The global financial crisis that started in 2007 represented a striking example of under-estimating risks of systemic nature. Both the academic research and the financial market regulation had overly focused on individual institutions’ risks in pre-crisis years. However, they had underestimated the risks across individual markets and financial institutions as well as their potential impact on asset prices. Moreover, risks were underestimated in terms of the macro-economically and financially stable economic environment, i.e. low-volatility and prosperous economic environment. This had resulted in strong risk appetite, and low risk aversion leading to overly low risk premiums, consequently causing optimistic expectations with regard to the future development of returns and general economic performance. Both international and national authorities responded to global financial crisis by plethora of regulatory changes. Systemic risk was acknowledged and macroprudential policies were instituted. Although the regulatory and economic/political response to the crisis mitigated number of problems, it likely failed to address fully the sources of systemic risk. First, it is because the regulatory overhaul focused primarily on the banking sectors opening thus avenues for systemic risk in other sectors. Second, some new sources of systemic risks emerged often associated with accommodative monetary policies of central banks.