty, or historical ties may be used in
discussions regarding Kosovo's status, effectively framing the discourse to appeal to the
audience's emotions and beliefs. Moreover, rhetorical strategies like hyperbole and analogy are
quite often employed to highlight the significance of particular political viewpoints or to make
comparisons with past occurrences. Serb politicians use figurative speech to convey complex
political viewpoints to audiences both at home and abroad. It adds layers of meaning to their
speeches by interacting with the cultural and historical background of their discourse.
Amid the complex landscape of Serbian political rhetoric, the incorporation of antithesis
is considered supreme as a powerful tool that enriches and highlights the discourse, especially
in the multilingual setting of Kosovo. In the intricate landscape of Kosovo's historical and
political complexities, Serbian leaders skillfully utilize antithesis as a powerful linguistic device.
By deftly juxtaposing contrasting ideas, they shed light on the intricate nature of their positions.
This technique serves as a powerful tool for emphasizing Serbia's perspective on issues such as
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and historical ties, setting it in stark contrast to opposing views.
This tactic takes on even greater significance in the bilingual setting of Kosovo, where both
Serbian and Albanian languages hold equal importance.
To effectively communicate with a bilingual audience, it is crucial to carefully navigate
linguistic nuances. By utilizing antithesis, political leaders can bridge cultural and linguistic
gaps, making for a powerful discourse. This rhetorical tool, when executed skillfully, allows for
a nuanced approach that acknowledges the linguistic diversity of the region while confidently
stating important stances on crucial issues.
Today, in Kosovo as a state with full democracy, political speeches are essential for
forming public opinion and influencing legislative choices. These speeches, which are an
effective communication tool, give political leaders the chance to directly address the public with
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their vision, principles, and policy goals. Politicians in Kosovo influence public opinion and
generate support by strategically framing important issues and using persuasive language and
rhetorical methods. Effective political speeches and their influence go beyond simple eloquence.
They tend to provide a link between public authorities and the general public, facilitating
democratic participation, accountability, and transparency. This highlights the speeches' critical
role in the dynamic relationship between public opinion, governance, and the policy-making
process. Speeches have been an important tool in Kosovo's turbulent history, helping to express
the people's hopes, complaints, and resiliency at pivotal points. Passionate speech has been used,
especially in times of conflict and political unrest, to mobilize communities, garner support, and
define the Kosovar people's collective identity. Moments of national importance, peace talks,
and declarations of independence have all been commemorated with historic speeches. These
speeches influenced the course of the country's history while also reflecting the hardships and
victories of the Kosovo people. Speaking at pivotal moments, leaders' eloquence and conviction
have sparked public sentiment and symbolized the tenacity and resolve of a people attempting
to exercise their right to self-determination while navigating difficult geopolitical challenges.
Saying this, the presence of linguistic diversity adds a compelling layer of complexity to
the use of antithesis in political communication, particularly in regions with bilingualism, as seen
in Kosovo. This coexistence of multiple languages presents both a challenge and an opportunity
for political leaders utilizing antithesis in their speeches. Beyond the intricacies of creating
effective rhetorical devices, the bilingual context requires skillful maneuvering of linguistic
nuances, cultural connotations, and historical resonances associated with each language. When
incorporating antithesis in a bilingual setting, one must carefully consider how contrasting ideas
and expressions may translate or resonate differently within various linguistic communities. The
broader impact of bilingualism on figurative language in political discourse is significant. To
effectively communicate with a diverse audience, it is crucial for political figures to carefully
tailor their language to be culturally relevant and resonant. This includes recognizing the
potential for bilingual individuals to interpret metaphors and opposing ideas differently. By
skillfully navigating this complexity, political actors can foster a more inclusive and impactful
form of communication. Harnessing the power of figurative language across diverse linguistic
backgrounds creates a more cohesive and effective dialogue especially in the Kosovo context.
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5. Antithesis in discourse
As Foucault argues "Discourse is a system of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, and
courses of action, beliefs, and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds
of which they speak" (Foucault, 1969, p. 45); as such antithesis, as a linguistic tool in political
discourse, can be a powerful tool for sending and receiving the message. Campaigns for
parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as municipal elections, are often an incentive
for linguists who deal with the analysis of the political discourse of political representatives
everywhere including Kosovo, as is the case in this article. It is known that politicians use
rhetoric and different linguistic and stylistic figures to reach their voters and what is heard the
most are metaphors, comparisons, synonyms, and others. But antitheses are not often heard in
speeches and public presentations as an interesting and quite powerful tool in the discourse of
any politician. The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, uses the antithesis in his speeches.
If we start with the person deixis that Levinsons (1983) emphasizes, too, as a process of
encoding role in a person's speech /Levinson,1983:62/, Kurti uses "we" and combines it with
the antithesis in his speeches.
"We shouldn't seek out what is possible, but we_ should and will make possible what we
seek out "(Kurti,2017, https://www.facebook.com/DMalbinin/posts/267652548205826/)
The wording "shouldn't seek out we should ... .seek out" is intended to specify that
it is the right of the citizens of a country to demand what they deserve according to the natural
law of human rights.
"We don't collaborate with others to bring misery to our people and luxury to the ones
in power"(Kurti,2017, https://www.periskopi.com/fialimi-plote-albin-kurtit-ne-tubimin-e-
sotem/)
In addition to the emphasis on the pronoun "we" that Kurti makes in his speeches to
identify the group of those who are the main participants of a society, i.e., the people, he also
does this to emphasize that in his attitudes, all are included, both for better and for worse; he also
includes those who have created negative situations in society, such as corruption and crime. To
emphasize the inclusion of all, he does not divide "us" and "them" but emphasizes the group
which together with him will affect the expected change. He emphasizes the attempt to fight the
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rulers of the previous governments, who had enriched themselves at the expense of the state
budget, which is still a poor one. This is what Van Dijk points out as ideological polarization
/van Dijk, 1997:28/ when a positive or negative evaluation is given to the parties involved. And,
in addition to the use of the pronoun "we", the utterance also shows the use of the antithesis
through the word "misery" against the word "luxury". Kurti tries to divide the economically poor
people from the members of the government who extorted the state budget for personal interests,
which was a prominent phenomenon before he became prime minister. The use of the antithesis,
in this case, promotes the image among the people that they are a group separated from the
usurpers of the state; they are the impoverished side against the abusers of the state budget who
live in luxury.
"The government in power has divided the common people but has united the corrupt
and the criminals "(Kurti, 2017,https://telegrafi.com/kurti-pushteti-ne-kosove-ka-percare-
popullin-kurse-ka-bashkuar-te-korruptuarit-e-kriminelet/)
"In general, even the middle class has more chances to become poorer rather than
richer "(Kurti, 2017, https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-laime/704478/kurti-ia-pse-do-te-fitoi-
vetevendosje/).
"The poor are poor because of a few who use their power to poor others and enrich
themselves " (Kurti,2017. https://www. botasot. info/aktuale-laime/704478/kurti-ia-pse-do-tefitoi
-vetevendosief).
"Someone is entitled to survive but someone else is entitled to luxury. Someone doesn't
have the basic things, but someone makes personal dreams come true".
(Kurti, 2017, https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-laime/704478/kurti-ia-pse-do-te-fitoi-
vetevendosje/).
The fight against crime and corruption, as a problem of the new state, makes Kurti always
distinguish between the people and the corrupt government; his speeches would focus on fighting
corruption because it is crime and corruption that have divided the people; and he uses the
antithesis in this part of his speech.
"In post-war Kosovo, our people have never had it more difficult in terms of socioeconomics
and never had it easier to make the desired change "(Kurti, 2017,
https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-laime/704478/kurti-ia-pse-do-te-fitoi-vetevendosie/).
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"We cannot successfully fight corruption and crime in society if we do not make the
institutions clean of it" (Kurti,2023, https://www.vetevendosie.org/mbledhia-li-e-keshillit-tepergi
ithshem-te-lv-se/").
Undoubtedly, the best strategy for drawing attention to the opinion to which the sender
of the message is addressed is to emphasize as much as possible the meaning required for the
recipient of the message, to reinforce that thought of the recipient of the message because the
mental and memory model of opinion is created in a way that makes the process of persuasion
easier in the future. The audience, in this case, the people who will vote, will know what the
message is about.
The use of different stylistic figures by politicians, according to Allen (1998), means to
appeal to the audience. Such an approach influences the audience to develop the culture of
receiving the message as an indivisible whole because it creates the feeling of being one and
indivisible. Kurti always tries to convey this message to the audience in his speeches. He talks
about love for the people and encourages the feeling of being united and equal, for a greater
purpose.
"People will love you if you love them back; People will never abandon you unless you
abandon them first "(Kurti,2017, https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-laime/704478/kurti-ia-psedo-te-fitoi
-vetevendosief).
The inclusion of the people as one body, to create a strong bond in the minds of the voters,
can be seen in many parts of Kurti's speeches. He does not want to be perceptive of the voter's
message without emphasizing the importance that voters have in the entire process of seeking
changes. Emphasizing the long period of misconduct of governance by previous governments,
Kurti, through his strategy, convinces the voter that change can only be made through the voter.
The voter can understand the real situation only when included directly in the whole
picture where everyone has a place. "18 months is not too long but 18 years are not too
short "(Kurti, 2017, https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-laime/704478/kurti-ia-pse-do-te-fitoi-
vetevendosie/).
A. Beard (2000) believes that one of the most efficient strategies related to persuasion is
the use of the so-called "list of three" (Beard,2000:38). Apparently, the repetition of certain
words, e.g., nouns, prepositions, and verbs strengthen the effect of the message that the speaker
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wants to give to the listener; in politics, it is the message given by the politician to the voter.
Kurti, too, uses "the list of three" to strengthen the effect of his message.
"Ifyou believe you've reached the ultimate truth, you've reached the end of the road, the
end of the effort, the end of history (Kurti, 2023, https://www.vetevendosie.org/mbledhia-li-e-
keshillit-te-pergiithshem-te-lv-se/).
"This requires strategy and tactics, flexibility and stability, persistence, and creativity "
(Kurti,2023, https://www.vetevendosie.org/mbledhia-li-e-keshillit-te-pergiithshem-te-lv-se/).
"The League of Prizren is a historical event, not in the sense of an already closed stage
of the past, but in the sense of an era that extends to the present, where we are a part of it and
which guides us for the future "
(Kurti, 2023, https://www.kultplus.com/laime/fialimi-i-albin-kurtit-ne-144-vietorin-e-lidhies-
shqiptare-te-prizrenit/).
In the case of Kurti, we do not only see the "list of three" but the repetition of words that
involve antithesis as a strong persuasive tool. It is considered as very creative by the listeners
because it reflects the power of the word, the conviction, and the determination to achieve the
goal, and gives the listener the feeling of being the most important part of the whole process of
change. He uses words such as "pro" and "against" to emphasize the idea behind the antithesis
used.
"Movement: Pro development, Against corruption; Pro equality Againstprivileges: Pro
domestic products, Against poverty; Pro employment, Against migration; Pro justice Against
crime; Pro unification of Albanians, Against Serbia's aggression; Pro minorities, Against
discrimination; Pro solidarity. Against division; Pro peace. Against war".
(Kurti, 2017, https://www.botasot.info/aktuale-laime/704478/kurti-ia-pse-do-te-fitoi-
vetevendosje/)
The use of antithesis or as it is also known as 'contrastive pairs' gives a special emphasis,
and a specific tempo, and shows the attitude of its speaker to the recipient of the message.
"Organized inactivity leads to bureaucracy. Disorganized activity leads to chaos "
(Kurti, 2023, https://www.periskopi.com/kurti-sot-prezantoi-platformen-si-kandidat-per-
kryetar-te-w-se-ia-fialimi-i-plote-i-tii/).
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The repetition of certain words and expressions is intended to strengthen the message
given because the way of conveying the message contains the most successful means of
attracting the listener's attention, understanding the power of the word, and acting according to
those words and expressions. They are expressions that connect with the listener and support the
audience because they are catchy, powerful, and always simple to remember.
"Pride without humbleness turns into arrogance. Humbleness without pride turns into
submission "
(Kurti, 2023, https://www.periskopi.com/kurti-sot-prezantoi-platformen-si-kandidat-per-
kryetar-te-w-se-ia-fialimi-i-plote-itii/?
cf chl rt tk=iOh9bJiPieK56TYx4Ft73npp7n6CsFJglbMUAza89iY-1687017748-0-
gaNvcGzNDBA)
"The issue that keeps such an activist is exactly this, how to influence history as apeople,
to be aparticipating people in it and not a spectator. This requires strategy and tactics, flexibility
and stability, persistence, and creativity. Not hardening and stubbornness, but also not letting
go or opportunism"
(Kurti,2023, https://www.vetevendosie.org/mbledhia-li-e-keshillit-te-pergiithshem-te-lv-se/).
"No success is achieved without difficulty, but if we liked comfort, we would not be
activists. We are comfortable with discomfort. We are concerned and worried, but we aren 't
concerned about why we are concerned, and we don't even worry about why we worry "
(Kurti, 2023, https://www.vetevendosie.org/mbledhia-li-e-keshillit-te-pergiithshem-te-lv-se/).
Kurti also used the antithesis to emphasize the human values of a global citizenry while
describing the country he leads from 2019 as its Prime Minister.
"Today I am speaking to you as the Prime Minister ofa sovereign and independent state,
small but important, poor but full ofhope, young but ancient at the same time, which has several
times defended common European values"(Kurti, 2023,
https://www.arbresh.info/laimet/fialimi-i-albin-kurtit-ne-parlamentin-evropian/).
The antitheses in Kurti's speeches are a powerful linguistic tool to present the determined
positions of his government in preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.
"Kosovo is not an issue in the dialogue, but a party to the dialogue ".
(Kurti, 2023\_ https://www.arbresh.info/laimet/fialimi-i-albin-kurtit-ne-parlamentin-evropian/)
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"Between Kosovo and Serbia, there is more of an armistice than peace. According to
Kant, a true peace solution is not possible without canceling the existing causes of future
war"(Kurti,2023, https://wvvw.kosova-sot.info/laime/654200/kurti-ne-23-vi etet-e-fundit-me-
serbine-me-shume-kemi-pase-armepushim-sesa-paqe-e-vertete/).
All these different lexical units, words, and expressions as part of Kurti's discourse are
used by him to convince the audience of their truthfulness and correctness, their importance, and
the power they are supposed to carry as an effective tool of persuasion and to strengthen the
sense of their true meaning.
6. Conclusions
In conclusion, this article emphasized the importance of studying the role of antithesis as
a potent linguistic tool of persuasion in political speeches in Kosovo. By delving into its
prevalence, effectiveness, and socio-cultural dynamics, this study aims to advance our
understanding of political rhetoric and communication within the specific context of Kosovo.
Through an examination of antithesis, this article seeks to shed light on the persuasive strategies
employed by Kosovo politicians and their impact on public opinion.
The research objectives focused on analyzing the prevalence and patterns of antithesis in
political speeches, assessing its rhetorical effectiveness, exploring the sociopolitical and cultural
factors that shape its usage, and evaluating its influence on audience perception. By employing
the methodologies such as corpus analysis and rhetorical analysis, and audience perception
studies, this article aims to provide comprehensive insights into the role of antithesis in political
discourse.
The anticipated contributions of this article lie in enriching the knowledge base on political
rhetoric in Kosovo, highlighting the significance of antithesis as a persuasive linguistic tool, and
deepening our understanding of the interplay between language, persuasion, and politics. The
findings of this article can serve as a valuable resource for political leaders, communication
practitioners, and researchers interested in political communication and discourse analysis.
By exploring the unique context of Kosovo, this article also adds to the broader
scholarship on political rhetoric by providing a comparative perspective and enhancing the
diversity of perspectives in the field.
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In summary, this article underscores the importance of investigating the role of antithesis
in political speeches in Kosovo, aiming to contribute to our understanding of political rhetoric
and communication within this specific context. By examining the prevalence, effectiveness, and
socio-cultural dynamics of antithesis, it seeks to advance knowledge in the field and provide
practical implications for political communication and discourse strategies in Kosovo and
beyond.
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