D
2022
On the Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Cooperative Fuzzy Game
BARTL, David
Basic information
Original name
On the Non-Emptiness of the Core of a Cooperative Fuzzy Game
Edition
Budapest, VOCAL 2022. 9th VOCAL Optimization Conference: Advanced Algorithms. Budapest, Hungary, May 25-27, 2022. Short Papers, p. 11-16, 6 pp. 2022
Publisher
Hungarian Operations Research Society
Other information
Type of outcome
Proceedings paper
Country of publisher
Hungary
Confidentiality degree
is not subject to a state or trade secret
Publication form
electronic version available online
Marked to be transferred to RIV
Yes
RIV identification code
RIV/47813059:19520/22:A0000283
Organization
Obchodně podnikatelská fakulta v Karviné – Slezská univerzita v Opavě – Repository
Keywords in English
Cooperative fuzzy TU-game; Core; Balanced game; Bondareva-Shapley theorem
Links
GA21-03085S, research and development project.
In the original language
We introduce the concept of a fuzzy coalition structure on a finite set of players. Then, we propose a new model of a cooperative fuzzy game with transferable utility: an existing coalition is assumed to endeavour in a branch of industry, and a deviation of a new coalition from the coalition structure is seen as an opportunity of the coalition. Based on these premisses, we introduce the concept of the core of the cooperative fuzzy TU-game with respect to a general fuzzy coalition structure. Finally, we define the concept of balancedness and formulate a generalization of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem.
Displayed: 2/5/2026 17:51