D 2022

Could CBDC be a threat to Monetary Policy?

PIRGMANN, Michael

Základní údaje

Originální název

Could CBDC be a threat to Monetary Policy?

Název česky

Could CBDC be a threat to Monetary Policy?

Autoři

PIRGMANN, Michael

Vydání

Praha, Konference doktorandů na Vysoké škole finanční a správní 2022: prezentace výsledků společenskovědního výzkumu s ekonomickými a finančními efekty (9. ročník) = Doctoral Students Conference at the University of Finance and Administration 2022: presentation of the results of social science research with economic and financial effects (9th annual conference), od s. 84-95, 12 s. 2022

Nakladatel

Vysoká škola finanční a správní

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Stať ve sborníku

Stát vydavatele

Česká republika

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

tištěná verze "print"

Odkazy

Organizace

Vysoká škola finanční a správní, a.s. – Repozitář

ISBN

978-80-7408-250-4

Klíčová slova česky

Monetary Policy; Effective Lower Bound; Cryptocurrencies; CBDC

Klíčová slova anglicky

Monetary Policy; Effective Lower Bound; Cryptocurrencies; CBDC
Změněno: 8. 3. 2023 03:55, RNDr. Patrik Mottl, Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

Central Banks are generally exposed to the Effective Lower Bound (ELB) problem when conduction Monetary Policy (MP). It is not possible for a central bank (CB) to perform MP with negative interest rates over a significant period because market participants would convert their deposits into cash if costs for conversion, storage and insurance would be lower than costs for their remunerated deposits. With many CB contemplating Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), this paper discusses the effects for MP under the restriction of the ELB. Under the assumption that the CB will implement a non-remunerated tier for CBDC to provide market participants with a cash like means of payment, it can be assumed that the ELB will increase from currently approximately -1% with only cash in existence, closer to zero when implementing CBDC. This is due to the lower costs of exchange, holdings and insurance when shifting deposits into a non-renumerated tier of CBDC instead of converting into cash in times of negative interest rates. Implementation of a tier of non-remunerated CBDC creates a significant “extra buffer” for market participants with a large destabilizing effect for MP which a CB needs to consider when performing MP at the ELB.

Česky

Central Banks are generally exposed to the Effective Lower Bound (ELB) problem when conduction Monetary Policy (MP). It is not possible for a central bank (CB) to perform MP with negative interest rates over a significant period because market participants would convert their deposits into cash if costs for conversion, storage and insurance would be lower than costs for their remunerated deposits. With many CB contemplating Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), this paper discusses the effects for MP under the restriction of the ELB. Under the assumption that the CB will implement a non-remunerated tier for CBDC to provide market participants with a cash like means of payment, it can be assumed that the ELB will increase from currently approximately -1% with only cash in existence, closer to zero when implementing CBDC. This is due to the lower costs of exchange, holdings and insurance when shifting deposits into a non-renumerated tier of CBDC instead of converting into cash in times of negative interest rates. Implementation of a tier of non-remunerated CBDC creates a significant “extra buffer” for market participants with a large destabilizing effect for MP which a CB needs to consider when performing MP at the ELB.

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